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Abstract 
Since 2016, when the term first entered South Africa’s political-economic discourse, the colloquial 
use of the concept “State Capture” has come to be a representative descriptor of a state besieged by 
corruption. In 2017, a collective of academics formed the State Capacity Research Project (SCRP) 
and released the Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is Being Stolen report (Bhorat, 
Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, Mondi, Peter, Qobo & Swilling, 2017), which was one of the first 
attempts to provide an academic framework for understanding this phenomenon. Drawing on 
neopatrimonial school of thought, the report argued, as do I, that State Capture extends beyond 
being a mere form of “grand corruption”. Building on this framework, this thesis critically examines 
the theories of state capture and neopatrimonialism, and puts forward a conceptualisation of State 
Capture as a context-specific phenomenon, encompassing a much broader political project 
undertaken by the power elite, which results in a unique form of (mis)governance.  
In July 2018, a follow-up case study was released, titled How One Word Can Change the Game: 
Case Study of State Capture and the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) (Foley & 
Swilling, 2018), which was produced from the research undertaken for this thesis. The case study 
presented in this thesis centres around what is commonly referred to as SASSA-Gate, where in 
March 2017 a potential national crisis was narrowly averted when the Constitutional Court was 
forced to extend an already unlawful and invalid contract to ensure the continuation of payment of 
social grants to some 17 million beneficiaries. The foundation of the crisis is linked to the original 
invalid contract, which was entered into between SASSA and Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) in 
2012, and which has been surrounded in controversy and allegations of corruption ever since.  
At the centre of the SASSA-Gate crisis (and the main motivation for the awarding of the invalid 
contract) is the proprietary biometric card technology of CPS. From the research, it emerged that 
there are potential insights which might be gained by applying the conceptualisation of State 
Capture to the ever-increasing uncertainties associated with future developmental disruptions, such 
as those associated with the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR). 
The research was undertaken as both a descriptive and an exploratory qualitative case study and is 
presented in a dense narrative format. Granular research methodology was adopted, where various 
data sources were combined and analysed from multiple perspectives and at different levels, and as 
such the findings of the research cannot be easily summarised. The principal outcome of the 
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research is the case study itself. The overall objectives of the research were primarily to provide a 
detailed account of the SASSA-Gate crisis and to further develop the theoretical framework for 
understanding the phenomenon of State Capture and how this relates to the concept of systemic 
neopatrimonialism. Ultimately, this research seeks to add further understanding of the current 
discourse on State Capture in South Africa and to provide a much needed, detailed account of how 
the shadow state operates and manoeuvres alongside and within formal government structures. 
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Opsomming 
 
Sedert 2016, toe die term die eerste keer in Suid-Afrika se polities-ekonomiese diskoers gebruik is, 
het die informele gebruik van die konsep “Staatskaping” ’n verteenwoordigende beskrywer van ’n 
staat in die greep van korrupsie geword. In 2017 het ’n groep akademici die State Capacity 
Research Project (SCRP) gestig en die Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is Being Stolen-
verslag (Bhorat et al., 2017) uitgereik, wat een van die eerste pogings was om ’n akademiese 
raamwerk te voorsien om hierdie verskynsel te verstaan. Gegrond op die neopatrimoniale 
denkskool, redeneer hierdie verslag, en ek ook, dat “Staatskaping” meer is as bloot ’n vorm van 
“grootskaalse korrupsie”. Gegrond op hierdie raamwerk, ondersoek hierdie tesis krities die teorieë 
van staatskaping en neopatrimonialisme, en doen aan die hand ’n konseptualisering van 
Staatskaping as ’n konteks-spesifieke verskynsel, wat ’n baie breër politiese projek omvat wat deur 
die mags-elite onderneem word, wat lei tot ’n unieke vorm van (wan)regering.  
 
In Julie 2018 is ’n opvolg-gevallestudie uitgereik, getitel How One Word Can Change the Game: 
Case Study of State Capture and the South African Social Security Agency (Foley & Swilling, 
2018), wat ontwikkel is vanuit die navorsing wat vir hierdie tesis onderneem is. Die gevallestudie 
voorgehou in hierdie tesis sentreer rondom wat oor die algemeen na verwys word as “SASSA-
Gate”, waar ’n potensiële nasionale krisis naelskraap afgeweer is toe die Konstitusionele Hof 
gedwing was om ’n reeds onwettige en ongeldige kontrak te verleng om te verseker dat die betaling 
van sosiale toelae aan ongeveer 17 miljoen begunstigdes sou voortgaan. Die basis van die krisis hou 
verband met die oorspronklike ongeldige kontrak, aangegaan tussen SASSA (die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Sosiale Sekuriteitagentskap) en Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) in 2012, wat sedertdien omhul is in 
kontroversie en bewerings van korrupsie.  
 
Te midde van die “SASSA-Gate”-krisis (asook die hoofmotivering vir die toekenning van die 
ongeldige kontrak) is CPS se patentregtelike biometriese kaarttegnologie. Uit die navorsing het dit 
duidelik geword dat moontlike insigte verkry kan word vanuit die toepassing van die 
konseptualisering van “Staatskaping” op die immer-groeiende onsekerhede wat geassosieer word 
met die toekomstige ontwikkelingsontwrigtinge, soos daardie wat geassosieer word met die Vierde 
Industriële Revolusie (4IR). 
 
Hierdie navorsing is onderneem as beide ’n beskrywende en ondersoekende gevallestudie en word 
voorgelê in ’n kompakte narratiewe formaat. Granulêre navorsingsmetodologie is onderneem, 
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waarvolgens verskeie databronne gekombineer en geanaliseer is vanuit verskeie perspektiewe en op 
verskillende vlakke; as sulks kan die navorsingsbevindinge nie maklik opgesom word nie. Die 
hooftuitkoms van die navorsing is die gevallestudie self. Die algehele doelwitte van die navorsing 
was primer om ’n omvattende beskrywing van die “SASSA-Gate”-krisis te verskaf en om die 
teoretiese raamwerk vir die begryp van die verskynsel van Staatskaping verder te ontwikkel, en hoe 
dit verband hou met neopatrimonialisme. Op die lange duur poog hierdie navorsing om meer kennis 
te bou rakende die huidige diskoers van Staatskaping in Suid-Afrika en om ’n broodnodige 
omvattende beskrywing te verskaf van hoe die skadu-regering naas en binne formele 
regeringstrukture werk en maneuvreer.  
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The challenges that we face in the 21
st
 century, such as climate change, social injustice, extreme 
poverty, and economic inequality, are multifaceted, complex, and intertwined. In an effort to tackle 
these challenges, in 2015 the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were drafted and adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly (United Nations [UN], 2016). The SDGs identify and 
categorise 17 objectives that focus on addressing social and environmental challenges collectively 
to promote sustainable human development, which calls for changes to current economic, social, 
and political paradigms and fundamental evolutions in our collective ways of knowing, 
understanding, and doing.  
 
Achieving these goals requires promoting and navigating a multiplicity of transitions, addressing 
immediate demands in light of perceived and real future constraints (and opportunities), and 
attempting structural transformation within systems that have deeply embedded expectations of 
“how the world works”. In order to achieve a goal, it is important to not only consider the long-term 
development objectives, but also to situate those objectives within the local context of the legacies 
from the past, the current circumstances, and the futures unknown.   
 
In South Africa, the legacy of the apartheid regime is still very much reflected in the felt reality for 
the majority of South Africans who, nearly 25 years into democracy, are still subject to hardships of 
extreme poverty, high levels of unemployment, and unabated inequalities. Arguably one of the most 
successful interventions that the government has adopted to address these challenges was the 
introduction and progressive expansion of the country’s social assistance programme, in the form of 
social grants (Bhorat & Cassim, 2014; Khan, 2013; Woolard, Harttgen & Klasen, 2010).     
 
These challenges that South Africa faces cannot be relegated to the legacy of apartheid alone. In 
2016, the Public Protector issued the State of Capture report (Public Protector, 2016a), in which the 
key findings of the investigation into potential corruption between state officials and the Gupta 
family close to then president Jacob Zuma were set out. In May 2017, a collective of academics, 
including Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, Mondi, Peter, Qobo and Swilling (2017) released the 
Betrayal of the Promise: How South Africa is Being Stolen report (hereafter referred to as the 
Betrayal of the Promise report). The report provides a high level conceptual framework for 
understanding the phenomenon of “State Capture”, outlining the mechanics by which state 
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institutions are repurposed and the shadow state is formed. The report draws strong parallels 
between the colloquial use of the term “state capture” in South African discourse and much broader 
concept(s) of neopatrimonialism. Much of the literature on neopatrimonialism points to the negative 
impact that this type of dominance model has on the state’s ability to steer and progress the nation’s 
development agenda (Bach, 2012). This could potentially be one of the factors explaining “the 
steady ‘regressivity’/diminishing ‘progressivity’ of the social grant system” (Khan, 2013: 573) and 
the stagnant (if not diminishing) state of South Africa’s development.  
 
As argued in the Betrayal of the Promise report (Bhorat et al., 2017), I argue that it is necessary to 
expand the understanding of “State Capture” from merely the typical activities of bribery and 
corruption to a broader political project. This requires extending academic enquiry beyond just the 
financial flows of ill-gotten gains and definitively criminal activities, to include the currency of 
power, the bartering of political favours by manipulation of state institutions (trading of fear and 
favours), and determining the various costs this places on South African citizenry. The research 
presented in this thesis builds upon the conceptual framework set out in the Betrayal of the Promise, 
by critically examining the theories of state capture and neopatrimonialism, focusing not only on 
the possible acts of corruption, but also the power dynamics that enables them.  
 
It is these aspects of the political project that this case study seeks to unpack, through examining the 
South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), with particular focus on what is commonly 
referred to as the SASSA-Gate debacle. SASSA-Gate refers to a sequence of events that culminated 
in a potential national crisis narrowly being averted in 2017 (and again in 2018). This was when 
there was a real risk of non-payment of social grants to an estimated 17 million South Africans 
unless an unlawful and invalid contract was extended with the service provider, Cash Paymaster 
Services (Pty) Ltd (hereafter referred to as CPS).   
 
The case study illustrates that power elite driving the political project of State Capture not only seek 
to subvert and bend the “rules of the game”, but if the opportunity arises and it is to their benefit, 
they are willing to break these rules entirely. The question that emerges is: What are the likely 
implications of this phenomenon when there are no rules to start with?  
 
At the centre of the SASSA-Gate crisis is the proprietary biometric card solution of Net1 UEPS 
Technologies Inc. (hereafter referred to as Net1), a United States (US)-based multinational 
corporation and the holding company of CPS. The consequences of the state’s (or rather a specific 
political elite’s) insistence of adopting this service provider’s proprietary biometric technology 
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could provide insight into the potential unforeseen (and perhaps darker) consequences that might 
come with the disruptive technologies/innovations of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR).  
 
Academic discourse around the current exponential technological advancements is yet to settle on a 
concept that adequately encapsulates the potential enormity and vast extent of the associated 
development implications. Since being introduced at the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2016, 
4IR is increasingly being adopted as a colloquial term for conceptualising the developmental 
disruptions of forthcoming technological era. Thus, for the purposes of this research, 4IR is utilised 
as a heuristic term for describing the changing technological paradigm. The research, however, 
limits the exploration of 4IR to the non-industry standard, biometric technology of CPS, as an 
illustrative example of disruptive innovation.       
 
1.2 Background: How the Research Came About 
 
In an interview with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), speaking on the sidelines 
of the Commission on the Status of Women at the UN in New York, on 19 March 2016, Bathabile 
Dlamini, Minister of the Department of Social Development (DSD) and leader of the African 
National Congress Women’s League (ANCWL), cautioned ANC members against airing the party’s 
dirty laundry in the media, saying: “All of us in the NEC [National Executive Committee] have our 
smallanyana skeletons and we don’t want to take out skeletons because all hell will break loose” 
(SABC Digital News, 2016a). 
 
Dlamini’s comment was made in the context of her absence from the first ANC NEC meeting held 
after the public media statement made on 16 March, by then Deputy Minister of Finance, Mcebisi 
Jonas, in which he took South Africa into his confidence and confirmed that he had rejected the 
Gupta’s R600 million bribe to become an agent of the shadow state and to be promoted to finance 
minister (SABC Digital News, 2016b). This statement, as short and succinct as it was, provided the 
nation with the confirmation that indeed there are many dark and dubious secrets hiding in the 
shadows, behind the closed doors of power centred around Jacob Zuma. 
 
When I started this journey of pursuing a master’s degree at the end of 2016, the concept of State 
Capture was only beginning to emerge. Like most South Africans, I was by no means in any 
position to fully comprehend or appreciate what the evidence contained in the Public Protector’s 
State of Capture report meant for the country when it was released on 2 November 2016 (Public 
Protector, 2016a). My initial research proposal was focused on exploring the potential for Universal 
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Basic Income in South Africa and what it would mean for the country’s social protection system 
and the economy. It is the events that followed the release of that report that would ultimately lead 
to the research that is presented in this thesis.  
 
Because my initial research topic was intimately linked to the country’s social security system, it in 
turn entailed the examination of the administrative institution of SASSA. It was while embarking on 
the planned initial research that I began to follow the increasing media reports of confusion around 
what was going to happen and how grants would continue to be paid come 1 April 2017 when the 
2012 irregular and invalid contract between SASSA and CPS expired. As the months unfolded, it 
became apparent that trouble was brewing. The following statement was made by the then SASSA 
chief executive officer (CEO), Thokozani Magwaza, during a presentation to the Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee on Social Development (PCSD) on 1 February 2017: “If you’ve got to choose 
between paying the grants and irregular, and if the country’s going to burn on the 1st of April and 
the irregular, I choose the country not to burn” (SABC Digital News, 2017). 
 
This statement highlights the magnitude of the crisis that was unfolding before South Africa’s eyes. 
The fact that a senior accounting official of the government was in parliament, plainly stating that 
he would knowingly enter into unlawful contract, was unprecedented. The looming crisis was the 
risk that some 17 million grant recipients would not receive the grants that they depended on come 
1 April – an eventuality which by that point was unthinkable. So unthinkable was this idea that 
admittedly almost everyone at the time was in agreement that this would not come to pass and that 
one way or another there was no option but to ensure that the payment of the grants would continue. 
Yet, until there was clarity on how the grants would be paid, the assurances given by the president 
and the minister provided little reassurance to the millions of children who were at risk of going 
hungry, nor would that alleviate the anxiety of the elderly who could be left homeless due to not 
being able to pay their rent. Had it materialised, this would have been a socio-political crisis of 
mammoth proportions.  
 
In response to this imminent threat, a collective of civil society organisations, led by the Black Sash 
Trust, approached the Constitutional Court to intervene. The urgency of the court application, given 
the limited time available for addressing the imminent crisis, was not disputed, nor was the required 
outcome in terms of CPS needing to continue to pay grants. In the court application, the minister 
and SASSA declared that “CPS is the only entity capable of paying grants for the foreseeable future 
after 31 March 2017”, a situation which the court did not take kindly to (Constitutional Court of 
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South Africa, 2017a: 8). Ultimately, on 17 March 2017, the court ruled that the invalid contract 
between SASSA and CPS would continue for a year and the crisis was thus averted. 
 
With the crisis averted, the country was not given time to recover, because on 30 March 2017, then 
president Jacob Zuma in a late-night announcement made a cabinet reshuffle. What was shocking 
about the reshuffle was that Zuma decided to, with no rational justification given, fire the then 
Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, and he did not remove Minister of Social Development 
Bathabile Dlamini, who had only days earlier been issued a scathing rebuke from the highest court 
in the country. This was just one in a long list of seemingly “irrational” and inexplicable public 
moments, where decisions and actions made by the former president and his administration were 
seemingly taken with disregard for what was good for the country and appearing to have been for 
his own narrow interests. These moments include, among others, the Marikana Massacre in 2012 
(Alexander, 2013); the landing of the Gupta plane at Waterkloof Air Base in 2013 (Staff Writer, 
2013a); in 2014 the Public Protector’s report, titled Secured in Comfort (2014), addressed the undue 
benefit Zuma received in relation to an approximately R225 million security upgrade to his Nkandla 
homestead; the firing of Minister of Finance Nhlanhla Nene in 2015 (including the over-the-
weekend appointment of Des van Rooyen) (Areff, 2015); the release of the State of Capture report 
by the Public Protector (2016a); and the cabinet reshuffle in March 2017 (Chirume, Hendricks, 
Furlong & Damba-Hendrik, 2017).  
 
The nation responded, embarking on mass protests throughout the country, and so did the academic 
community. I was humbled by the opportunity to join the State Capacity Research Project (SCRP) 
to provide research assistance in the preparation of the Betrayal of the Promise report (Bhorat et al., 
2017), which was released in May 2017. Working on the research for the Betrayal of the Promise 
report, I began to recognise the stark similarities between the dubious activities that had been taking 
place at the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and what had happened at SASSA. It was at that point I 
decided to abandon my initial intended research, which, although potentially useful, would not 
address the immediate challenges facing the country. I recognised that my research efforts could 
provide greater value by focusing my attention on better understanding the theoretical concepts 
behind the State Capture and determining how the SASSA-Gate crisis materialised. 
 
Following the release of the Betrayal of the Promise report, the SCRP was additionally tasked to 
compile detailed studies of the different cases of State Capture in South Africa. The study of the 
SASSA-Gate crisis was selected to be one of the SCRP cases, and in July 2018 we released the 
report titled How One Word Can Change the Game: Case Study of State Capture and the South 
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African Social Security Agency (Foley & Swilling, 2018). The research undertaken for the SCRP is 
thus the central focus of this master’s thesis.  
 
Since SASSA irregularly awarded the grant payment contract to CPS in 2012, there has been a 
plethora of investigative reporting on allegations of corruption surrounding the awarding of the 
tender to CPS; some emanating from the court filings in the litigations. Most of the allegations 
relate to Minister Dlamini’s indirect connections to the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
partners of CPS and its US-listed holding company, Net1. Significant questions have also been 
raised regarding the role that the external advisors played in the decisions and actions that 
culminated in the SASSA-Gate crisis. It is these relationships between and events surrounding the 
informal networks of actors and formal government institutions that this case study research seeks 
to unpack, within a conceptual framework derived from the theoretical concepts of state capture and 
neopatrimonialism.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Since 2016, colloquial discourse on South Africa’s political economy has been dominated by the 
concept of State Capture. The release of the Betrayal of the Promise report (Bhorat et al., 2017), 
which drew extensively on the neopatrimonial school of thought, was aimed at providing an 
academic understanding of this phenomenon. The report argued that State Capture, at least in the 
context of South Africa, is more than just a form of “grand corruption” of SOEs but is rather a much 
more extensive part of a political project undertaken by a group of political elite. The political elite 
driving this project not only seek to subvert and bend the “rules of the game”, but if the opportunity 
presents itself and is to their benefit, are willing to break these rules entirely. The question that 
therefore emerges is: What are the likely implications of this phenomenon when there are no rules 
to start with? Herein is the challenge that the unfolding 4IR and the associated increasing 
advancement of disruptive innovations may present.  
 
The preliminary investigation indicated that there appears to be a distinct disconnect between the 
concepts of state capture and neopatrimonialism, in both economic and political theory. Similarly, 
there also appears to be a lack of academic enquiry into some of the relationships or links between 
the political economy and technology or innovation studies, particularly as it relates to governance, 
corruption, and the associated impacts of disruptive technologies. The SASSA-Gate crisis, due to 
the people involved and how it was able to occur, presents a unique instance through which these 
gaps in academic research may be explored.     
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1.4 Research Questions and Objectives 
 
The broad research questions that emerge from the problem statement are as follows: 
 
1. What is the difference or relationship between state capture and neopatrimonialism, and how 
might either of these concepts be applicable to the SASSA-Gate debacle?  
2. How is a state institution “captured” and what are the potential consequences thereof?  
3. How did technology (particularly biometric technology in this case) play a role in the 
SASSA-Gate crisis, and what can be learned from this case study in terms of the relationship 
between state capture, neopatrimonialism, and future technology disruption?  
 
By answering the above research questions, this study seeks to achieve two principal objectives, 
namely:  
 
1. to unpack a detailed account of the SASSA-Gate crisis and to establish if there are any 
insights that pertain to the phenomenon of State Capture and how they relate to 
neopatrimonialism; and 
2. to explore if there are any broader political, social, and economic aspects that government, 
academia, and society in general should consider as we navigate through the exponentially 
rapid unfolding of the 4IR.  
 
1.5 Goals and Rationale for the Study 
 
Maxwell (2013) identifies three main types of goals for research, namely personal, intellectual, and 
practical. Maxwell (2013: 219) explains that “[p]ersonal goals are those that motivate you to do this 
study; they can include a desire to change some existing situation, a curiosity about a specific 
phenomenon or event, or simply the need to advance your career”. As indicated in Section 1.2, this 
case study emerged from a desire to “change” (or rather understand) the existing situation, where it 
is evident that the actions and decisions taken under the Zuma administration were not in the best 
interest of the country, the consequences of which have a profound negative impact on the country’s 
development. The country now faces the immense task of unravelling and repairing the damage 
done by this Zuma-centred political project, and, as such (a possible benefit which this research 
may provide) to contribute to this task by shedding light on how the shadow state operates and 
manoeuvres alongside and within formal government structures. It is only through having a better 
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understanding of the broader political project that South Africa will be able to safeguard its 
constitutional democracy. 
 
This search for greater understanding, “gaining some insight into what is going on and why this is 
happening”, relates directly to the intellectual goals of this research (Maxwell, 2013: 220). With the 
theories of state capture and neopatrimonialism already identified as potential academic 
explanations for understanding the events that occurred under the Zuma administration, the aim of 
the research is therefore to explore the relationship and links between these two concepts and how 
they apply to the South African context. The second aim, which emerged through the case study 
itself, is to explore the potential need for further investigation and enquiry into the relationship 
dynamics between technology/innovation and the political economy.  
 
Ultimately, the practical goal of the research, linking the personal and intellectual goals, is to 
provide a “formative stud[y] … that [is] intended to help improve existing practice rather than 
simply to determine the outcomes of the program or practice being studied” (Maxwell, 2013: 222). 
The intended improvements relate not only to assist in addressing the real-world problem of State 
Capture but are also aimed at contributing to the academic discourse surrounding the various 
theoretical concepts.   
   
1.6 Approach to the Research Design and Methodology  
 
Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty articulating what it is that they 
are doing, methodologically speaking. The case study survives in a curious methodological 
limbo (Gerring, 2004: 341). 
 
As clearly stated in the title of this thesis and as described in the problem statement, this research is 
first and foremost a case study. However, as indicated in the statement above, defining a case study, 
methodologically speaking, seems yet to be adequately addressed in academia. Most agree that case 
studies are inherently a form of qualitative research, predominantly applied in fields of study 
concerned with human affairs, as it is in this case. Baxter and Jack (2008: 545), in referencing the 
case study research design developed by Robert Yin, provides four situations in which a case study 
approach would be considered preferential, all of which are applicable to this research; namely 
when: 
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(a) the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions; (b) you cannot manipulate 
the behaviour of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual conditions 
because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) the boundaries 
are not clear between the phenomenon and context.  
 
Baxter and Jack (2008: 544) highlight that the advantages of utilising a case study is that it 
“facilitates exploration of a phenomenon within its context [and] the issue is not explored through 
one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be 
revealed and understood”. This is particularly useful for the purposes of this case study as the 
concepts that are utilised emanate from different disciplines and, as such, provide different lenses 
through which the case can be explored. Drawing from the research questions and objectives 
identified above, the purpose of this case study is both descriptive and exploratory in nature.  
Creswell (2014: 21) notes that unlike most traditional quantitative types of research design, which 
are often well defined in terms of a linear sequence of tasks required for conducting a specific type 
of research, “qualitative approaches allow room to be innovative and to work more within 
researcher-designed frameworks”. In agreement, Maxwell (2013: 214-215) asserts that qualitative 
research design  
 
…should be a reflexive process operating through every stage of a project [where] the 
activities of collecting and analysing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or 
refocusing the research questions, and identifying and dealing with validity threats are 
usually going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others.  
 
Rather than present a list of sequential tasks, Maxwell (2013) presents an “Interactive Model of 
Research Design”, which focuses on five key components of a research study and outlines the 
reflective connections between one another (see Figure 1). The five components are the goals of the 
research, the conceptual framework, the research questions, the methods used, and the validity of 
the research.  
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Figure 1: Interactive Model of Research Design 
Source: Maxwell (2013: 217) 
 
In terms of case study research, however, one key element is missing from Maxwell’s model, which 
is the case itself. The real-world context of a case study undoubtedly affects all these components of 
the research and, as such, Maxwell’s (2013) Interactive Model of Research Design must be 
supplemented with an approach that caters for the empirical world. In order to address this, the 
research design applied for this case study follows from the “abductive approach to case research” 
(called Systematic Combining) developed by Dubois and Gadde (2002), and later refined by 
Alrajeh, Fearfull and Monk (2013). Dubois and Gadde (2002: 556) describe systematic combining 
as “a nonlinear, path-dependent process of combining efforts with the ultimate objective of 
matching theory and reality”. This is a process where there is continuous and concurrent evolution 
and refinement of the theoretical framework, empirical investigation (or data collection), and the 
case analysis.    
 
Like Maxwell (2013) and Creswell (2014), Dubois and Gadde (2002) recognise that the traditional 
research design of sequentially phased research activities does not allow the flexibility or reflexivity 
required to unleash the full potential of case study research. They argue that by enabling the 
researcher to move “‘back and forth’ from one type of research activity to another and between 
empirical observations and theory, [the researcher] is able to expand his understanding of both 
theory and empirical phenomena” (Dubois & Gadde, 2002: 555). The process could possibly best 
be described as being iterative; however, there is actually no specificity as to when or how the 
“matching” of the theoretical and the real need takes place.  
 
Goals 
Methods Validity 
Conceptual 
Framework 
Research 
Questions 
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To translate this process into research design, certain initial steps are required. As with almost all 
research, an initial literature review and a preliminary empirical investigation (i.e. problem 
identification) are required. The literature review forms the basis for developing the conceptual 
framework, and the preliminary investigation lays the foundation for the case itself. At the same 
time, the theory assists in defining the boundaries and parameters of the case study, and the 
evidence collected during the empirical investigation guides how theory is translated into the 
conceptual framework. Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of systematic combining, as 
presented by Alrajeh et al. (2013).   
 
 
Figure 2: Research process using abductive approach 
Source: Alrajeh et al. (2013: 1) 
   
The research methods utilised for the research consisted of a literature review, desktop research, and 
observations. For ethical reasons it was decided not to include interviews as part of the research 
methods. However, to ensure the validity of the research, the case study was distributed to and 
reviewed by several individuals with direct involvement in or knowledge of the events covered by 
the case study or with expertise related to SASSA and South Africa’s grant payment system. The 
application of Maxwell’s (2013) Interactive Model of Research Design means that in this research 
the case study parameters, methods, and validation, as well as the ethical considerations and 
limitations of the study, are all affected by the conceptual framework. It is for this reason that the 
next chapter will provide the conceptual framework for the case study. The remaining components 
of the research methodology will be unpacked in further detail in Chapter 3. 
 
Literature 
The  
empirical  
world 
Theory Evidence 
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Case 
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Like most qualitative case study researchers, I prescribe to the constructivist paradigm in principle. 
According to Baxter and Jack (2008: 545), citing Miller and Crabtree (1999: 10),  
 
[c]onstructivists claim that truth is relative and that it is dependent on one’s perspective. 
This paradigm ‘recognizes the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but 
doesn’t reject outright some notion of objectivity. Pluralism, not relativism, is stressed with 
focus on the circular dynamic tension of subject and object’.  
 
However, for the purposes of research itself, due to the nature of the topic and goals of the research, 
a “pragmatic worldview” was adopted. Creswell (2014: 10) muses that “pragmatism as a worldview 
arises out of actions, situations, and consequences rather than antecedent conditions (as in 
postpositivism)”. Often associated with mixed-methods studies, this worldview allows enquiry to be 
relatively intellectually flexible, as “[p]ragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy 
and reality” and “[p]ragmatists do not see the world as an absolute unity”. With pragmatism the 
primary focus is placed on the research problem and pragmatists will use all and any approaches 
available in order to better understand the problem. Pragmatism does not demand that reality be 
necessarily either “independent of the mind or within the mind”; this in turn allows for a plurality of 
worldviews. For instance, since this case study centres on the potential corrupt acts and/or 
intentions of individuals with political power, the risk of subjective biases (be they my own or of 
potential participants) is extremely high. To mitigate against this risk, the primary method adopted 
for this case study (namely document analysis) was selected with a view of maintaining a high 
degree of objectivity in undertaking the research.  
 
One of the major criticisms of pragmatism stems from its underlying rejection of the notion that 
there exist absolute truths. For pragmatist, “there are no first principles and that all human 
knowledge is empirical, including theories of knowledge” (Scott & Briggs, 2009: 228). This 
presents two key challenges with pragmatism, the first being that it does not provide for a definitive 
epistemological methodology. And the second, related challenge is that “[w]ithout a careful ethical 
grounding, pragmatic practice risks boiling down to an unreflecting ethical relativism or at least will 
find it difficult to avoid the suspicion of mere opportunism and utilitarianism” (Ulrich, 2007: 4). 
Both criticism can be overcome through by adopting an appropriate methods of research (such as 
triangulation) and being reflective throughout the research process (Scott & Briggs, 2009; Ulrich, 
2007).It is also important to note one of the major advantages of the pragmatist approach, which is 
particularly relevant to the research is highlight by Kadlec (2006: 541) when she states that:  
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The political, social, and economic challenges we face require that we arm ourselves not 
with fixed absolutes, but rather with a commitment to open-ended and flexible inquiry aimed 
not at final consensus about our aims, but rather at achieving a greater understanding of 
the consequences of our practices and policies. 
 
The final reflection on the approach to this research study is to draw attention to the five 
misunderstandings about case study research identified by Flyvbjerg (2011; 2006), which are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Five misunderstandings about case study research 
Misunderstanding  Flyvbjerg’s counterarguments 
1  “General, theoretical knowledge is 
more valuable than concrete case 
knowledge”. 
“Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human 
affairs. Concrete case knowledge is therefore more valuable than the vain 
search for predictive theories and universals” (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 304). 
2 “One cannot generalize on the basis of 
an individual case; therefore, the case 
study cannot contribute to scientific 
development”. 
“One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study 
may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement 
or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization is overvalued as 
a source of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of example’ and 
transferability are underestimated” (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 305). 
3 “The case study is most useful for 
generating hypotheses; that is, in the 
first stage of a total research process, 
while other methods are more suitable 
for hypotheses testing and theory 
building”. 
“Case studies are especially well suited for theory development because 
they tackle the following tasks in the research process better than other 
methods: 
 Process tracing that links causes and outcomes … 
 Detailed exploration of hypothesized causal mechanisms  
 Development and testing of historical explanations  
 Understanding the sensitivity of concepts to context  
 Formation of new hypotheses and new questions to study, sparked by 
deviant cases” (Flyvbjerg, 2011: 306). 
4 “The case study contains a bias toward 
verification; that is, a tendency to 
confirm the researcher’s preconceived 
notions”. 
“The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the 
researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the 
contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a greater bias 
toward falsification of preconceived notions than toward verification” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2011: 311). 
5 “It is often difficult to summarize and 
develop general propositions and 
theories on the basis of specific case 
studies”. 
“It is correct that summarizing case studies is often difficult, especially as 
concerns case process. It is less correct as regards case outcomes. The 
problems in summarizing case studies, however, are due more often to the 
properties of the reality studied than to the case study as a research 
method. Often it is not desirable to summarize and generalize case studies. 
Good studies should be read as narratives in their entirety” (Flyvbjerg, 
2011: 313). 
Source: Flyvbjerg (2011: 302) 
 
In summation, Flyvbjerg (2011) attempts to address five of the general criticisms that case studies 
often receive. These criticisms are often based on the long-held contestation between quantitative 
and qualitative research, particularly with regard to theory, validity, and reliability, and the 
“positivistic” influence on social sciences. Of particular importance for this research and this case 
study is the notion that for a case study to contribute to “scientific development”, it should yield 
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some form of generalised theory or outcome that can be easily summarised and is replicable. It must 
be categorically stated that this is most definitely not the objective of this case study.  
 
This case study is a dense narration (based on granular research) of a single case of a context-
specific phenomenon, which is State Capture. For Flyvbjerg (2011; 2006), one advantage that 
emanates from presenting dense narratives is that they are often embedded in and are reflexive of 
the complexity and contradictions of the real world. This can serve to guard against the perpetuation 
of narrative fallacies, which can result from the “human inclination to simplify data and information 
through over interpretation and through a preference for compact stories over complex data 
sets”(Flyvbjerg, 2011: 311). Flyvbjerg (2011) highlights that in order to undertake dense case study 
narration, the opposite of conventional ‘academic wisdom’ must be adopted, namely that rather than 
“closing” or summing up a case study, the outcomes of the case study should remain open. This 
openness can be achieved by providing in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives, at various 
levels, which is not consigned to any singular specific domain of academic enquiry. As highlighted 
by Flyvbjerg (2006: 238),  
 
[t]he goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow the 
study to be different things to different people … Case stories written like this can neither be 
briefly recounted nor summarized in a few main results. The case story is itself the result. 
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Figure 3 outlines the structure of the thesis. As this case study is presented in a dense narrative 
format, the next chapter will provide the conceptual framework for the case study. Chapter 3 will 
present the research methodology and techniques and provide structure for the narrative for the case 
study. Chapters 4 to 8 present the case study itself, where at the end of each chapter a summary of 
the findings is presented. Finally, Chapter 9 presents the overall conclusions and recommendations 
of the research.  
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Figure 3: Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods of Granular Research 
Chapter 4: SASSA and South Africa’s Welfare System 
Chapter 5: SASSA-Gate Chronology 
Chapter 6: Probably Corrupt 
Chapter 7: Beyond Corrupt 
Chapter 8: What Futures May Unfold? 
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations 
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 Chapter 2: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the relevant theories and literature that are relevant to this thesis 
and provides an outline of the conceptual framework for this case study. The first section provides a 
literature review of the concept of state capture and a critical review of neopatrimonialism, and 
examines the relationship and links between the two concepts. The analysis put forward serves to 
provide a high-level overview of the history behind the key theories and to explain the underlying 
ideas that relate to the case study itself. The second section presents the conceptual framework for 
the phenomenon of State Capture in South Africa, which is the object of the case study. It presents 
the key concepts and outlines, and expands on the characteristics and the modus operandi of State 
Capture as identified in the Betrayal of the Promise report. The third section seeks to explain what 
is meant by the 4IR in the context of the case study and provides a high-level overview of the 
factors and aspects of the 4IR that are considered relevant for the case study. The last section aims 
to provide a synthesis of how the case study and its context should be understood relative to the 
three theoretical framings. 
 
2.2 Neopatrimonialism and State Capture  
 
2.2.1 State Capture versus state capture 
 
At the end of 2017 the term “State Capture” was announced by the Pan South African Language 
Board (PanSALB) as the South African word for the year (Pijoos, 2017). The term found its way 
into the public lexicon following the release of the Public Protector’s State of Capture report 
(Public Protector, 2016a) in late 2016. The report detailed the findings of an investigation into the 
alleged corrupt relationship between senior government officials at various state institutions and a 
family (the Guptas) who were politically exposed and personally connected to then President Zuma 
(by way of his son). The report itself did not refer to the specific term “state capture”.        
 
The term was seminally published in a report, titled Seize the State, Seize the Day: An Empirical 
Analysis of State Capture and Corruption in Transition Economies, by Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann (2000). The report was based on a study conducted as part of the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey undertaken by the World Bank in 1999, with the objective of 
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providing an analysis of governance, corruption, and state capture in transitioning economies. In the 
report, it  
 
contrast[s] state capture (firms shaping and affecting formulation of the rules of the game 
through private payments to public officials and politicians) with influence (doing the same 
without recourse to payments) and with administrative corruption (‘petty’ forms of bribery 
in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations) (Hellman et al., 2000: 
ii).  
 
The survey was conducted across several post-communist countries and was referenced frequently 
in relation to the  
 
accumulation of economic power in the hands of the so-called oligarchs [which] was akin to 
a massive transfer of state assets into private hands, with the result of a weakening of the 
institutional and normative environments inherited from the Communist era (Bach, 2011: 
288).  
 
Over the years there have been a few developments in terms of how state capture is defined and 
how it has been adopted. Dassah (2018) points outs several of the different typologies for defining 
state capture and how these have been interpreted. The first type of descriptors relate to the 
institutions of the state considered to be captured, for example the Legislature, a specific 
department, law enforcement, Judiciary, parliament, etc. The second is to define state capture in 
terms of the organisation that is viewed as having captured said institution. These could be private 
sector firms (as was the case in the original application by Hellman et al., 2000), but this could also 
include political leaders or any other external interest group. A third way of defining state capture is 
in terms of the extent to which the external interests have captured various state institutions. For 
instance, if it is a singular incident or institution, it would be considered “local” state capture; 
however, if the external interest captures more than one institution or is involved in multiple 
instances of corrupt activities with numerous individuals, it would be considered “global” state 
capture.     
 
As highlighted by Bach (2011: 287), the meaning of state capture, due to the diverse interpretations 
and applications of the term, is “rather fuzzy”. In his description, Bach (2011: 287) asserts that 
“state capture was an attempt at measuring the extent to which the state is subject to ‘capture’ – or 
undue influence – by powerful vested interests”. From this perspective, the concept of state capture 
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is not distinguishable from influence or administrative corruption and it is not specifically focused 
on firm-level analysis or policy manipulation, nor is it limited to just financial forms of corruption. 
This thus opens the understanding of state capture to a much broader range of potential vested 
interests and a variety of exchanges and relationships between state officials and external actors. 
This broader interpretation of state capture would then appear to be a useful and fitting concept for 
describing the findings of the Public Protector’s report on the alleged corruption that took place at 
SOEs to the benefit of the Gupta family and associates (Labuschagne, 2017).   
 
The challenge in using the concept of state capture to describe the current state of South Africa’s 
political economy is that it focuses explicitly on the activities of corruption and fails to recognise 
the political and social dynamics of what unfolded under the Zuma administration. Labuschagne 
(2017: 51) highlights this shortcoming of the concept and notes that “discussions around state 
capture are principally done from an economic context, not from a political perspective”.  
 
It is precisely this gap in the usefulness of the concept that the Betrayal of the Promise report sought 
to address by drawing from the neopatrimonialism school of thought (Bhorat et al., 2017).  
 
At this point, it is important to highlight that a distinction must be made between the theoretical 
concept of state capture, as discussed above, and State Capture (capitalised), which is used to 
encapsulate the distinct contemporary phenomenon that has occurred under the Zuma 
administration in South Africa. Here State Capture is used in reference not only to corruption (the 
focus of state capture as a theoretical concept) but also to a host of other actors, activities, and 
factors that culminate in a unique form of political (mis)governance.  
 
With its limited application to predominantly economic studies, with the primary focus on 
measuring the impacts of state capture, this phenomenon is often examined at national (or rather 
macro-economic) levels, where multiple cases are observed, seldom at an institutional or sectoral 
level. This is perhaps why one aspect of state capture that does not appear to have been given 
sufficient consideration is to answer the question of how state capture occurs. Numerous attempts to 
find a detailed account or singular case study of how this form of corruption actually occurs have 
yielded no satisfactory results. In academic literature, there appear to be very few (if any) detailed 
accounts of actual events or occurrence of explicit state capture. 
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2.2.2 Critical review of neopatrimonialism theory 
 
Neopatrimonialism theory is firmly embedded in the fields of political and development studies, 
and has emerged as a school of thought for explaining transitioning political regimes of emerging 
and developing economies, in particular reference to African countries. Its focus is on the political 
and organisational structures (or rather the dominance models) of state governance and defining 
characteristics of transitioning political economies.  
 
Since the term “neopatrimonialism” was first used in the 1970s, it has been widely adopted for a 
range of different analyses and adapted to complement several different forms of enquiry. For the 
purposes of this research, it will not be feasible or necessary to undertake an in-depth exploration of 
the expansive history of literature on neopatrimonial theory. Instead, this review draws on previous 
work of different researchers who presented a variety of contemporary meta-analyses on 
neopatrimonial theory. These include, among others, Bach (2012), Van de Walle (2003), Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1994), DeGrassi (2008), Erdmann (2012), Erdmann and Engel (2006; 2007), 
Isaacs (2014), Kelsall (2011), Mkandawire (2015), and Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston (2009). 
 
A commonly used description referenced by scholars (Bach, 2012; Erdmann & Engel, 2007; 
Mkandawire, 2015) is provided by Clapham (1985: 48), who defines neopatrimonialism as  
 
a form of organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a 
political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. 
Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally 
defined, but exercise those powers ... as a form of private property.  
 
The concept is derived from Max Weber’s theories, developed in the early 20th century, on 
legitimacy and three ideal types of dominance, namely legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic 
(Weber, 1978). The legal-rational form of dominance is generally characterised as being based on 
impersonal bureaucratic logic and is prescribed by law, where authority is allocated, defined, and 
limited by law. Pitcher et al. (2009: 130) note the following:  
 
In other words, citizens comply because they believe the law grants authority to the ruler. 
The law, or a governing instrument such as a constitution, has a transhistorical rationality 
of its own that extends beyond the behavior of any individual leader. In theory, the leader 
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derives legitimate authority to act and expect obedience only insofar as he or she is 
accountable to the rule of law. 
 
Neopatrimonialism is derived from Weber’s (1978) concept of patrimonialism, which is a type of 
traditional dominance, where “the right to rule is vested in the person; and the legitimacy of this 
person’s authority is derived from popular acceptance of the norms, customs or beliefs commonly 
associated with traditional familial or household structures” (cited in Sigman & Lindberg, 2017: 2). 
Initially, when deployed by Eisenstadt (1973), the prefix “neo-” served to indicate that patrimonial 
characteristics were present in “modern” African states. There are two notable distinctions that can 
be made between neopatrimonialism and patrimonialism. The first is that under patrimonial rule 
there is no distinction between public and private; “the state was the personal domain of the rulers 
and they used the resources of the state to ensure the obedience of the population” (Duthie, 2015: 
112). Under neopatrimonialism, however, the presence of a formal legal-rational bureaucracy 
requires the separation of public and private to be recognised, at least in principle. Second is that, as 
noted by Sigman and Lindberg (2017: 2),  
 
the traditional basis of patrimonial authority may be less pronounced in neopatrimonial 
settings than in more purely patrimonial ones (Roth, 1968). Rather than practicing loyalty, 
tribute or reciprocity, all of which tend to be rooted in shared customs or beliefs, practices 
in neopatrimonial settings may take on a more transactional character.  
 
It is specifically the transactional nature, by which personal or political allegiances between the 
ruler (or as referred to by some, the “strong man”) and the subordinates (cronies) are established 
and maintained, that links neopatrimonialism with theories on clientelism and corruption. Both 
clientelism and corruption in turn require control over the distribution and management of rents, 
which often entails the centralisation of power and control over state resources (Kelsall, 2011). As a 
result of these seemingly natural correlations between these concepts, the application of 
neopatrimonialism tends to focus on three characteristics, namely “strong presidents [or 
presidentialism], clientelistic linkages between citizens and politicians, and the use of state 
resources for political legitimation [or rather corruption]” (Sigman & Lindberg, 2017: 1). 
 
Neopatrimonialism is a concept that, although widely utilised and applied in a variety of studies, is 
not without a degree of ambiguity and contestation. Over the years, through numerous applications 
with varying interpretations in different fields of analysis, it has become somewhat of a “catch-all” 
concept to explain the failure of African countries to realise developmental ambitions (Erdmann, 
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2012). As indicated, there is expansive literature on the history of neopatrimonialism theory , which 
shall not be explored further in great detail; however, some of the characteristics that have prevailed 
in neopatrimonial theory are best summarised by Bach (2012: 221) as follows: “Neopatrimonialism 
provided the ‘common denominator’ for a range of practices that are highly characteristic of politics 
in Africa, namely nepotism, clannish behaviour, so-called ‘tribalism’, regionalism, patronage, 
‘cronyism’, ‘prebendalism’, corruption, predation, factionalism, etc.”.   
 
For Mkandawire (2015: 563), among others (Bach, 2012; DeGrassi, 2008; Erdmann & Engel, 2007; 
Gray & Whitfield, 2014; Pedersen, 2015; Pitcher et al., 2009; Wai, 2012), “neopatrimonialism has 
become the convenient, all-purpose, and ubiquitous moniker for African governance”. Mkandawire 
(2015) and Wai (2012) highlight that, through its extensive application over time, particularly to the 
African context, the concept has become a reductionist generalisation of “African culture” conflated 
with the prevalence of corruption and underdevelopment, exhibiting a distinctly Afro-pessimism 
approach by Western scholars that it does not adequately reflect the complexity and diversity of 
Africa’s political reality. For Mkandawire (2015: 602),  
 
[t]he analytical template forged by the neopatrimonialism school has had the effect of 
flattening the African political and economic landscape – often rendering monochromatic 
the many colorful and varied characters who have taken the African political stage over the 
last half century.  
 
I agree with Mkandawire that the manner in which neopatrimonialism has been adopted over the 
years is unhelpful and with its current interpretation does not present a meaningful concept for truly 
analysing or understanding the political and economic dynamics of a state (be it in Africa or 
elsewhere in the world). I do, however, agree with several other authors (Bach, 2012; Erdmann & 
Engel, 2007; Pitcher et al., 2009) that neopatrimonialism is still “useful as an organising concept”, 
even though it still presents a “major methodological challenge for empirical research” (Erdmann & 
Engel, 2007: 103-104). 
 
Also critical of how the concept of neopatrimonialism has been applied to the African continent, 
Pitcher et al. (2009) suggest that most applications of the concept are seemingly adopted in a 
manner that delegitimises patrimonialism (and in turn neopatrimonialism) as a form of legitimate 
dominance. They argue, as do I, that the application of neopatrimonialism has historically been 
through a misinterpretation or misrepresentation of Max Weber’s theories on the ideal type of 
legitimate domination. The paragraphs that follow outline several issues with regard to the 
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“historic” or general application of patrimonial and neopatrimonial concepts that do not align with 
Weber’s original formulation of “ideal” types of dominance. 
 
2.2.2.1 Conflation of ideal types of dominance with different types of regimes 
 
[Weber’s] use of the term ‘patrimonial’ delineated a legitimate type of authority, not a type 
of regime (Pitcher et al., 2009: 125). 
 
The statement above is the first major misrepresentation that is often made with regard to Weber’s 
theories, which is the conflation of ideal types of dominance with different types of regimes (Isaacs, 
2014). In particular, it is the conflation of the formal legal-rational type of dominance with 
democratic regimes and the neopatrimonial type with authoritarianism. As a starting point, I make 
my own observation of Weber’s (1978: 941-1157) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, which is that in his explorations and explanations on the ideal types of domination, he 
did not limit or restrict the application of dominance to the level of the state (although this is 
specifically addressed). The main reason for pointing this out is that it helps to better understand the 
differences between the two main types of dominance.  
 
Perhaps the best example of the legal-rational bureaucratic type of dominance can be found in large 
corporate companies where, theoretically, the appointment of a board of directors (separation of 
ownership and administration) and the CEO (the authority) is subject to prescribed rules, the 
structure of the company is formal, and the selection of personnel impersonal. In terms of 
patrimonial dominance, the Mafia would possibly serve as a suitable example where the head of the 
organisation is also generally the head of a family/kinship that undertakes the administration of the 
“business”, there are no fixed or written rules, and the business itself operates based on skewed 
power relations between the Mafia and the small business owners to whom they provide “protection 
services”. It must be noted that the criminality of this example is not to imply or delegitimise 
patrimonialism; it is just a good example and the counterargument would be that corporate 
companies are also often involved in criminal activities.   
 
Being able to separate the notion of dominance from its application on state- or country-level 
analysis is important because it shows that Weber’s type of dominance is concerned with describing 
the way in which legitimate authority (over a hierarchical structure organisation) is derived and is 
characteristic of the systems under which that authority is exercised. It does not necessarily allude 
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to or imply any specific set of values or principles on which that authority is legitimised. Neither of 
the examples provided (corporate company or the Mafia) could be considered democratic.  
 
The conflation of types of dominance with types of regimes has been a major source of contention 
for those critical of neopatrimonialism and yet even among those critical of this conflation, it is 
often reaffirmed. For example, Erdmann and Engel (2007: 114) initially acknowledged that not all 
legal-rational forms of dominance are necessarily democratic. However, they later state in their 
closing remarks that “neopatrimonialism corresponds with authoritarian politics, whereas legal-
rational domination relates to democracy”.  
 
While it is true that most, if not all, democratic regimes are more aligned to the legal-rational form 
of dominance, I would argue that it is not true that all legal-rational forms of dominance are 
democratic. A definitively undemocratic regime, South Africa’s apartheid government serves as a 
prime example of this fact. Under the apartheid regime, racial discrimination was “rationalised”, 
legislated, and regulated, much the same as it had been done earlier across the Western world. A 
feature of the apartheid regime was that it actually formalised and legislated traditional (semi-
patrimonial) dominance under various pieces of legislation, starting with the Bantu Authorities Act, 
No. 68 of 1951 (South African History Online [SAHO], 2011).  
 
This Act decreed that chiefs, appointed by the South African government, would become 
local administrators of so-called ‘tribal areas’. This was the beginning of separate 
development, better known as apartheid. In 1959 a policy of Promotion of Bantu Self 
Government was adopted. This formed the basis for the ‘bantustans’, homelands for the 
original inhabitants of South Africa (Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 1996: 52). 
 
This highlights a second aspect that Weber made explicitly clear, being that “[t]he forms of 
domination occurring in historical reality constitute combinations, mixtures, adaptations, or 
modifications of these ‘pure’ [ideal] types” (Weber, 1978: 954). This is to say that in reality there 
does not exist in any country, nation, or organisation that can claim to be a “pure” form of legal-
rational or patrimonial dominance, but there will be a combination of the ideal types. Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1994: 459) were some of the first scholars to acknowledge this gap, when they stated 
that “while neopatrimonial practices can be found in all polities, it is the core feature of politics in 
Africa”. Attempting to reconcile the understanding that all states possess traits that are both legal-
rational and patrimonial, “Van de Walle (2001a) and others suggest that countries may differ in the 
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extent of their neopatrimonialism along a unilinear continuum from ideal types of completely 
patrimonial on one end to completely rational-legal on the other” (DeGrassi, 2008: 110). 
 
Erdmann and Engel (2007) and others (such as Isaacs, 2014) highlight that a significant academic 
gap in the historic application of the concept is the lack of recognition of the legal-rational aspects 
of neopatrimonialism. They contend that, in terms of its application to Africa, seemingly too much 
focus has been placed on the informal dynamics of neopatrimonialism and that insufficient attention 
has been paid to the formal bureaucratic rules. This is seemingly the case as, based on my research 
on neopatrimonial literature, I was unable to find a single case study (singular or comparative) that 
clearly articulates or examines the legal-rational aspects of the specific countries being analysed. 
The question that must therefore be asked is how one can determine the degree and extent to which 
neopatrimonialism (existence of both legal-rational and patrimonial) might actually exist in said 
country. It would seem then that the application of neopatrimonialism in comparative analysis has 
not in fact been to compare countries with regard to each country’s relative degree of 
patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism, but rather a comparison between these countries and an 
“ideal type” based on Western democracy ideals (Bach, 2011; DeGrassi, 2008; Gray & Whitfield, 
2014; Isaacs, 2014; Mkandawire, 2015; Pitcher et al., 2009).  
 
2.2.2.2 Reciprocity, accountability, and legitimacy  
 
[Weber’s] use of the term patrimonial … included notions of reciprocity and voluntary 
compliance between rulers and the ruled … For Weber, patrimonialism was … a specific 
form of authority and source of legitimacy (Pitcher et al., 2009: 125). 
 
The failure to explore and recognise the legal-rational component of neopatrimonialism might also 
be an explanation as to why there appears to also be a general lack of acknowledgement of the state 
in its entirety and not just the bureaucratic government (i.e. to include analysis of the broader 
population/society, private sector and “informal” institutions such as non-governmental 
organisations [NGOs] and the media). In not adequately accounting for the legal-rational 
characteristic of neopatrimonial dominance, implying the separation of public and private, scholars 
neglected to also recognise the other centres/actors with power that exist outside of formal 
government bureaucracy. In understanding the state, government is only one part of it and here 
exists a host of other public, as well as private, institutions that should be considered. This is an 
important factor to consider, particularly in relation to the role of the private sector in terms of 
economic power and development (corruption does not just take place within government, it 
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requires an external actor). The role of NGOs and independent media and their relationship 
dynamics with government are also key considerations regarding holding those in power of 
authority accountable. It is also equally important to consider the sovereignty of the state and the 
role of other external actors, particularly in the context of globalisation.      
 
The importance of analysing the state in its entirety speaks directly to the third major 
misrepresentation that is often made with regard to Weber’s theories on ideal types of dominance, 
namely the issue of legitimacy of authority. In most instances of its application, the “legitimacy” of 
the neopatrimonial dominance in the respective countries is never fully explored or stated in relation 
to the countries’ specific formal legal-rational context. Legitimacy is not only determined by legal 
means; it is also established on “consensuses” of the populace. In terms of Weber, for a form of 
dominance to be considered legitimate, it requires that obedience (or submission) of the ruled to the 
commands or authority of the ruler would, by necessity, need to a certain extent be voluntary. As 
noted by Szelenyi (2016: 6), for Weber, traditional (or patrimonial) forms of dominance are 
considered legitimate “if those subordinated to authority accept their subordination, since they 
cannot define a better alternative and the staff of the person who issues commands has a firm belief 
that the master’s claims (myths for his superiority) are valid”. 
 
Legal-rational forms of dominance are considered legitimate when “every single bearer of powers 
of command is legitimated by that system of rational norms, and his power is legitimate insofar as it 
corresponds with the norm. Obedience is thus given to the norms rather than to the person” (Weber, 
1978: 954).  
 
For neopatrimonialism it is important to determine how one differentiates whether obedience by 
subordinates is being given to the individual (the ruler) or if it is being given to the norms (the 
rules). Erdmann and Engel (2007: 114) assert that “[p]ublic norms under neopatrimonialism are 
formal and rational, but their social practice is often personal and informal”. I would argue that this 
assertion is incorrectly stated and that it adds to the notion of imposing Western ideals, as opposed 
to examining the contextual realities of Africa and elsewhere. The legal “norms” of a country may 
be prescribed (legislated) as formal and rational, but these do not imply that social (or public) norms 
are also necessarily formal and rational. Botswana, which is considered by Pitcher et al. (2009) to 
be an exception to the general application of neopatrimonial theory, may be the best example of 
this. I propose that the main reason for Botswana being an exception is that it is a situation where 
the public norms and practised norms of those in authority are neopatrimonial in nature, but they are 
aligned and, as such, the country can be considered stable and legitimate. I agree with Pedersen 
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(2015: 142) when he states: “In trying to understand public administration in African countries, it 
appears to be as important to uncover such norms and practices as individuals’ neopatrimonial or 
rational-legal motivations.”  
 
2.2.2.3 Regulated versus predatory forms of neopatrimonialism 
 
For Weber, patrimonialism was not a synonym for corruption, ‘bad governance’, violence, 
tribalism, or a weak state (Pitcher et al., 2009: 125).  
 
The statement above made by Pitcher et al. (2009) is the last major misrepresentation of Weber’s 
theory on legitimate types of dominance. The general application of neopatrimonialism appears to 
have failed to recognise that patrimonialism is a legitimate form of dominance and that there is a 
necessary degree to which personal rulers are held accountable to those they rule over. This is a 
critical point, as under legitimate patrimonialism the ruler is required to govern in a manner that is 
in the interest of his/her subjects and not only in consideration of self-interests. In the majority of 
instances where neopatrimonialism is applied, it is when those in authority are only concerned with 
their own narrow interests and not those of the broader society. In short, neopatrimonialism is 
applied to instances of an abuse of power (hence the seemingly automatic association with 
corruption). There are indeed situations where legal and public norms are formal and rational, but 
practices of those in power are not aligned. This issue has to some extent been addressed by 
scholars who differentiated between “regulated” (where practices focus on effective rents 
distribution that can be developmental) and “predatory” (excessive rent-seeking, with distribution 
bias) types of neopatrimonialism (Bach, 2011). However, this differentiation is not often reflected 
in the application of neopatrimonialism, where the concept has seemingly become synonymous 
with the latter.  
 
2.2.2.4 Is the concept of neopatrimonialism still useful?  
 
Given the issues raised above, the question that remains is in what way neopatrimonialism can 
remain useful. I would argue that there are two potential trajectories that neopatrimonial theory can 
follow in the future.  
 
First would be that neopatrimonialism remains a concept that reflects a type of “ideal” dominance 
and continues to be applied for the purposes of political comparative analysis. However, I would 
argue that this would only be acceptable provided academics and scholars who utilise the concept in 
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this way take into account the issues that are described above. It should be acknowledged that over 
time, perhaps in response to critical views of the concept, it seems that these issues are increasingly 
being recognised and addressed in their application.  
 
In their article, titled Neopatrimonialism reconsidered: Critical review and elaboration of an 
elusive concept, Erdmann and Engle (2007) provide possibly the best definition for a “post-
Weberian” interpretation of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in particular relation to the state, 
which is that  
 
[n]eopatrimonialism is a mixture of two co-existing, partly interwoven, types of domination: 
namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all 
power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are 
personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. 
However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at 
least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction. 
Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-
rational bureaucracy or ‘modern’ stateness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although 
in practice the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed ... the 
patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and output, 
but does not take exclusive control over the legal-rational logic. That is, informal politics 
invades formal institutions. Informality and formality are intimately linked to each other in 
various ways and by varying degrees; and this mix becomes institutionalised (Erdmann & 
Engel, 2007: 105).   
 
Within this definition, Erdmann and Engel (2007) no longer attempt to define dominance in the 
strict terms of Weber, but make several distinctions that may assist in finding clarity on the use of 
neopatrimonialism theory. In particular, they differentiate personal relations of patrimonialism and 
impersonal characteristics of legal-rational form, with the separation of the political and the 
administrative relations; they reaffirm the separation of public and private under the legal-rational; 
and they emphasise the existence (“invading”) of informal politics within formal institutions.  
I would argue that these differentials exist in all states (or any form of community or organisation) 
across the world and this again reaffirms the assertion that neopatrimonialism is in fact present in all 
regime types. The only distinction that Erdmann and Engel (2007) make with regard to 
neopatrimonialism is that “the patrimonial penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, 
functions, and output” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007: 105). I would argue that this assertion cannot be 
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made unless the country is analysed within its own distinct legal-rational framework and its 
respective public norms and practices are assessed in order to determine legitimacy.  
 
Erdmann and Engel (2007: 113) state that “[n]eopatrimonialism is a heuristic concept, derived from 
the works of Weber, for the comparative analysis of political domination”. Provided that this is 
explicitly stated up front by scholars in their adoption of the concept and that the underlying 
presumptions with regard to the analysis are clearly stated, this application of the concept is still 
relevant and useful. As illustrated in the discussion above, historical interpretations and applications 
in the comparison are specifically in relation to an ideal type of “Western democratic” legal-rational 
forms of dominance, which are considered the public norms, and where the neopatrimonial 
practices observed are predominantly predatory or corrupt in nature. The admitted irony, given my 
critical view of the concept’s application, is that it is in fact exactly under these suppositions that the 
concept of neopatrimonialism is applied to this case study of State Capture in South Africa. 
Section 2.2 outlines the context-specific description of neopatrimonial concepts applicable to this 
case study.   
 
As indicated previously, neopatrimonialism is not only applied in political studies but is widely 
adopted in economic and development studies. Thus far, neopatrimonialism has been utilised as a 
“catch-all” explainer (the cause) for the economic development failures of African states, depicting 
a linear relationship between economic development and type of dominance. This again is a 
reductionist application of the concept and does not adequately address the interconnectedness and 
complexity of social, economic, and political realities of a state or its development. However, in its 
application to economic and development studies, neopatrimonialism has evolved to become a kind 
of undefined analytical framework for assessing the economic development and “good” governance 
(or rather institutional development) of a state. This then provides the second trajectory that 
neopatrimonialism theory could follow.  
 
Rather than being a fixed set of ideal characteristics to define particular type(s) of state dominance, 
neopatrimonialism could be further developed into an empirical analysis tool (or formal framework) 
that links interconnected and related theories across a variety of disciplines and respective units of 
analysis and measurement. This would include, for example, political theories, such as regime 
types, freedom of the media, the strength of civil society, and the use of violence by governments; 
economic theories on rent management, corruption, market regulation and competition, and 
economic inequality; and social theories on societal norms and practices, individual freedoms and 
inequality, diversity or homogeny of the populace, etc. Neopatrimonialism as an analytical 
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framework would then evolve from being a concept related to a fixed type of descriptive analysis to 
the collective analysis of a broad range of multidisciplinary interrelated phenomena. 
 
Being derived from neopatrimonial theory, the framework would fundamentally need to account for 
both formal and informal relations and differentiate between norms and practices that are present in 
all aspects of the state. Catering for the informal dynamics (which by their nature are not fixed or 
definitive) requires the recognition that states are path dependent, and are continuously changing 
and evolving. As such, neopatrimonialism as a framework would therefore by necessity need to be 
expanded and specifically formulated to account for these complexities, but it is precisely through 
accounting for these complexities that the full value of neopatrimonial theory might be realised.  
 
Developing such a framework is outside the scope of this research. However, the case study itself 
provides insights into neopatrimonial theory and the potential value that may lie in transforming 
neopatrimonialism from a fixed concept into an analytical framework.  
 
2.2.3 The link between state capture and neopatrimonialism 
 
The question that remains is how neopatrimonialism relates to state capture. Drawing the link 
between state capture and neopatrimonialism is not easy and very few authors explicitly address in 
any great detail the inextricable connection between these two theories. There is hardly any 
reference to neopatrimonialism in literature on state capture. Conversely, in literature on 
neopatrimonialism, very little recognition (or elaboration) is given to state capture, other than as 
being a type of “grand corruption”. Sindzingre (2012: 98), for instance, acknowledges that “the 
‘capture’ of political processes, policies and institutions by private interest groups is a dimension of 
neopatrimonialism”, but does not elaborate further. Erdmann and Engel (2007: 96), in their article 
titled Neopatrimonialism reconsidered: Critical review and elaboration of an elusive concept, 
emphasised that they did not address the “problem of the political economy of neopatrimonialism, 
and the obvious relationship between rent-seeking and neopatrimonialism”.  
 
This disconnect between the two theories is, however, puzzling, as state capture fundamentally 
speaks to the concept of neopatrimonialism. For state capture to occur requires the concurrent 
existence of a willing public official that is situated within the formal “legal-rational bureaucracy” 
and an external actor (private firm or an individual) who enters an informal exchange, which could 
be patrimonial (or neopatrimonial) in nature, from which both the external actor and the public 
official derive some form of undue benefit.  
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It is important to emphasise that corruption (and state capture, as initially defined) as a general 
concept is far broader than its applications in neopatrimonial theory; which is to say that, even 
though corruption (in various forms) is a characteristic of neopatrimonialism (according to its 
historic application), not all instances of corruption are neopatrimonial in nature. Establishing 
whether a particular instance of corruption is neopatrimonial in nature requires establishing whether 
a personal or political relationship exists through which the corrupt exchange is enabled. This 
entails examining not only what the corrupt activity is, but also who is involved and how it was 
achieved.     
 
As outlined in the previous section, neopatrimonialism through its application has come to represent 
an undefined collective of interconnected phenomena and it could thus be said that state capture is a 
sub-type phenomenon of a predatory form of systemic neopatrimonialism. Figure 4 provides a 
graphic representation of how the concepts of neopatrimonialism, corruption, state capture, and the 
context specifically define South Africa’s State Capture overlap.  
 
 
Figure 4: Interests of neopatrimonialism and state capture 
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2.3 Conceptual Framework for South Africa’s State Capture 
 
2.3.1 Points of departure: Neopatrimonialism in South Africa 
 
Increasingly within the ANC, leadership behaviour appears to be characterized by neo-
patrimonial predispositions and, while formal distinctions between private and public 
concerns are widely recognized, officials nevertheless use their public powers for private 
purposes (Lodge, 2014: 1). 
 
The statement above was made by Tom Lodge in 2014 in an article titled Neo-patrimonial politics 
in the ANC. The importance of highlighting the date of the article is that the notion of 
neopatrimonialism being a core fixture of South African politics is not new and had been identified 
some time before the revelations contained in the Public Protector’s State of Capture report. For 
Lodge (2014), neopatrimonialism is deeply embedded within the ANC and is fundamentally rooted 
in the long history of the party. Lodge (2014), together with other scholars, suggests that the 
“patronage-based relationships formed the core of inter-elite alliances within the ANC in its early 
years” (cited in Beresford, 2015: 231). Patrimonial (and neopatrimonial) tendencies were reinforced 
and entrenched under the apartheid regime, where “during its time [in] exile, it became not only a 
dispenser of employment, welfare, education and scholarships to many who had fled South Africa, 
but was to become deeply entangled with criminal networks” (Southall, 2016: 81). Lodge (2014), 
Beresford (2015), and Southall (2016) all highlight that, since being elected into power, the extent 
of these patrimonial and neopatrimonial tendencies within the ANC has become increasingly more 
apparent. They all acknowledge that the increase of these tendencies was not only due to the gained 
control of the immense swaths of state resources, but is also in response to the highly skewed 
economy they inherited, where systemic inequalities of apartheid meant that the majority of the 
country’s citizens were grossly underprovided for by the state. When Nelson Mandela was 
inaugurated as the first democratically elected president of the country, he made the following 
promise to the nation, on behalf of the ANC: 
 
… to liberate all our people from the continuing bondage of poverty, deprivation, suffering, 
gender and other discrimination … [to] build [a] society in which all South Africans, both 
black and white, will be able to walk tall, without any fear in their hearts, assured of their 
inalienable right to human dignity – a rainbow nation at peace with itself and the world 
(SABC Digital News, 2015). 
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It is this promise that the academics of the SCRP argue that the Zuma administration betrayed 
(Bhorat et al., 2017). In the Betrayal of the Promise report, they argue that legitimate concerns of 
addressing the systemic injustices and addressing the issues of high inequality, poverty, and 
unemployment were used to mask and hide an ulterior agenda of extracting state resources for the 
benefit of a few power elite. If we acknowledge that South Africa has, since the dawn of 
democracy, operated under neopatrimonial dominance, I would argue that what the Betrayal of the 
Promise report outlined is how, under the Zuma administration, there was a distinctive change in 
the type of neopatrimonial dominance of the country, going from a regulated to a predatory form of 
neopatrimonialism.  
 
It needs to be recognised that undoubtedly strong comparison can be drawn between the types of 
predatory neopatrimonialism phenomena that have occurred under the Zuma administration to those 
of the apartheid regime (Lodge, 2014). The challenge with drawing this comparison is that the 
apartheid government operated under a distinctly different legal-“ration” form of dominance and 
such comparison falls outside of the scope of this reach. There were most definitely significant acts 
of corruption and potentially state capture under Mbeki and even the Mandela administrations, the 
Arms Deal scandal being perhaps the most notable (Hyslop, 2005). However, because of the dismal 
state of the economy they inherited and the economic policies that implemented to address this, the 
access to rent seeking opportunities was limited. In addition, as noted previous, there appears to 
have been a distinctive shift in the nature and objectives of government under the Zuma 
administration, where it appears that decisions and actions made by the former president and his 
administration were taken with disregard for what was good for the country and appearing to have 
been for his own narrow interests.  
 
It is important to highlight that the purpose of this case study is not to examine the history of 
neopatrimonialism in South Africa or to explore in detail why State Capture was able to occur, but 
rather to describe and define what the phenomenon of State Capture is and how it manifests within 
a government institution. As noted previously, for the purposes of this case study, State Capture is a 
term that is used to encapsulate the distinct contemporary phenomenon that has occurred under the 
Zuma administration in South Africa. In light of this, it is neither necessary nor practical (given the 
limitations of time for the study) to provide a fully detailed explanation of the political dynamics of 
and within the ANC. Similarly, it is not feasible for the case study to address all the various actors 
and activities involved in State Capture. The Betrayal of the Promise report focused on SOEs and 
the Zuma-Gupta network. However, as highlighted in the report, this is only one node of the State 
Capture network and looting of the state is only one of the many activities that constitute State 
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Capture. All of these aspects fall outside the scope of this case study, but I strongly recommend that 
they be explored as part of future research.  
 
There are, however, several key points that are laid out in the Betrayal of the Promise report that are 
important for providing context in this case study. The first is to address how and why it was that 
Zuma came to be elected as president of the ANC at the national conference in Polokwane in 2007 
and then in 2009 became president of the country. In the Betrayal of the Promise report, the SCRP 
argues that Zuma’s election was in response to the approach and policies adopted by his 
predecessor, Thabo Mbeki.   
 
Under Mbeki’s presidency, South Africa’s approach to addressing the socio-economic challenges 
inherited from the apartheid regime had three key features, which were encapsulated in the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy.  
 
This entailed the following (Bhorat et al., 2017: 7):  
 
 Massive expansion of the grants system for the poor and the unemployed, focusing 
principally on mothers and the aged. 
 A strong focus on ‘deracialising’ control of the economy through affirmative action policies 
designed to fast-track the placement of black people into management and senior 
management positions. 
 Transformation of white ownership of the economy through BEE policies.   
 
This “developmental welfarism” approach (that placed confidence in market-driven transformation) 
was not aligned to the more radical dispositions of the party, which favoured a view that in order for 
meaningful development to take place, it required leveraging of state resources and under deliberate 
state intervention to speed up transformation (Bhorat et al., 2017: 7). Also noted was that Mbeki 
shifted political power away from the ANC and was focused on building the Office of the 
Presidency to be the main centre of authority for determining the country’s developmental 
trajectory. Zuma’s election at Polokwane was in effect a retort to Mbeki’s leadership approach and 
signalled the start of two interrelated transitions that would be the underpinning of the Zuma 
administration, namely (Bhorat et al., 2017: 7):   
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 The transition from traditional black economic empowerment (BEE), which was premised 
on the possibility of reforming the white-dominated economy (now depicted as white 
monopoly capital), to radical economic transformation [RET], which is driven by 
transactors disguised as a black capitalist class not dependent on white monopoly capital. 
 The transition from acceptance of the constitutional settlement and the ‘rules of the game’ to 
a repurposing of state institutions that is achieved, in part, by breaking the rules. 
 
I, like the SCRP, do not have any argument against the very real need for “RET” in the country. The 
issue is that this legitimate call for action has been misappropriated and used to mask the corrupt 
exploitation of the state by a select few politically connected elite to the detriment of the rest of the 
country. This deception is in essence what State Capture is all about, as noted in the Betrayal of the 
Promise report (Bhorat et al., 2017: 4):  
 
It is now clear that while the ideological focus of the ANC is ‘radical economic 
transformation’, in practice Jacob Zuma’s presidency is aimed at repurposing state 
institutions to consolidate the Zuma-centred power elite. Whereas the former appears to be 
a legitimate long-term vision to structurally transform South Africa’s economy to eradicate 
poverty and reduce inequality and unemployment, the latter – popularly referred to as ‘state 
capture’ – threatens the viability of the state institutions that need to deliver on this long-
term vision. 
 
Drawing on the Betrayal of the Promise report, together with other literature on state capture and 
neopatrimonialism, the paragraphs that follow provide descriptions of key concepts that are used to 
define State Capture.   
 
2.3.2 The constitutional and shadow states 
 
[W]e will refer to the emergence of a symbiotic relationship between the constitutional state 
and the shadow state. The constitutional state refers to the formalised constitutional, 
legislative and jurisprudential framework of rules that governs what government and state 
institutions can and cannot do. The shadow state refers to the networks of relationships that 
cross-cut and bind together a specific group of people who need to act together for whatever 
reason in secretive ways so that they can either effectively hide, actively deny or consciously 
‘not know’ that which contradicts their formal roles in the constitutional state (Bhorat et al., 
2017: 6; Researcher’s emphasis).  
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South Africa is a constitutional democratic state, in which public norms are based on the 
Constitution and all the citizens of the country are expected to act in accordance to the rule of law 
(or at least should be). The shadow state, however, does not prescribe to the values or principles on 
which the Constitution is based. Fundamentally, the practised norms of the shadow state are in 
contradiction to the public norms. Deception is the key tool for the shadow state in order for it to 
achieve its objectives, by corrupting and manoeuvring within the constitutional state. The ultimate 
objective of the shadow state is not only to subvert the Constitution, but, if allowed, to replace it – 
hence reference made in the Betrayal of the Promise report to a “silent coup” (Bhorat et al., 2017: 
3). This can only be achieved by changing public norms, often through deception that is rooted in 
populist politics.   
 
It is important to note that in some instances individuals might not knowingly or willingly be part of 
shadow state activities. The motivations and intentions behind an individual’s actions vary and can 
be co-opted through cohesion or coercion. Deception also takes place within the shadow state itself, 
where individuals may not have full knowledge of the actual ultimate intentions/objectives of 
certain actions or decisions.   
 
The second point is that the shadow state consists of not only individuals who are employed in 
government, but fundamentally includes external actors outside of government. This could include 
collectives within the political party, family and tribal affiliates, and a wide array of other actors. 
Most often this will also include at least one individual/company in the private sector, through 
which the intended benefits (financial, political, or both) for the power elite can be derived.  
 
2.3.3 Power elite and Kitchen Cabinets 
 
In the Betrayal of the Promise report, the notion of a “power elite” (also referred to as the Zuma-
centred elite) refers to 
  
a relatively well-structured network of people located in government, state institutions, 
SOEs, private businesses, security agencies, traditional leaders, family networks and the 
governing party. The defining feature of membership of this group is direct (and even 
indirect) access (either consistently or intermittently) to the inner sanctum of power to 
influence decisions. The power elite exercises its influence both through formal and 
informal means. However, what unites the power elite is the desire to manage effectively the 
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symbiotic relationship between the constitutional and shadow states. In order to do this, and 
in broad terms, this power elite loosely organises itself around a ‘patron or strongman’, 
who has direct access to resources, under whom a layer of ‘elites’ forms who dispense the 
patronage, which is then managed by another layer of ‘brokers, fixers or middlemen’ 
(Bhorat et al., 2017: 5). 
 
What distinguishes the “power elite” from the broader shadow state is that individual power elites 
are aware and supportive of the objectives of State Capture and they are in fact the drivers or 
managers behind the activities of the shadow state.  
 
As indicated above, members of the power elite can serve various different roles (as elites, brokers, 
fixers, or middlemen) that are required to achieve a specific State Capture objective. These roles are 
not fixed and not are defined by any specific prescripts (as the shadow state operates without any 
fixed rules) and an individual might in fact perform multiple roles in different situations. Each of 
these roles, however, serves specific functions, which enable the power elite to repurpose and 
extract benefits from the constitutional mandates of the government.  
 
For the purposes of State Capture, “elites” are considered those individuals who are in positions that 
yield exclusive power within the constitutional state. This would include ministers, deputy 
ministers, board members, and senior administrative positions such as CEOs of state companies. 
These are positions of oversight, ultimate accountability, and with executive/exclusive authority. 
“Fixers”, on the other hand, are involved at an administrative or operational level. They can operate 
formally or informally both within and outside of the constitutional state. Their function is to 
infiltrate and manipulate the processes and functioning of the state, and they serve as an 
accountability buffer between the elite and any illicit activities that are taking place within the 
government. The broker or middleman thus serves as a secondary buffer, where they reside in the 
shadow state and fall outside of any formal engagements or exchanges. Without having any direct 
involvement in any of the formal contracting, the middleman is free to interact with and between 
the various members of the shadows state, both within and outside of the government and the 
external benefiting party (be it a company, political party, or select group of individuals). 
 
Determining exactly who the members of the power elite are is not an easy task, but they are often 
involved in multiple projects of the shadow state. Unlike instances of “petty” corruption, where a 
direct link can be made between the actions of the official and the illicit payment by the benefiting 
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party, the power elite can be a facilitator in one project and then be “paid out” (or derive benefit) 
from a completely separate project. This is what I refer to as “trading in fears and favours”.  
 
The structures and settings within which the coordination and negotiations of and between the 
power elite occurs are what the SCRP refers to as Kitchen Cabinets. These can take place either in 
formal or informal structures, both inside and outside of the government. The Betrayal of the 
Promise report provides the following description:  
 
Kitchen Cabinets are small informal reference groups that are convened on an as-needed 
basis. They can also be shell structures that are activated when needed … Kitchen cabinets 
can be once-off consultative events (e.g., with black business), or semi-permanent structures 
like inter-ministerial committees comprising people from different sectors and environments 
to tackle a common issue, or regular meetings with key networks (e.g., the Guptas or family 
networks). They are essentially how the competing nodes within the power elite coalesce 
and disperse to influence decision making (Bhorat et al., 2017: 15). 
 
2.3.4 Repurposing the state  
 
Repurposing state institutions refers to the organised process of reconfiguring the way in 
which a given state institution is structured, governed, managed and funded so that it serves 
a purpose different to its formal mandate. Understanding state capture purely as a vehicle 
for looting does not explain the full extent of the political project that enables it. Institutions 
are captured for a purpose beyond looting. They are repurposed for looting, as well as for 
consolidating political power to ensure longer-term survival, the maintenance of a political 
coalition, and its validation by an ideology that masks private enrichment by reference to 
public benefit (Bhorat et al., 2017: 5).
 
 
 
Corruption as a concept does not adequately cover the variety of other ways in which benefits can 
be illicitly extracted from the state by those in power. Repurposing, as defined above, is a concept 
that caters for a much broader range of activities that do not necessarily meet the strict definition of 
corruption. It also allows for activities that might not be explicitly illegal, but are definitively 
unethical (not aligned to public norms) and/or are an abuse, or rather a misuse, of power. 
Corruption is still of course one of the most predominant ways in which the state is repurposed.  
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2.3.5 The party political machinery: Clientelism and patronage 
 
In our democratic (constitutional) system, any strongman is in turn reliant on maintaining political 
patronage in order to retain power, either through cohesion or violence (in the broadest definition of 
these terms). If we recognise that the Guptas only form one node of the network, which is purposely 
focused on addressing the financial looting tasks of the shadow state, it then requires us to enquire 
as to who may be involved in the other nodes and what function they fulfil in terms of establishing 
and maintaining control over the shadow state. It is in this regard that those elites in the cabinet, as 
well as those elites outside government but within the ANC structures (in this case it is Dlamini, in 
her position as leader of the ANCWL), have an important role to play. As discussed in Section 
2.2.2, clientelism is considered a key characteristic and is central to both regulated and predatory 
forms of neopatrimonialism.  
 
State capture, as a form of grand corruption, is for the most part understood as an end in and of 
itself with the singular objective of looting the state. This is, however, different to the broader and 
more rigorous notion of State Capture as a political project, which aims to continue, grow, and 
ultimately replace the current socio-political compact as laid out in the Constitution. Manzetti and 
Wilson (2007: 949) highlight that “as long as corrupt leaders can satisfy their clientelistic networks 
by manipulating government resources, they are likely to retain political support”. Arguably, this is 
the basis from which all political parties operate and is the root of populist politics (Anciano, 2018). 
The State Capture project differs, however, in that it requires the perversion of the populist 
sentiment to camouflage the manipulation of resources for selective interests. When the majority of 
South Africans live in abject poverty and are unemployed or working poor, it is understandable that 
they will tend to favour and vote for those who are seen to be addressing their immediate plight, as 
opposed to “politicians who promise public goods (as opposed to individualized ones) in the long 
term” (Manzetti & Wilson, 2007: 954). Social grants (in many cases the only source of income on 
which beneficiaries are able to survive) can be viewed as an example of this. The perceived 
progressiveness associated with the marginal increases in grants has allowed the government (or 
rather the governing party) to avoid implementing much more difficult reforms necessary for 
structural transformation (Khan, 2013). Social grants are one of the main motivators for people 
voting for the ANC and as such reaffirms that the association of the state function with the political 
party is also important for the power elites to maintain power (Plaut, 2014). 
 
Van de Walle (2007: 3) draws a distinction between three types of clientelism. The first being 
termed “tribute”, which is used to denote the traditional form of distribution that occurs under the 
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“ideal” type of patrimonial dominance (and as such is not applicable to this case study). The second 
type is defined as “elite clientelism”, which is “the strategic political allocation of public offices to 
key elites, granting personal access over state resources” (Van de Walle, 2007: 3). This type of 
clientelism is a common occurrence under predatory forms of neopatrimonialism. The last type is 
“mass clientelism, which relies on the practice of using state resources to provide jobs and services 
for mass political clienteles, and usually involves party organizations and electoral politics” (Van de 
Walle, 2007: 3). Mass clientelism fundamentally has redistributive potential and, as such, can be 
found in both regulated and predatory forms of neopatrimonialism, and, as noted by Van de Walle 
(2007: 3) and others (such as Anciano, 2018), “should be associated with mass politics, including in 
the mature democracies of the West”.   
 
Under State Capture in South Africa, both elite and mass clientelism are present and both serve the 
purpose of gaining and maintaining power. Mass clientelism serves to mobilise and maintain voter 
support for the ANC, and elite clientelism serves to develop and maintain political allegiances 
within the ANC itself.  
 
2.3.6 The Long Game: Changing the rules of the game  
 
As highlighted previously, the key objective of the power elites is not only to abuse their temporary 
positions of power, but also to ensure the longevity of power. This can be done in two ways; the 
first is by maintaining satisfactory levels of mass clientelistic redistribution of state resources, as 
described in the previous section. Alternatively, this can be accomplished through influencing and 
changing (or rather transitioning) public norms to align with their “State Capture logics”. There are 
numerous ways in which public norms can be altered, some of which are particularly worth noting.  
 
The first is achieved through diminishing mechanisms of accountability within the state. It is for 
this reason that a crucial aspect of the State Capture political project entailed the hollowing out of 
the state security and law enforcement institutions (Bhorat et al., 2017). The second is to transform 
public norms to become aligned with the power elite’s practices. To quote from the Betrayal of the 
Promise report: “The aim of state capture is to change the formal and informal rules of the game, 
legitimise them and select the players allowed to play” (Bhorat et al., 2017: 5). This was the 
principal task of the propaganda machines driven by Bell Pottenger and funded by the Guptas, 
whose messages from their own media outlets (the New Age Newspaper and the DSTV channel 
ANN7) repetitively called for the admonishment of White Monopoly Capital (WMC). The 
“inadequacies” of the Constitution were echoed and carried by these shadow state structures. 
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The third way to ensure the longevity of State Capture is more aligned with the general 
interpretation of state capture, which entails the manipulation of government policy, or rather the 
ignoring/changing thereof, with the specific intention of benefiting the shadow state. This can be 
seen throughout the political project of State Capture, where examples include, among others, the 
interference at the SABC by Faith Muthambi (Southall, 2016); Eskom coal procurement policy not 
aligned to Mining Charter requirements under the leadership of Brian Molefe (Eskom, 2016); and 
the new Mining Charter proposed by Mosebenzi Zwane – which specifically allowed for Broad-
based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) to be applicable to naturalised citizens 
(Seccombe, 2017). 
 
2.3.7 State Capture and the modus operandi 
 
Drawing from the concepts defined above and combining the two theories of state capture and 
neopatrimonialism, to the specific context of the events that took place under the Zuma 
administration, State Capture can therefore be defined as follows:   
 
State Capture is the formation of a shadow state, directed by a group of power elite, which 
operates within and parallel to the constitutional state (in both formal and informal ways) 
and whose objective is to repurpose state governance in order to derive benefits that align 
with the power elite’s narrow financial or political interests – which are often in conflict 
with public norms and not aligned with the principles of the Constitution.  
 
Under this definition, State Capture is a specific type of systemic neopatrimonialism, where public 
norms are founded on liberal democratic legal-rational forms of dominance; however, the practices 
of those in power are predatory in nature and resemble a patrimonial form of dominance in that they 
are informal and personal. State capture (in terms of the strict theoretic definition and a form of 
grand corruption) is just one of the more visible phenomena that have occurred under South 
Africa’s State Capture. It is important to note, however, that there are several other phenomena that 
can be attributed to State Capture, including, but not limited to, the use and manipulation of media 
(capture of the independence of the media), securing control over law enforcement agencies (which 
enables but is not corruption), and using state resources to secure patronage (also not explicit 
corruption).  
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Drawing from the Betrayal of the Promise report, as well as other examples of what seem to be 
instances of State Capture in the media, it was possible to establish what might be considered the 
“typical” modus operandi of State Capture. In terms of the modus operandi for “capturing” a 
government institution, the shadow state undertakes the following tasks or actions from within the 
government itself: 
 
 Securing control over the public service, in particular through the appointment of cabinet 
ministers, board directors, heads of strategic agencies, etc.  
 Intentionally weakening key technical institutions and formal executive processes:  
o This often entails removing key top officials and replacing them with people who 
would not obstruct the objectives of the shadow state;  
o Having officials only in acting positions (limiting their ability to take long-term 
strategic decisions);  
o Appointing external advisors; and 
o Deploying persons (“fixers”) to intervene in the procurement process.  
 Securing access to opportunities for repurposing the state by manipulating or changing the 
directives or objectives of the government:  
o In cases where the shadow state objectives are for the purposes of accruing wealth, 
this often centres around large-scale projects/contracts; and  
o There is often an element of “scope creep” in the contract, where the value is 
increased or the contract is extended, potentially indefinitely. 
 Creating parallel political, governmental, and decision-making structures that undermine the 
functional operation of government institutions.   
 
Most examples of State Capture also entail actions/activities that are undertaken by the shadow 
state, which are outside of the government. The following are applicable to the State Capture of 
SASSA: 
 
 The companies that are awarded the contracts are either: 
o recently established (start-ups, with little experience); 
o complex joint ventures, with very little background/clarity of ownership or capability 
(B-BBEE deals often fall within this category); or 
o newly acquired reputable and established companies.  
 Behind formal (often legal) contract agreements are the “brokers/middlemen” who broker 
the deals, where wealth is often accumulated through lucrative B-BBEE partnerships entered 
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into with a private sector company and then distributed across the informal network of the 
power elites.  
 There is often a concerted effort by those in the shadow state to stifle or remove the 
competition or critics of shadow state operations.  
    
2.4 Understanding of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR)  
 
Many “buzz words” are used to describe the exponentially emerging advances in a vast spectrum of 
technological developments. Some refer to or are more specially focused within the perspective of a 
field of study or a sector of industry, such as the “6th Wave of Innovation” focusing on green 
technologies in sustainability science and long-wave transition theory (Kurki & Wilenius, 2015; 
Swilling, 2013), or Industry 4.0 (Ślusarczyk, 2018; Morrar, Arman & Mousa, 2017), which is 
utilised in the fields of business, economics, and development studies. Others focus on the 
convergence and emergence of a potential stream of new technologies, such as Web 3.0 or the 
Internet of Things (Morrar et al., 2017; World Economic Forum [WEF], 2016a). The challenge in 
finding an appropriate universal or all-encompassing descriptor for the future technological outlook 
is the uncertainty of how and which technologies will have dominance in the coming era of 
development. This is the nature of technology and innovation. However, what is certain is that there 
are likely to be significant disruptions to all aspects of human life. Emerging 
technologies/innovations already have a significant impact on the economy (automation in 
manufacturing), in politics (cyber warfare), and in society in general (social media).  
 
It is important to note that for the purposes of this research, the terms “disruptive innovation” or 
“technology disruption” (which are considered interchangeable for this research) are applied in the 
broadest possible sense and are not based on the specific use in disruptive technology theory that is 
applied in business studies (McDowall, 2018; Christensen, Raynor & McDonald, 2015). It should 
also be noted that for the purposes of this research, the concepts of new technology and innovation 
are not considered mutually exclusive. For clarity, disruption is used to indicate “serious alteration 
or destruction of structure”, and innovation means “the change of something established by the 
introduction of new methods, ideas or products” (Kramer, 2018: 247). The introduction of a new 
technology (be it a product or tool, method or process, systems, etc.) implies innovation. However, 
innovation does not necessarily imply a new technology; it only requires that said technology is 
adopted or applied in a new way. For example in this case study even though the biometric 
technology utilised by CPS is relatively old, however, the application of the technology to enable 
financial transactions was at the time a unique capability. The preference for CPS’s solution, despite 
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it not being catered for under the National Payment System regulations and not aligning to industry 
standard payment methods, makes the use of the biometric technology a form of disruptive 
innovation.    
 
Each year the WEF hosts an annual summit in Davos, Switzerland, where global business leaders, 
public sector officials, and academics (among others) meet to discuss and deliberate on the 
developmental state of the world. The theme of 2016’s gathering was Mastering the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (WEF, 2016b). The founder of the WEF, Klaus Schwab, believes that due to 
our advancements in technology, “we are on the verge of a revolution that will fundamentally 
transform the way we live, work and interact with each other”. For Schwab, the difference of the 
coming revolution, in comparison to previous technological development, is due to the “merging 
technologies that blur the boundaries between the physical, digital and biological world” (Prisecaru, 
2016: 61). This is arguably the first major international multi-stakeholder event that specifically 
focused on the broader potential social, economic, and to some extent political implications and 
changes that are likely to occur as a result of exponential disruptive technology development. It is 
for this reason that the term utilised for this case study is the Fourth Industrial Revolution.  
 
I agree with Oosthuizen (2016: 370), who states: 
 
The reasons supporting the conviction that a fourth and distinct revolution is underway, and 
not merely a continuance of the third industrial revolution, is because of its velocity (4IR is 
evolving at an exponential rather than linear rate), breadth and depth (4IR is not only 
changing the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of doing things but also ‘who’ we are), and systems 
impact (4IR sees the advent of transformation of entire systems, across (and within) 
countries, companies, industries and society as a whole). 
  
Most technologies and innovations are developed with the view of solving a problem or improving 
and adding value to a society. Technology and innovation can be considered as being “disruptive” 
when they fundamentally alter societal norms and practices, and change the way we live our lives. 
The “rules” that govern how society functions are inherently incorporated into the technology; 
however, the introduction of a new technology in turn disrupts how these functions manifest. This 
often means having to revise and adapt the “rules” to cater for the technology or in some cases it 
requires the establishing of new rules, where none were needed before (Klang, 2006). 
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The risks and opportunities associated with the 4IR are increasingly being identified and studied, 
particularly with regard to either a particular technology or a specific sector or industry. The energy 
sector, for instance, is undergoing a massive transformation with renewable energy technology, 
which presents significant opportunity in terms of reducing carbon emissions and mitigating the 
potential impact of climate change (Geels, 2011). The benefits associated with self-driving cars 
(reduced road accident deaths, for instance) come with the potential risk of massive labour 
displacement, which may result in millions of people becoming unemployed (WEF, 2016a). The 
extent of these potential technology impacts is beginning to filter into policy discussions and 
debates, particularly relating to specific sectors such as labour, education, and social protection.  
 
The broader implications of the 4IR collective disruption, in terms of not only economic but more 
so the social and political systems under which any given society is governed, are difficult to 
tangibly identify or plan for. This creates an uncomfortable environment of uncertainty in which 
technologies emerging for altruistic developmental pursuits are confronted with the stubbornness of 
legacy structures of power and governance.  
This uncertainty is illustrated by Schwab (2016), who explains that 
 
new technologies and platforms will increasingly enable citizens to engage with 
governments, voice their opinions, coordinate their efforts, and even circumvent the 
supervision of public authorities. Simultaneously, governments will gain new technological 
powers to increase their control over populations, based on pervasive surveillance systems 
and the ability to control digital infrastructure. 
 
The duality of the two potential outcomes of technology disruptions cannot be readily determined 
based on the technology alone. Ultimately, the outcomes of the unfolding 4IR will be as a result of a 
multitude of contextual factors, such as countries’ socio-economic dynamics or a state’s capacity to 
guide development and adapt exponentially to technology-driven change. As Schwab (2016) states: 
 
Ultimately, the ability of government systems and public authorities to adapt will determine 
their survival. If they prove capable of embracing a world of disruptive change, subjecting 
their structures to the levels of transparency and efficiency that will enable them to maintain 
their competitive edge, they will endure. If they cannot evolve, they will face increasing 
trouble. 
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The broader impacts that the social, economic, and political context has on development outcomes 
are often pushed aside in technology and innovation discourse. Conversely, discourse around the 
impact and challenges that come with technology advancement appears to be equally downplayed 
in social and political studies (Klang, 2006). In short, there currently does not appear to be any 
collective or holistic theoretical framework or concept for defining the 4IR and what its disruptive 
implications mean for human development.  
 
With that said, it is important to highlight that there are several emerging theoretical areas of 
research that are seeking to address at least some of these gaps. One example of a theory is the 
multi-level perspective (MLP) of socio-technical transitions, which is predominantly being explored 
and developed within the sector and discipline of energy research. Although in its early stages of 
conceptualisation, it potentially provides a starting point (or at least a point of reflection) for 
developing a multidisciplinary framework for addressing the 4IR.  
 
2.4.1 Technology transitions and disruptive innovation 
 
MLP has emerged in the field of energy research as a response to the global challenge of climate 
change, with the principal objective of understanding technology transitions and how they could be 
manipulated to speed up the transition from current forms of carbon-heavy energy production to 
renewable energy technologies (Wieczorek, 2018). Geels (2011: 26) defines MLP as follows: 
 
The multi-level perspective (MLP) is a middle-range theory that conceptualizes overall 
dynamic patterns in socio-technical transitions. The analytical framework combines 
concepts from evolutionary economics (trajectories, regimes, niches, speciation, path 
dependence, routines), science and technology studies (sense making, social networks, 
innovation as a social process shaped by broader societal contexts), structuration theory 
and neo-institutional theory (rules and institutions as ‘deep structures’ on which 
knowledgeable actors draw in their actions, duality of structure, i.e. structures are both 
context and outcome of actions, ‘rules of the game’ that structure actions.  
 
The MLP contends that technology transitions, which take place on a broader socio-technical 
landscape (first or upper level), are driven by several different interconnected socio-technical 
regimes (second or middle level) and that there is not a single set of factors that influence the way 
an alternative technology (referred to as niche technology, which is the third or lower level) 
emerges or is adopted. The value that this conceptualisation provides in terms of the 4IR is that it 
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entails a multidisciplinary approach and examines a problem or situation at different levels. The 
following extract is one of the more succinct explanations for MLP theory, provided by Wieczorek 
(2018: 204): 
 
The central level comprises of socio-technical regimes: sets of rules and routines that define 
the dominant ‘way of doing things’. Regimes account for path-dependence, stability and are 
often locked-in, which hinders radical change. Regimes are stabilised by the socio-technical 
landscape, a ‘broad exogenous environment that, as such, is beyond the direct influence of 
actors’ (Grin et al., 2010, p. 23). Landscape encompasses such processes as urbanisation, 
demographic changes, wars or crises that can put pressure on regimes making them 
vulnerable to more radical changes. Regimes transform on condition of availability of 
alternatives that can fulfil the same societal function. Alternatives are developed in niches, 
protected spaces, that facilitate experimentation with novelties. In the context of the MLP, 
system transformation is driven by change agents and occurs in the outcome of mutually 
reinforcing contextual, landscape pressures, internal regime destabilisation processes and 
upscaling of innovations developed in niches.  
 
Since it was first introduced, several criticisms have been levied against the theory (Wilson & 
Tyfield, 2018); one of particular note is the lack of acknowledgement of political dynamics in the 
socio-technical regime (Cherp, Vinichenko, Jewell, Brutschin & Sovacool, 2018; Meadowcroft, 
2009). MLP theory views technological transition from the perspective of technology development 
being driven by these social-technical systems, but it fails to recognise the “feedback loop” that is 
associated with the technological disruption. That is to say, it does not address the question as to 
how technology might affect the other various systems (or rather landscapes) within their own 
distinctive transition trajectories. The concerns are currently about the politics in technology 
development (entailing policy and regulation) and not the politics of technology disruption and the 
potential negative implications that might result from technology adoption or manipulation (Tyfield, 
2018). As Cherp et al. (2018: 184) caution MLP scholars:  
 
While highlighting important connections between the technological, the social, and the 
political, such representation runs the risk of over-simplifying political phenomena by 
reducing them to a conflict over technological innovation: for example, between on the one 
hand, change-resisting incumbents and on the other hand, change-seeking newcomers.  
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The main challenge with the application of this framework to the 4IR is the assumption of the 
exogenous nature of landscapes transitions in relation to technology adoption. Due the rapid 
exponential development of disruptive innovation, the assumption that the landscape transition will 
take place over longer periods of time must be called into question. Smith, Voß and Grin 
(2010: 441) highlight that the conceptualisation of landscapes includes, among others, 
“environmental and demographic change, new social movements, shifts in general political 
ideology, broad economic restructuring, emerging scientific paradigms, and cultural developments”. 
As discussed above, these are all matters of concern and are likely to be impacted by the 4IR.   
 
MLP transition theory is relatively young; it is still very much in development and it is already 
expansive in terms of theoretical implications. However, its application is still relatively limited in 
that its focus is primarily on addressing one main (very legitimate) concern of transitioning to a 
low-carbon energy regime in order to address the problem of climate change. Due to its limited 
scope and the issues with regard to addressing political power dynamics, further explanation and 
examination of MLP theory are not necessary for this case study. However, it is important to note 
that these issues (and other emergent issues) will undoubtedly continue to be addressed as the 
theory develops (Geels, Schwanen, Sorrell, Jenkins & Sovacool, 2018). In a recent critical 
reflection on the concept of “disruptive innovation”, Kramer (2018: 248) highlights that 
 
[w]hen … we speak of disruptive innovation in the energy system, the implicit understanding 
of virtually anyone I’ve ever spoken to – both during my time in industry and in academia – 
is that we’re speaking here about technical and business innovation. But what about 
innovation in our institutions? In global governance? Or lifestyle change? I believe that, in 
the light of the challenges ahead of us, the narrow focus on the technical and the business-
technical in the main-stream discourse of innovation is unjustified.  
 
2.4.2 Informality and corruption 
 
As noted, MLP transition theory, which is currently embedded in sustainable development studies, 
is just one of the research areas that could provide insight into and contribute to our collective 
understanding of what and how the 4IR will unfold. There are several other areas of research that 
are worth noting, specifically in relation to this case study.  
 
The first is that there appears to be increasing recognition of a need to address, or rather 
incorporate, “informality” into various areas of research related to technology development. As 
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noted earlier, a large amount of academic literature on technology and innovation disruption is 
concentrated either on the individual technologies themselves or within specific fields of research or 
disciplines. For example, Baumann (2013) provides a review of two books (Shadow Economies of 
Cinema and Digital Disruption) that are specifically concerned with how technological 
developments have impacted the distribution of movies in the film industry. Both these books are 
concerned with issues such as piracy (considered to be informal distribution) and the 
democratisation of media, and both discuss the various ways in which technology development 
(disruptions), such as DVDs and online streaming, has and continues to rapidly transform the film 
industry.  
 
A second example is provided by Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski and Seru (2017), in a working paper 
titled Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks. In this paper they examine the 
rise of what they refer to as “shadow banking”, which is the increased uptake of online financial 
services (such as those offered by “fintech” lenders like Net1) rather than utilising the services of 
traditional banking institutions. Buchak et al. (2017: 2) highlight that there are two possible 
hypotheses in relation to this shift by consumers. The first might be because of the “increased 
regulatory burden on traditional banks” and that “shadow banks exploit regulatory arbitrage” (i.e. 
the same formal regulations do not apply to these online financial service providers). The second is 
because of the “disruptive technology”, where Buchak et al. (2017: 2) note that “[f]intech shadow 
banks have gained market share because they provide better products, or because they provide 
existing products more cheaply, and their technology has disrupted the mortgage market”. Both 
these examples highlight the strong links between technology development and informality. 
Technology therefore both emerges from and in turn creates informality.    
 
The second area of research that should be noted in terms of disruptive innovation and the 4IR, 
which follows from the informality of technology development and disruption, is that technology 
transitions and transfers have the potential to protract or even exacerbate corruption. This relates to 
the path dependency of socio-technical transitions, but it is further related to the exponential speed 
at which technology and innovation are advancing. As highlighted by Eggers, Baker, Gonzalez and 
Vaughn (2012: 18), who discuss the implications of disruptive innovation within the public sector, 
 
[t]he pressure to move quickly vastly increases the likelihood of fraud, waste and abuse. 
Cost overruns, time overruns, cancelled projects, poor project selection, bid rigging, false 
claims, corruption and kickbacks are just a few of the consequences of trying to move too 
fast to spend public money.  
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Several case studies have explored the reality of the links between technology adoption and 
corruption. Sutherland provides two case studies that specifically examine the corruption within the 
telecommunications industries of two African countries, namely in Benin (Sutherland, 2011) and 
Morocco (Sutherland, 2015). Addo (2016) presents a similar case study, titled Explaining 
‘irrationalities’ of IT-enabled change in a developing country bureaucracy: the case of Ghana’s 
Tradenet. Addo and Sutherland both draw on neopatrimonialism theory as an explanation for the 
“irrationalities” and the failure of technology adaptation to local context. Although this is not 
something necessarily I agree with (in terms of the strict application of neopatrimonialism as 
elaborated on above), these articles do highlight the risks of corruption and that the concept of 
neopatrimonialism (the invading of informality in formal “rationality”) has bearing on technology 
adoption and transitions.  
 
Following from conventional economic development theory, it can be assumed that corruption 
would hamper a country’s ability to innovate. However, an article by Smith and Thomas (2015), 
titled The role of foreign direct investment and state capture in shaping innovation outcome in 
Russia, seems to suggest this is not necessarily the case. As they note:  
 
Corruption can affect innovation in two ways. It can either ‘grease’ or ‘sand the wheel’ of 
innovation (Leff 1964; Bailey 1966). Corruption can help remove rigid obstacles (‘greasing 
the wheel’), for example, by acting as a hedge against political risks, so that it can boost the 
scope and scale of investment [or] corruption can slow the process of economic 
development since rigidities created by regulations are endogenous to the system. This 
means that once bureaucrats realise they can take advantage of regulations, they produce 
more regulations. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that the highest bribes are not 
necessarily paid by those most efficient at producing, but by those most efficient at rent-
seeking (Smith & Thomas, 2015: 782).  
 
2.5 Colliding Paradigms of Multiple Theories 
 
State capture, as a form of grand corruption, is often examined in terms of its impact on the 
economy. Often examined at a national level, it is primarily focused on incorporating high-level 
analysis of structures and governance of formal institutions and the financial implications thereof. 
However, the issue that state capture does not adequately address in terms of understanding what 
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has taken place under the Zuma administration is the informal and political aspects of what has 
transpired.  
 
State capture takes place at the firm or institutional level. In its application it primarily describes or 
is concerned with the outcome of one particular type of interaction and does not refer to or reflect 
on the nature (why or how) of the event itself. The events themselves are distinct and discrete, with 
a specific set of actors and decisions. 
  
Neopatrimonial theory has historically been associated with transitioning political economies, but 
its historic application in both political and development sciences is seen by many to be a 
reductionist concept that serves as an Afro-pessimist “catch-all” explanation for corruption and 
dysfunctional governance associated with the African continent. I, however, argue that the concept 
is still very useful, provided it is contextually applied, where both the legal-rational (formal and 
impersonal) and patrimonial (informal and personal) aspects of governance are addressed, and 
public norms versus authoritative practices are assessed honestly.  
   
Systemic neopatrimonialism takes place at the national or regional level and entails multiple 
occurrences of a collective of different events or sub-phenomena. It describes the nature or 
characteristics of the governance model under which these events occur. This phenomenon consists 
of multiple actors, having multiple interactions, and takes place over a long period of time. As 
outlined in the conceptual framework, this case study is particularly focused on a specific instance 
of predatory neopatrimonialism, where state capture (as a form of grand corruption) is just one of 
many phenomena that constitute the State Capture of South Africa under the Zuma administration. 
As argued above, state capture potentially serves as an indicator of predatory neopatrimonialism; 
and how and why it takes place potentially serves to determine where a nation resides relative to 
Weber’s ideal types of dominance. 
 
The 4IR is a long-term process and is taking place on a global scale. It is unknown and uncertain in 
its outcomes and how it will unfold. Technology disruption and disruptive innovation are just that, 
disruptive; and as such they will not be limited to sitting comfortably within one specific discipline, 
industry, or sector, nor fit neatly in the current formal structures of governments. The 4IR is in 
effect the recognition that the entire world is in a state of transition and as such presents 
opportunities for addressing some of the most significant challenges that the world faces. It does, 
however, equally present opportunity for the manifestation of predatory-type neopatrimonialism. 
Much like sustainable development theory emerged as a response to the progressive understanding 
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of realities of climate change and that human development can no longer ignore its 
interconnectedness with the environment, I espouse that due to the enormity of the implications, the 
4IR should similarly be advanced within development studies. MLP, presented in Section 2.4, 
potentially provides an initial framework for further developing 4IR theory.  
 
Following from the conceptual framework, which highlights that State Capture is a transition from 
regulated to predatory-type neopatrimonialism, it must be recognised that it cannot be considered a 
static state of existence. If we apply similar principles as those adopted in MLP transition theory 
(allowing for analysis at multiple levels and accounting for the interconnectedness of multiple 
complex systems), it is possible to situate the case study within each of the three underlying 
concepts of state capture, neopatrimonialism, and the disruptive innovation that comes with the 4IR. 
For this case, neopatrimonialism is used to describe the broader political landscape within which the 
socio-technical regime relates to the grant payment system (which incorporates SASSA, CPS, grant 
beneficiaries, etc.). The transitioning of the political landscape from a regulated to predatory form 
of systemic neopatrimonialism can be considered as the disruption, which is State Capture (or rather 
the associated corrupt activities of the power elite). This disruption “from above” allows for 
advancement of new/alternative technology (the niche) and in turn transitions the socio-technical 
regime.  
 
In line with the MLP, Figure 5 provides a graphic representation of the different “layering” of the 
three main concepts/theories, in terms of their respective analytical timeframe, application, and 
scope. Understanding the relationship between the various concepts that apply to this case study 
makes it is possible to identify three main commonalities that cut across all three concepts, namely 
the governance at an institutional level; the combination and accounting for both formal and 
informal “rules of the game”; and in this specific case of predatory neopatrimonialism, the 
underlying use of deception by those in power to derive personal/political benefit. 
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Figure 5: The varying scope of the theory  
 
2.6 Summary 
 
As in the Betrayal of the Promise report, I argue that the strict theoretical concept of state capture 
(as a form of “grand corruption”) does not adequately encapsulate the political dynamics of the 
State Capture that occurred under the Zuma administration. The theory of neopatrimonialism 
provides a heuristic concept for analysing State Capture; however, it is not without flaws. This 
chapter presents a critical review of neopatrimonialism that identifies and addresses some of the 
issues that have emerged through the historical application of the concept, particularly through its 
reductionist application to the African continent.  
 
 
Following from the literature review and drawing on the work presented in the Betrayal of the 
Promise report, the second section of this chapter expands and refines the conceptual framework for 
the phenomenon of State Capture in South Africa. It presents the key concepts and outlines the 
characteristics and modus operandi of State Capture. For the purposes of this case study, State 
Capture is considered a predatory-type systemic neopatrimonialism, whereby a group of power elite 
oversee the operations of a shadow state with the intention of repurposing state institutions to fulfil 
their own narrow financial and political objectives.     
 
Finally, this chapter provides an explanation of what is meant by the 4IR in the context of the case 
study, whereby it serves as a heuristic concept to describe the uncertainty associated with the ever-
accelerating occurrences of disruptive innovation/technologies.  
 
4IR  
(technology disruption) 
Neopatrimonialism 
SASSA State Capture  
•Global level 
•Addressed mainly in economic business studies, but 
impacts all disciplines 
•Uncertain and unknown 
•National/State level 
•Origin in political science 
•Adapted for political economy and development 
studies 
•Several different phenomena 
•Institutional level 
•Type of corruption 
•Economic and business studies 
•Is a single event/phenomenon 
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 Chapter 3: Methodology and Methods of Granular Research 
 
3.1 Defining the Case Study  
 
Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, policies, 
institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more methods. The case 
that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an 
analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case 
illuminates and explicates (Thomas, 2011: 513). 
 
Although there are many different definitions of what a case study is, the one that has proved most 
useful for the purposes of this research is provided by Thomas, in an article titled A Typology for 
the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure. 
Thomas (2011: 513) emphasises the importance of defining and distinguishing between the object 
and subject in case study research when he notes that 
 
inexperienced social inquirers, especially students, [tend] to neglect to establish any kind of 
object (literally and technically) for their inquiries. Identifying only a subject, they fail to 
seek to explain anything, providing instead, therefore, a simple description in place of a 
piece of research.  
 
The subject of the case study is centred around the SASSA-Gate crisis. Focus is placed on the 
SASSA-Gate crisis, SASSA as an institution, and the grant payment system. However, it also 
includes the analysis of a host of other people, events, decisions, policies, and institutions. Further 
explanation of the scope and boundaries of the case study are outlined in the next section.   
 
For Thomas (2011: 515), “the object constitutes, then, the analytical frame within which the case is 
viewed and which the case exemplifies”. The object of this case study is the context-specific 
phenomenon of State Capture in South Africa, as defined in the previous section. More specifically, 
it is the study of a sub-type phenomenon of State Capture (the class), which is related to both a type 
of predatory neopatrimonialism (at state level) and state capture (at institutional level). The 
secondary object of the case study relates to the disruptive nature of technology in development. As 
noted by Thomas (2011: 514), the object of a case study “need not be defined at the outset but, 
rather, may emerge as an inquiry progresses”. This was indeed the case, with regard to 
incorporating the 4IR into this case study. 
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Drawing from the research questions, objectives, and goals of the study, as outlined in Chapter 1, 
the purpose of the case study can be classified according to a number of different ways, all of which 
are useful when deciding on which methods to adopt for the research. For the purposes of this 
study, however, I have chosen to utilise Yin’s (2013) classifications where a case study can be 
either exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory. As previously indicated, based on the objectives of 
the research, this case study is principally descriptive, in terms of the case and the application of 
State Capture, as defined in the previous chapter. As noted by Hancock and Algozzine (2006: 4), 
for “descriptive studies, information is collected for the purpose of describing a specific group with 
no intention of going beyond that group”. This case study seeks to provide a complete description 
of the phenomenon of State Capture within the case-specific context. The research is, however, also 
exploratory, in that it simultaneously seeks to examine the application of theories of state capture, 
neopatrimonialism, and the implications these have in terms of development within the 4IR.  
 
For the purposes of the case study, the concepts and modus operandi outlined in Section 2.2 serve 
as the propositions of the case study.  
 
3.2 Boundaries and Scope of the Case Study 
 
There are several ways in which the boundaries of a case study can be determined. For instance, 
Creswell (2014: 14) states that “[c]ases are bounded by time and activity, and researchers collect 
detailed information using a variety of data-collection procedures over a sustained period of time”. 
For Thomas (2011), the boundary and “shape” of the case study can be determined by considering 
whether it is a singular in-depth case or a multi-case comparative study. Baxter and Jack (2008) 
note that cases can also be bound in terms of place and the theoretical framework or the context of 
the case. For this case study it is important to consider all of these, as they help to focus the 
research.    
 
3.2.1 Bounded in time 
 
As this case study emerged in response to the SASSA-Gate crisis, and following from the 
framework established in the Betrayal of the Promise report, the case study is primarily concerned 
with the events that took place under Zuma’s presidency. One of the points of departure is that there 
was a distinct change to the approach to governance under the Zuma regime and, as such, the case 
study also examines what the situation was prior to Zuma being elected president. It is important to 
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note, however, that the exploration of what had transpired before the Zuma administration is limited 
only to information that is pertinent to the case analysis.  
 
The case study also extends beyond the SASSA-Gate crisis (which was resolved by the 
Constitutional Court in March 2017) to examine the subsequent development to the grant payment 
system. The case study was “closed off” at the time when Jacob Zuma resigned as president of the 
country.   
 
3.2.2 Bounded in place 
 
The case study is of the context-specific phenomenon of State Capture in South Africa. However, as 
one of the critical actors in the case is the US-based multinational company Net1, the case study 
includes and makes use of information obtained from the United States of America (USA).  
 
3.2.3 Bounded by context and theory  
 
The boundaries of the case study can be determined by considering how the case in question 
corresponds with the theoretical framework. Figure 6, linking back to the conceptual framework, 
indicates the positioning of the SASSA-Gate case study within theories of neopatrimonialism and 
state capture.  
 
 
Figure 6: Situating SASSA State Capture in the theory 
 
 
Corruption 
state capture 
Neopatrimonialism 
SASSA-Gate 
SA State Capture 
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Drawing from the definition, the object of the case study requires the research to examine not only 
the events that surround the SASSA-Gate debacle, the grant payment system, and SASSA as an 
institution, but is also to analyse a host of other people, events, decisions, policies, and institutions.  
 
Upon reflecting on some of the criticism levied against the historic application of neopatrimonial 
theory, I identified that it was necessary for the case study to include several critical components 
that might otherwise not have been addressed. Rather than attempt to capture all the aspects that are 
included in the case study, Table 2 provides a brief description of some of the major components 
that have been included and outlines what has been specifically excluded from the case study, with 
motivations. 
   
Table 2: Scope of the case study  
Component Description Comments/Exclusion 
People, 
decisions, and 
events 
This component includes all those connected to 
or linked (formally or informally) to SASSA-
Gate, the institution, and the grant payment 
system. 
Only those who can be identified as potentially 
being part of the shadow state are investigated in 
detail.   
Institutions and 
governance 
Based on the country’s legal-rational 
framework under which the constitutional state 
operates, this component includes the 
legislative framework for the social grant 
system and SASSA. Additional institutions that 
feature in the case study include National 
Treasury (NT), the South African Post Office 
(SAPO), parliament, and the Judiciary. 
The role of parliament is not examined in depth in 
this case study, as the political capture of this arm 
of government is in and of itself a separate 
phenomenon of the State Capture project, with its 
own unique set of power dynamics. It is, however, 
utilised as a source of information for the case 
study. 
Companies and 
the private 
sector 
This component includes a detailed exploration 
of Net1 and CPS, in terms of contractual 
arrangements, company histories, and business 
strategy. B-BBEE partnerships are also 
included.  
The case study recognises Net1’s competition (in 
the form of AllPay and banks), but does not 
explore their service offerings. In addition, the 
analysis of Net1 is only concerned with its 
involvement in the grant payment system and 
does not provide a full assessment of the company 
itself. 
Grant payment 
system 
Includes a high-level overview and description 
of the changes to the system over time and 
outlines the key technical aspects that are 
needed to fully understand the case study.  
Does not include an in-depth assessment of the 
system itself; rather, the case draws on the 
comments and analyses made by experts.  
“External” 
factors and the 
broader 
populace 
The governing party (ANC) and other 
connected or related events that include 
individuals critical in the case study.  
The case study particularly examines the 
impact of SASSA-Gate on grant beneficiaries 
and it includes civil society and the media. 
Like parliament, the “capture” of the political 
party itself is a standalone case study in its own 
right. However, the role of the ANCWL is 
addressed in this case study.  
 
3.3 Ethical Considerations  
 
Following the general approach to qualitative case study research, my initial intention was to 
include interviews as one of the research methods. Due to the nature of the research, which entails 
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investigation of potential criminal activities by government officials, the research proposal was 
flagged by the university’s Research Ethics Council (REC) as being medium-risk research. It was 
highlighted in correspondence from the REC (Graham, 2018: 1) that 
 
[p]articipants may well be directly involved or implicated in the case or incidentally, 
disclose evidence or make allegations to the researcher of suspicious or unusual 
activities/transactions … [This] may necessitate the duty to report as per the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act (s 32, 28, 28 A, 29, 31, 30) or the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act (S34).  
 
Even though these concerns could have been addressed by putting in place procedures for 
addressing disclosure of criminality, the flagging of the risk served as a major reflection point for 
the research. The legal implications of the potential exposure to sensitive information aside, several 
other ethical issues may have emerged if I proceeded to include interviews as part of the research 
methods. All the ethical issues are primarily concerned with the potential risk of bias of the 
participants, my own, the audience, and the research in general.   
 
The first issue is concerned with the practical and procedural aspects of the research. The positions 
and number of the potential participants that I would need to have gained access to would have 
presented a major challenge. Even though I was able to gain access to some of the former high-level 
government officials involved in the case, it is unlikely that those who were aligned with the 
shadow state objectives would have been willing to participate. If the participants were only those 
who were working against the shadow state, then the research was at risk of presenting a one-sided 
perspective of events. The modus operandi of the shadow state implies that those who oppose or 
obstruct are systematically and potentially unjustly removed from their bureaucratic positions. As 
such, participants may harbour resentment, which might influence what evidence they do or do not 
choose to provide. The potential risk of the research resulting in an unbalanced and incomplete 
account of the events might not have only affected my own understanding of the case, but may have 
also resulted in an unfair representation or depiction of those individuals involved.   
 
According to Tracy (2010: 847), these concerns could all be considered to be examples of 
situational ethics, where the ethical practices “emerge from a reasoned consideration of a context’s 
specific circumstances”.  
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As will be outlined in the chapters that follow, many unanswered questions still surround the 
SASSA-Gate debacle. A second ethical consideration is that, due to the research being based solely 
on information that is available in the public domain, there is a potential degree of uncertainty with 
regard to the accuracy of said information. However, this concern was addressed to the best of my 
ability through the approach adopted in the methods of identifying data sources, data collection, and 
data analysis. Until such time as there is a full ventilation of what had taken place and what the 
actual motivations and intentions were of those individuals implicated in shadow state activities, it 
would be neither just nor academically responsible to allow opinion or bias to corrupt the research. 
Although it is not possible to completely eliminate all possible instances of bias within the study, 
incorporating these ethical considerations in the reflective and iterative process of the research 
endeavoured to mitigate against this risk.  
 
3.4 Research Methods and Analysis 
 
Unique in comparison to other qualitative approaches, within case study research, 
investigators can collect and integrate quantitative survey data, which facilitates reaching a 
holistic understanding of the phenomenon being studied. In [a] case study, data from these 
multiple sources are then converged in the analysis process rather than handled individually. 
Each data source is one piece of the ‘puzzle’, with each piece contributing to the researcher’s 
understanding of the whole phenomenon (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 554). 
 
3.4.1 Literature review and analysis  
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the case study emerged from the work undertaken by the SCRP in the 
compilation of the Betrayal of the Promise report. However, this report did not provide a detailed 
background or literature review with regard to the neopatrimonialism or state capture concepts that 
were adopted. As such, when I embarked on this research journey, it was necessary to approach the 
various concepts anew, and a traditional literature review method was thus adopted for the case 
study. The purpose of the literature review was not only to provide a review of each of the various 
concepts or theories in isolation, but also to examine how these concepts were connected, linked, or 
overlapped. The literature review served to address the theoretical aspect of the first research 
question, which is: What is the difference or relationship between state capture and 
neopatrimonialism?  
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The first step of the literature review process was to define each of the various concepts and 
theories. As such, my initial approach was to look for “a literature review or a meta-analysis of 
research articles in the area the thesis is focused on” (Kaminstein, 2017: 2). This was particularly 
useful for neopatrimonialism; however, as the other two concepts are relatively new (academically 
speaking), there is little meta-analysis for state capture, and the 4IR is yet to be defined as an 
explicit academic concept. For state capture, the literature in which the concept was first defined 
thus served as the points of departure for the literature search. With regard to the 4IR, this required 
a much broader search in terms of technology and innovation development theories, and cross-
referencing these with the political, economic, and development concepts of neopatrimonialism and 
state capture. Various techniques were applied in the search for appropriate literature, including 
utilising a literature search by drawing from references and citations and the progressive expansion 
of keyword searches (e.g. starting with state capture then moving to only capture, starting with state 
capture in South Africa, and looking at global literature).  
 
3.4.2 Data sources and collection 
 
Documentation and video and audio recordings were used as the primary sources of data for this 
case study. Most of the data were collected from online sources, with one major exception being a 
cache of supplementary court filings and support documentation that I obtained in person when 
attending an inquiry. The following are the main types of data utilised in this research: 
   
1. Legal court filings, including judgements, affidavits, heads of arguments, and support 
documentation; 
2. Official government and company reports or documentation (such as letters, financial filings 
for public companies, government statistics, etc.); 
3. Speeches and formal media statements (documented), as well as informal statements made 
to the media (audio, video, or reported); 
4. Outcomes from meetings and engagements with the Legislature (primarily with national 
parliament, but also at provincial level), including written questions and answers, documents 
provided at oversight meetings, presentations, and video and audio recordings;   
5. News media and investigative reporting; and 
6. Other grey literature, such as reports by non-government or non-academic institutions (also 
used in the literature review).  
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A second source of data was direct observations, where I attended the six-day Section 38 Judicial 
Inquiry hearings, which were concerned with establishing whether or not Bathabile Dlamini 
(Minister of the DSD at the time) should be held personally liable for the costs of litigation in the 
Black Sash Trust case. Because of the ethical issues outlined in the previous section, I refrained 
from directly using the notes that I made while observing the Inquiry. This is in particular reference 
to the notes that detailed subjective observation (or rather opinion) of the ways in which witnesses 
responded to questions or their overall demeanour when giving testimony. It is important to note, 
however, that these subjective observations did prove very valuable in two ways.  
 
The first is that they reaffirmed that my decision to specifically not pursue interviews as a method 
for the research was correct. For example, it was evident from the testimony given by Thokozani 
Magwaza (who was CEO of SASSA during the SASSA-Gate crisis) that he was anxious to tell his 
side of the story and it would appear he had a great deal of information he was hoping to make 
public through the Inquiry. As indicated above, the inability to control what information an 
interviewee would divulge in an interview could potentially have both ethical and legal 
ramifications.  
 
The second and possibly more important way in which the direct observations (as well as indirect 
observations through video broadcasts) contributed to the research was to assist in determining what 
information should be pursued and where it might be found (in other words, as related to data 
collection). For example, when a witness appeared to be uncomfortable or unwilling to answer a 
specific question, the question itself would provide guidance on what needed to be investigated.  
 
In terms of how data were collected and stored, I set up a specifically designed data management 
system, where when data were reviewed and deemed relevant to the case study, they would be 
collected (saved or documented) and they would then be categorised in terms of source, author or 
origin, date, type (based on the list above), and medium (document, web page, video, etc.). All data 
were then encrypted and stored on a secure online cloud, to which only I have access. Data 
collection and data analysis took place concurrently, with further elaboration provided in the next 
section. Table 3 provides a high-level overview and breakdown of which data were collected and 
utilised in the research for this case study.   
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Table 3: Overview of data collected 
Data type/source Date collected and reviewed 
1 Legal court filings 8 different court cases relating specifically to the grant payment, CPS, 
and SASSA 
5 other types of litigation (labour disputes, US civil suits, etc.) 
350+ documents reviewed  
± 30 hours observation and ± 18 hours video 
2 Official government/company reports or 
documentation 
100+ different reports or documents 
3 Speeches and media statements 60+ different speeches and media statements 
± 6 hours video 
4 Outcomes from meetings and 
engagements with the Legislature  
25+ parliamentary meetings  
30+ documents  
±18 hours video and audio 
5 News media and investigative reporting 360+ news articles  
±3 hours video 
6 Grey literature for case study 50+ other types of case-specific grey literature 
7 Articles, books, and other grey literature 250+ documents reviewed in the development of the conceptual 
framework 
 
The accuracy and “trustworthiness” of the first four types of data were established based on where 
the data originated from. All these forms of documentation and evidence are formal (they have the 
assumed legal and normative legitimacy of “trustworthiness”) and within the public domain. When 
utilising the evidence sourced from the news media or other grey literature, particular care was 
taken to ensure that in the case of specific facts, these could be attributed to multiple sources. 
Alternatively, when there was only a single source for the evidence or the evidence was 
unsubstantiated or unproven (i.e. allegations of wrongdoing), it is explicitly stated as such.  
  
3.4.3 Granular data analysis 
 
Unlike most qualitative case studies, data from interviews and direct observation (in terms of 
evidence) were not adopted as sources of data for the research. As such, the approach to the data 
analysis was considered to be more aligned with that of historical studies. The only main difference 
between this case study and a historical study is that the data were collected and analysed while the 
events themselves were unfolding. Like historical studies, one of the main goals of the research is to 
present an in-depth, detailed account of what had transpired over a bounded period in time. This 
research required that I “enter into an in-depth learning process, to become intimately involved in 
data collection and to be a critical editor of texts” (Law, Stewart, Letts, Pollock, Bosch & 
Westmorland, 1998: 5). Like most qualitative research, the processes of data collection and data 
analysis took place concurrently (Yin, 2013).  
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The application of Maxwell’s (2013) Interactive Model of Research Design required returning to 
the goals, objectives, and research questions of the case study. The research questions are 
admittedly very broad and open, and the main reason for this is that the case itself is broad. It 
consists of multiple events, involves a number of people and institutions, and is centred within a 
complex system, all interconnected by very different and distinct types of relationship dynamics. 
Rather than attempt to capture all the various questions that could be posed to limit or confine the 
research, I chose to instead incorporate the questions into the analysis itself. This fundamentally 
entailed that with each new piece of data that was collected, I would ask the basic questions of who, 
what, when, where, how, and why. This would then either lead to a new question that would need to 
be answered by new evidence or it would confirm or link to a previously obtained piece of 
evidence. Each piece of evidence was evaluated in terms of the boundaries of the case study, the 
credibility of the source of the evidence (data source), and how that evidence related to the 
conceptual framework. Table 4 presents a set of indicative questions that were asked.   
 
Table 4: Example of granular research questions  
Questions People 
Institutions and 
organisations 
Decisions and events 
Programmes and 
systems 
Who? 
Who are they connected 
to? 
Who has “ownership” of 
the institution? Who is 
linked to the institution 
and how? 
Who is involved in the 
event? Who made final 
decisions? Who was 
affected by the event? 
Who developed and 
implemented the 
system? Whom does the 
system involve? Who is 
impacted by the system? 
What? 
What is their 
role/responsibility 
(objectives)? What is 
their background?  
What is the objective? 
What does/did it do?  
What led up to the 
event/decision? What 
was the outcome/impact 
of the event? 
What was the system 
before and after? What 
are the issues?  
Where? 
Are they part of 
government, private 
sector, political party, 
etc.?  
Where is it situated in 
terms of the state? 
Under what jurisdiction 
does it fall (legal and 
norms)? 
Where were decisions 
made?  
Where was the system 
developed and 
implemented?  
When? 
When did they become 
involved? Are they 
involved in other 
controversies? 
When was it 
established? When did it 
experience change?  
When did it take place? 
When did the system 
change?  
Why? 
Why were they involved 
– constitutional vs 
shadow state? 
Why were they involved 
– constitutional vs 
shadow state? 
Why was the decision 
taken - what is the 
motivation or intention 
behind the decision?  
Why the system was 
changed (motivation or 
intention)?  
How? 
How did they become 
involved? How did their 
involvement have an 
impact?   
How did they become 
involved? How did their 
involvement have an 
impact?  
How was the decision / 
event take place (formal 
or informal) 
How has the system 
changed? 
 
A data source could contain multiple pieces of evidence or the data source itself was the evidence. 
As such the documenting of evidence and then the cross-referencing and management of the 
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research data base were vitally important for the case study. All three forms of reasoning – 
deductive, inductive, and abductive – were applied in the analysis of the case evidence.  
 
The systematic approach was applied to both the collection and the analysis of the data, which 
entailed first identifying the key dates and events (often linked to the legal court cases) and 
thereafter establishing a chronological matrix (see Appendix A). The chronological matrix entails 
the classification/coding of the empirical evidence divided into the following broad categories: 
  
 Administration and politics: The movements of people in positions of administrative and 
political power.   
 The litigation: This does not only include litigation concerning SASSA, but also other 
parties’ litigations. 
 Grant payment system: This is not restricted to the payment of grants, but also includes all 
other administrative functions associated with SASSA (e.g. changes in grant regulations, 
irregular payment to CPS, etc.).    
 CPS and empowerment partners: This category examines Net1/CPS as a business, includes 
the various deals they have entered into with empowerment partners, and the developments 
with regard to other Net1 subsidiaries.  
 Controversies and the parallel/shadow state: This is where there are key moments in which 
the rationale behind an action or event does not make “sense”. It also includes all the 
allegations levelled against individuals considered to be part of the shadow state.  
 
This matrix was then complemented by a process of mapping data and evidence, in terms of the 
various formal and informal relationships between individuals and/or institutions (an example is 
provided in Appendix B), sequential causality of events or decisions, and changes to the systems or 
institutions. Utilising the chronological matrix, together with various network mapping processes, 
enabled for thematic analysis to be undertaken by applying different lenses, namely the 
constitutional state, the shadow state, the power dynamics, and what distinguishes this from 
straightforward corruption; and lastly to explore the case in terms of the much broader 
developmental (and State Capture) objectives.  
 
3.5 Limitations of the Research 
 
By deciding not to include interviews as part of the research methods, the research was limited in a 
number of ways. The first is that by not conducting interviews, the potential value that might have 
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emerged from having multiple perspectives of the events that have unfolded was lost. However, the 
ethical risks associated with undertaking the interviews, was a trade-off I was prepared to make.   
 
The second limitation associated with not conducting interviews was the inability to conduct 
triangulation of the research findings and outcomes, which is an important aspect of validation of 
qualitative research. In order to address this, as highlighted in Chapter 1, once the case study itself 
was in the final drafting stage, it was distributed to several individuals who have direct experience 
and intimate insight into SASSA, social development in South Africa, and the SASSA-Gate crisis 
for review. A second form of triangulation resides in the research design itself. The iterative process 
and continuous reflection, particularly as related to the matching process of theory to the empirical 
world and methods adopted for collection and analysis of data, ensured that even though the case 
study is a dense narrative and not easily summarised, the research remains credible (Flyvbjerg, 
2011; Tracy, 2010).    
 
The other main limitation of the study was with regard to the scope of the academic enquiry that 
could be undertaken within the given time and financial constraints, as well as the actual complexity 
of the subject matter. The objective of the research was not to explicitly develop new academic 
theory, but rather to explore if and how existing theory may be applicable to a specific case study.  
 
In addition to the level of detail, the scope of the research was limited in terms of the extent to 
which various aspects of the case study was explored and/or assessed. For instance, as indicated in 
the bounded scope of the case study, even though the power dynamics and political aspects were 
included as part of the research, this did not extend beyond those who were directly involved in the 
SASSA-Gate debacle. As noted, extensive analysis of parliament and the governing political party, 
I argue, should be treated as standalone cases and separate sub-phenomena of State Capture.  
 
3.6 Narration of the Case Study 
 
The narration of the case study follows directly from the approach to the analysis, where each of the 
following chapters presented each of the different lenses through which the case study can be 
explored. As the grant payment system evolves and develops as a result of the decisions and actions 
taken over time, it is necessary to incorporate a certain degree of technical information with regard 
to the system throughout the narration of the case study. These concise technical details are 
captured within text boxes. At the end of each chapter a summary is presented, which serves 
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specifically to outline the links between the different aspects of the case study and the particular 
theories to which they relate.  
 
The next chapter provides the contextual basis from which this case study is explored. It presents a 
brief overview of the historical background of South Africa’s social grants system, outlines the 
legislative and technical framework in which SASSA has been established, and lastly discusses the 
use of biometric verification technology as part of the grant payment system.  
 
Chapter 5 details key events and decisions taken, outlining what has transpired over the years since 
SASSA was established, culminating in the crisis of March 2017 that nearly resulted in the 
government not being able to meet its constitutional obligation of providing millions of the poorest 
South Africans with the social grants they depend on for their survival. This chronology is focused 
primarily on the governance and legal aspects of the crisis and thus describes the case study through 
the lens of the constitutional state.  
 
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the so-called “SASSA-Gate” scandal in the context of the 
existence of a shadow state and particularly focusing on non-government actors. In particular, it 
examines the contradictions that emerge when the interests of the shadow state are in conflict with 
not only the constitutional state, but also with the ideological rhetoric of this political project, 
namely RET. This section fleshes out the various allegations about with whom and how certain 
individuals from both outside and within state institutions were entangled in the CPS contracts in 
various ways.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the political and power dynamics relevant to the case study. It discusses the 
political dynamics of the ANCWL and power elite Kitchen Cabinets’ function, showing how these 
form an integral part of the political project of State Capture. It also provides an example of the 
other means by which the DSD and SASSA were repurposed, in particular with regard to the use of 
state resources to manipulate and secure legitimacy from the voting public.  
 
Finally, Chapter 8 contextualises the SASSA case within the broader context of the very real and 
difficult economic, social, and political challenges that South Africa faces going forward. It 
provides an analysis of subsequent events following from the March 2017 Constitutional Court 
judgement, particularly from the perspective of State Capture, and discusses the broader impact of 
the biometric technology in the State Capture project and on South Africa’s social welfare system. 
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 Chapter 4: SASSA and South Africa’s Welfare System 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a brief overview of the historical background to South Africa’s social grants 
system, outlines the legislative and technical framework in which SASSA has been established, and 
lastly discusses the use of biometric verification technology as part of the grant payment system. 
 
4.2 Background on South Africa’s Social Grants 
 
For many people in this country the payment of social grants by the state provides the only 
hope of ever living in the material conditions that the Constitution's values of dignity, freedom 
and equality promise. About 15 million people depend on the payment of these social grants. 
They are vulnerable people, living at the margins of affluence in our society (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2013: 3). 
 
In 1994, when the democratically elected ANC government was instituted, the social security 
system that was inherited was skewed towards favouring white pensioners, with little protection in 
place for addressing the plight of African women and children. The system was to be reformed to 
equitably and fairly cater for all South African citizens. Access to social security is one of several 
socio-economic rights guaranteed in the South African Constitution of 1996, where Section 27 (1) 
(c) of the Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to … social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social 
assistance” (Republic of South Africa [RSA], 1996: 11).   
 
However, unlike other socio-economic rights, such as the right to freedom of expression or property 
rights, the Constitution also recognises and accommodates the practical limitations on the state’s 
ability to comprehensively fulfil this mandate, in that the state is subject to an internal limitation of 
the resources that are available. Section 27(2) in the Constitution states that “[t]he state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive 
realisation of each of these rights” (RSA, 1996: 11).  
 
This caveat is a necessity, in that it allows for flexibility in terms of establishing of policy and the 
management of the state’s budget and the country’s fiscal sustainability. It is in this regard that the 
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expansion and application of social grants policy can arguably be viewed as one of the greatest 
post-1994 redistributive achievements.  
 
In 2002, the Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South 
Africa (also referred to as the Taylor Committee) presented its recommendations in reports to the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. The Taylor Committee (2002) was tasked by cabinet to 
establish a holistic overview of South Africa’s social policy requirements and to put forward 
recommendations on how to develop a comprehensive social security system for the nation. The 
outcomes of the Committee of Inquiry informed the legislation relating to social assistance 
(including social grants) that has since been developed and administered over the years, among 
others the expansion of childcare grants and the use of biometric verification in the grant payment 
system. 
 
Social grants were identified as a key component of the GEAR framework, which was adopted 
under the Mbeki presidency. Under Mbeki, the increased scope of social grants was implemented as 
the main form of wealth redistribution and was the principal programme which sought to account 
for the flaws/shortcomings of implementing neoliberal economic policies (Khan, 2013). As a result, 
there was a significant growth in the number of grant recipients, in particular the introduction of 
Child Support grants in the early and mid-2000s, which resulted in the number of South African 
citizens receiving social grants ballooning from approximately three million beneficiaries in 2000 
(primarily Old Age grants) to over 12 million beneficiaries by 2008. Figure 7 outlines the growth in 
number of grant beneficiaries over time. 
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Figure 7: Growth in number of grant recipients 
Source: SASSA Annual Report 2016/2017 (SASSA, 2017a) 
 
As of December 2017, there are currently over 17 million grant beneficiaries. Social grants are 
targeted at providing financial relief to the most vulnerable in South Africa’s society, namely the 
elderly, children, persons with disabilities, and temporary assistance for those experiencing 
financial hardship outside of their control. The latter is referred to as the Social Relief of Distress 
Grant, which is provided in the form of food parcels, vouchers, or cash, on an as and when required 
basis. Table 5 provides a breakdown of the fixed grants, outlining grant type, number of 
beneficiaries, and monthly amount respectively.  
 
Table 5: Breakdown of grant types and amounts 
Grant type 
Beneficiaries Amounts 
Number % of total Monthly grant Total amount (R'000) % of total 
Old Age 3 302 202 19% R1 505 R58 320 617 42% 
War Veteran 176 0% R1 525 R3 849 0% 
Disability 1 067 176 6% R1 505 R19 926 031 14% 
Care Dependency 144 952 1% R1 505 R2 613 647 2% 
Foster Child 440 295 3% R890 R5 326 151 4% 
Child Support 12 081 375 70% R350 R51 476 941 37% 
Grant in Aid 164 349 1% N/A R650 308 0% 
Total 17 200 525 100% 
 
R138 317 544 100% 
Source: SASSA (2017a) and National Treasury (2017) 
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Research is currently being undertaken by NGOs such as the Pietermaritzburg Agency for 
Community Social Action (PACSA) in search of determining what would constitute “a decent 
standard of living” for South Africans. Their focus is to determine the true reality of the poor in 
terms of inflation of food prices (which is a primary expense for the poor). This entails monitoring 
prices of a selected “food basket”, which the research indicates are much higher than the average 
annual consumer price index (CPI), which is applied to the annual increase of grants. They indicate 
on average that “PACSA’s Food Basket tracks on average 5.3% higher than the CPI figures” (Smith 
& Abrahams, 2015: 15). Social grants are increased annually in line with average annual CPI, 
which means that the material/practical value of grants has decreased over the years. This 
demonstrates “the steady ‘regressivity’/diminishing ‘progressivity’ of the social grant system” 
(Khan, 2013: 573). 
 
Khan (2013: 575) highlights that social grants are no longer just a “stop-gap measure” for counter-
balancing the deficiencies in the government’s policies to achieve meaningful structural 
transformation of the economy, social grants “are now a structural necessity and ‘politically 
irreversible pillars of social policy’”. The redistributive potential that social grants, together with 
other social policies, serve is ultimately constrained by the amount of resources at the government’s 
disposal. In 2014, NT indicated that in terms of the national fiscus being able to sustain and cater 
for the country’s social spending,  
 
[c]urrent levels of spending are sustainable, provided that real growth remains above 3[%]. 
In a secular stagnation scenario, social spending will be increasingly difficult to sustain. 
Faster population growth will also put strain on the fiscus, if not accompanied by higher 
economic growth (Sachs, 2014: 19).  
 
The growth in social grant beneficiaries must also be noted, particularly with regard to Old Age 
Child Support grants, which had average growth rates of 3.7% and 20.2% (inclusive of programme 
expansion) respectively over the last five years (SASSA, 2017a). This harsh reality that the country 
now faces is not lost on SASSA, when it highlighted in recent court papers that  
 
[t]he continuing inability of the economy to create sustainable and decent employment, 
combined with the slow growth trends over the foreseeable future require creative and cost-
effective solutions to reduce the burden of poverty within increasingly limited resources 
(SASSA, 2017b: 56).  
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4.3 Legislative and Institutional Factors Regarding SASSA 
 
In 2004, the legislation that formalised South Africa’s social security systems and established the 
national agency that would be responsible for administering grants was signed and promulgated. 
The Social Assistance Act, No. 13 of 2004 (RSA, 2004a) and the SASSA Act, No. 9 of 2004 (RSA, 
2004b) are the two main pieces of legislation that outline the requirements and parameters for social 
grants and the institutional structure by which they are distributed. The primary objective of SASSA 
(also referred to as the Agency) is to centralise and standardise the payment and administration of 
grants. Over and above this legislation, SASSA is also required to be governed by all legislation 
related to the operation and governance of any state-run entity, including to the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA), No. 1 of 1999. The PFMA is directly related to and founded on one of 
the key tenets of the Constitution (RSA, 1996: 112), articulated under section 217(1), which states:  
 
When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any 
other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do 
so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective.  
 
Prior to the establishment of SASSA, the payment of grants was fragmented, as the responsibility 
for grants resided with each of the nine provinces, and payment methods were inconsistent and 
inefficient. The majority of grants were paid in cash through contracted service providers, each 
conforming to separate and varying service-level agreements and providing different models for 
payment (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013). The regulations attached to the Social 
Assistance Act provide the various methods by which grant beneficiaries are able to receive their 
grants, namely: “a) electronic transfers into an account of the beneficiary held at a financial 
institution or that of a procurator; b) manual payments at a designated pay-point; or c) any other 
method approved by the Minister” (Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2011: 4).  
 
The objectives and mandate of SASSA, as outlined in section 3 of the SASSA Act are the 
following: 
 
a) act, eventually, as the sole agent that will ensure the efficient and effective management, 
administration, and payment of social assistance;  
b) serve as an agent for the prospective administration and payment of social security; and  
c) render services relating to such payments (RSA, 2004b: 6). 
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The SASSA Act details the Agency’s functions, which include the administering of social grants in 
terms of Chapter 3 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004, as well as  
 
to collect, collate, maintain, and administer such information as is necessary for the 
payment of social security, as well as for the central reconciliation and management of 
payment of transfer funds in a national database of all applicants for and beneficiaries of 
social assistance (s4(1)(a) and (b) of the SASSA Act) (Supreme Court of Appeal of South 
Africa, 2011: 4).  
 
Where necessary or appropriate, the SASSA Act further makes an allowance for the Agency to, 
“with the concurrence of the Minister enter into an agreement with any person to ensure effective 
payments to beneficiaries” (RSA, 2004b: 7). This in effect allows SASSA to contract service 
providers for the payment of grants, but this can only be done once the minister has approved such 
an action. 
 
In terms of governance structure, unlike commercial SOEs, which are generally governed by a 
board of directors that provides a degree of separation between the administration and management 
of the entity and the Executive Authority, the CEO of SASSA reports directly to the DSD minister. 
In terms of the SASSA Act, the following are worth noting under the “Functions of Chief Executive 
Officer” (RSA, 2004b: 9-10):  
 
(1)  The Chief Executive Officer is responsible for-  
a) the management of the Agency, subject to the direction of the Minister;  
b) the compilation of a business and financial plan and reports in terms of the Public 
Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act No. 1 of 1999), for approval by the Minister; 
c) the appointment of members of staff contemplated in section 7(1j); and  
d) control of, and maintenance of discipline over, members of staff of the Agency. 
(2)  The Chief Executive Officer is accountable to the Minister and must report to him or 
her on the activities of the Agency ... 
(7)  The Minister may override any decision taken by the Chief Executive Officer.  
  
A last note with regard to legislation governing SASSA is that “[t]he appointment of the Chief 
Executive Officer is subject to the conclusion of a written performance agreement entered into 
between that person and the Minister” (RSA, 2004b: 8). Ultimately, it is this agreement that would 
outline in detail the administrative relationship (role and responsibilities) between SASSA and the 
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DSD, which are not addressed in the Act. The 2014/2015 Annual Report of the DSD stated that 
“[d]espite the non-completion of the oversight compact agreement with SASSA, other governance 
tools were used to provide support and strategic guidance for these public entities” (DSD, 2015a: 
36). The oversight compact agreements, referred to as the shareholder’s compact, were regarded as 
an important mechanism to facilitate oversight by the Minister of Social Development through the 
DSD under the stewardship of Zola Skweyiya. The early shareholder agreements mandated the 
CEO of SASSA to meet with the Director-General (DG) of Social Development and with an 
oversight unit within the Office of the DSD’s chief operations officer (COO). The use of the 
shareholder’s compact and the mechanisms for accountability they established were essentially 
abolished at the end of Skweyiya’s tenure. This laid the basis for a direct relationship between the 
CEO of SASSA and the Minister of Social Development in a manner that served to exclude an 
oversight role for the DG of Social Development. 
 
The importance of this agreement should not be understated, as this is where the details of the roles 
and responsibility and the relationship between the minister, the DSD DG, and the SASSA CEO 
would be fleshed out. There is a duplication of responsibilities between the DG of the DSD and the 
SASSA CEO, as the DG is the accounting officer for the overall social grants system, in particular 
the allocation of budget for grants (the “big money”), the DSD’s operations, and services associated 
with certain grants (such as Foster Care and Disability grants), while the SASSA CEO is 
responsible for the administration of grants. In light of experience, Point 7 above is the root cause of 
institutional instability because in situations where the SASSA CEO’s decisions are overturned by 
the minister, it would effectively mean that the minister has assumed de facto the role of the 
accounting officer of the Agency.  
 
4.4 Biometric Technology and National Payment System (NPS) 
 
One of the functions of SASSA, as stated in the SASSA Act, is to “establish a compliance and fraud 
mechanism to ensure that the integrity of the social security system is maintained” (RSA, 2004b: 
16). What this mechanism entailed, its parameters, and how it was to be structured remained the 
prerogative of the Agency. Over the years, SASSA has established various units within the 
organisation to address the issue of fraud, partnering with other crime investigative units, to a point 
where there is now a dedicated department that specifically focuses on fraud and corruption 
(SASSA, 2017a). 
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In her statement on 5 March 2017, in which Minister Dlamini briefed the media on the actions that 
SASSA was undertaking to ensure that the payment of grants continued past April 2017, she said:  
 
Fraud and corruption is well documented in cash transfer systems throughout the world and 
South Africa is no different. We constantly need to innovate and remain ahead of both 
syndicates and recipients working with some of our officials to protect the social grants 
investment … This is the reason biometric verification must be at the centre of recipient 
authentication as advised by the Taylor Committee report in 2002 and I will not back down 
on this requirement (Dlamini, 2017a: 1). 
 
When SASSA took over the contracts with the various provincial service providers in 2006, the 
social grant system was fragmented, inconsistent, and inefficient. Most of the operations were 
undertaken manually and several loopholes allowed for various types and scale of fraud to occur. 
Fraud ranged from millions of rands being siphoned by corrupt civil servants to beneficiaries 
registering “phantom twins” in order to receive an additional Child Support Grant. There were cases 
of beneficiaries receiving grants in more than one province and there were allegations that Old Age 
grants were still being collected after the beneficiary had passed on. There is no denying that it was 
necessary to address this issue and this was in fact one of the main arguments for the establishment 
of SASSA: to standardise the payment service and consolidate and maintain a registry of all grant 
beneficiaries and minimise the losses to the state due to fraud and corruption.
 
This reinforced the 
argument for biometric technology and why it became a fundamental part of the government’s 
techno-political programme (Donovan, 2013).  
 
In a 2013 working paper published by the Centre for Social Science Research, titled The Biometric 
Imaginary: Standardization & Objectivity in Post-Apartheid Welfare, Donovan (2013) examined 
the motivation behind the adoption of biometric verification in the grant payment system and 
investigated both its strengths and weaknesses. Several questions emerged from his report that will 
be considered in this case study. The first is in relation to understanding how and why a certain 
technology is adopted. Is the technology a tool that is used to reach a certain objective, or is the 
objective to utilise a specific technology? In a system as complex as the payment of grants, where 
there are as many social issues as there are administrative issues, it is sometimes easier to find a 
solution to the symptoms (in this case beneficiary fraud) than a cure for the disease (poverty and 
unemployment). The second is how these objectives are defined and understood, as this directly 
relates to the effectiveness of any technology application. This would need to include having an 
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understanding of how a technology affects or impacts the broader systems of the institution, other 
government functions, and society in general.  
 
Text Box 1: Key technical concepts  
 
Although it is not the intention to go into great technical detail regarding the various systems and sub-
systems involved in the payment of grants, it is important to provide the reader with a basic understanding of 
several key concepts, which will inform the remainder of the case study. Where appropriate, a text box such 
as this shall provide necessary technical information.  
 
Grant payment methods:  
As indicated above, the allowed methods of payments are either by way of electronic transfers into an 
account of the grant recipient or by manual cash payments at a designated paypoint (Supreme Court of 
Appeal of South Africa, 2011). 
 
Costs and fee structure: 
Several cost centres must be considered when examining a payment model, namely:  
 cost to government for service providers to distribute grants;  
 cost to beneficiaries for transactions and bank service fees; and 
 cost to retailers or commercial service providers for transactions and payment devices. 
 
NPS: 
“A national payment system (NPS) does not 
only entail payments made between banks, 
but encompasses the total payment process. 
This includes all the systems, mechanisms, 
institutions, agreements, procedures, rules 
and laws that come into play from the 
moment an end-user, using a payment 
instrument, issues an instruction to pay 
another person or a business, through to the 
final interbank settlement of the transaction 
in the books of the central bank. The NPS 
therefore enables transacting parties to 
exchange value to conduct business 
efficiently” (SARB, 2008: 1). 
 
Figure 8: Layers of service provision in the NPS 
Source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2008) 
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Smart card technology and open-architecture / open-loop vs closed-loop system: 
The Payment Association of South Africa (PASA) is a self-regulatory body, whose mandate is derived from 
the NPS Act, No. 78 of 1998, which develops the rules, criteria, and governance structures as may be 
required to carry out its function and to manage its members’ specific payment activities through legal 
constructs (PASA, 2017). 
 
Open architecture is in effect the system design of the NPS, where transfers take place within and between 
banks, based on PASA-regulated processes and specified industry standards for the various elements of the 
payment system. “Inter-operability within the National Payment System (NPS), including the utilisation of 
the ATM and retail point-of-sale [PoS] network requires for the card to be EMV (Europay, MasterCard, 
Visa) compliant as determined by Visa and MasterCard … In South Africa, PASA has prescribed only the 
EMV standard coupled with a MasterCard/Visa card to operate within the NPS” (Dlamini, 2017b: 3). 
 
Closed-loop: “In a closed system, the card issuer is the scheme owner” (Banking Enquiry Panel, 2008: 230). 
The system utilises proprietary technology/IP smart cards (not EMV standard), which require compatible 
merchant devices in order for a transaction to occur and both are connected to the scheme owner, thus 
eliminating the need to be connected to the NPS. These smart cards can be interoperable, provided they 
partner with a bank that is connected to the NPS and are EMV enabled; however, if (as in the case of CPS) 
the scheme/system owner is a non-bank service provider, it is still considered a closed-loop system. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, I argue that neopatrimonialism, as an analytical concept, is contingent 
on being applied within a specified context and that it is necessary to establish the legal-rational and 
bureaucratic framework for the analysis. This chapter thus serves to provide the background for the 
case study in terms of the constitutional objectives and function of social grants, as well as the legal 
structures and bureaucratic systems through which these objectives are supposed to be realised, and 
grants are administered (by SASSA).   
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 Chapter 5: SASSA-Gate Chronology  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the signature achievements of our constitutional democracy is the establishment of 
an inclusive and effective programme of social assistance. It has had a material impact in 
reducing poverty and inequality and in mitigating the consequences of high levels of 
unemployment. In so doing it has given some content to the core constitutional values of 
dignity, equality, and freedom. This judgment is, however, not an occasion to celebrate this 
achievement. To the contrary, it is necessitated by the extraordinary conduct of the Minister 
of Social Development (Minister) and of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) 
that have placed that achievement in jeopardy. How did this come about? (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2017a: 6). 
 
The above is the opening statement from the scathing Constitutional Court judgment that was 
handed down on 17 March 2017. The judgment was regarding the extension of an unlawful and 
invalid contract, which the Constitutional Court had ruled as such in 2013, between SASSA and 
grants payment service provider, CPS. This chapter seeks to answer the question as put forward by 
the Constitutional Court, by providing a high-level overview of the sequence of events, decisions 
that were made, and of the people involved.  
 
5.2 First Failed Attempts 
 
In 2006, SASSA inherited the fragmented and non-standardised social grants service provider 
contracts for the various provinces. The method and manner in which grants were distributed to 
recipients varied greatly between the various service providers, as did the costs and the terms and 
conditions of service contracts. In line with the recommendations laid out by the Taylor Committee, 
SASSA undertook to centralise the payment of grants. On 23 February 2007, the Agency issued its 
first Request for Proposal (RFP) for the “Provision of a Payment Service”. Nine bids were received 
for the tender; however, in its final report submitted to the CEO of SASSA on 25 September 2008 
(almost a year and a half after being issued), the Bid Adjudication Committee (BAC) concluded that 
the tender should be cancelled (Adjudication Committee, 2008). 
 
The reasons as to why the tender was cancelled and the events and revelations that followed are 
worth exploring further.  
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5.2.1 First failed tender 
 
In response to media speculation and allegations of potential corruption, the Social Development 
Minister, Zola Skweyiya, at the time (March 2009) determined that a detailed report be released to 
the public, that outlined the findings and reasons for the cancelation of the 2007 tender. The report, 
titled Narrative Report of the Adjudication Committee in Respect of Payment Tender Service 
(Adjudication Committee, 2008) (hereafter referred to as the Narrative Report), provided key 
insights into some of the challenges involved in providing payment service for grants, as well as 
highlighting some of the reoccurring issues that arise in finding and procuring a suitable service 
provider.  
 
The first aspect to note is that it would appear from the Narrative Report that the focus of the 
department (and in turn the service provider) was to be placed on improving and standardising the 
experience of the beneficiary, improving operational efficiency (including reducing costs), and 
reducing fraud and corruption. It was SASSA’s intention to appoint service providers to render the 
payment of social grants to qualifying beneficiaries in all provinces in a standardised manner. It is 
unclear as to how many service providers SASSA was aiming to appoint, on what basis, or how the 
work/services would be allocated should there be more than one service provider (allocated 
according to province, based on method of payment, etc.). From a response by SASSA to an article 
published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in June 2008, titled South Africa – All Is Not 
Well With Government Tenders, it was stated that 
 
[t]he Minister and SASSA are also concerned about the fact that certain service providers 
have dominated the social grants payment market since the service was opened up. In the 
current bid process, instead of looking for one service provider to ensure uniformity of 
services nationwide, SASSA decided to subdivide the bid into nine provincial tenders. This 
will prevent the development of a monopoly and allow opportunities for new entrants into 
the market (Sokomani, 2008). 
 
The lack of clarity regarding exactly which services SASSA required and how it envisioned the 
provisioning of the required services is undoubtedly one of the problems that faced both the bidders 
and in turn the Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC) and the BAC. In the end, the BAC “unanimously 
agreed that the RFP was fraught with problems (some insurmountable) notwithstanding subsequent 
questions and answers and bidders’ notices designed to clarify and remedy it” (Adjudication 
Committee, 2008: 15). They noted that the “refinement of criteria in the RFP caused more problems 
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… thereby rendering the entire evaluation process unreliable” (Adjudication Committee, 2008: 15). 
This is a critical point to highlight, as similar observations can be made in the tender process in 
2011. Yet, in that instance, the confusion created by the refinement of criteria was seemingly 
ignored and the preferred “technical” option put forward by CPS was pushed through.  
 
The Narrative Report further highlighted that given the factors that led to the BAC determining that 
the tender ultimately be abandoned, the bidders failed to meet the strategic objectives of the tender 
itself. Specifically noted was that bidders  
 
did not provide standardised payment services; were offered via merchants and were thus 
not safe and secure for beneficiaries; were not cost effective; did not transfer maximum risk 
to the private sector; and were not in line with principles of the Black Economic 
Empowerment (Arendse, 2009: 2-3).  
 
As will be seen further in this report, the issues in relation to BEE would seem to be an ongoing 
point of contention in finding a suitable service provider, as well as the provisioning of a 
standardised payment service.  
 
It would only be revealed years later, in a 2012 amaBhungane article, that an apparent attempt at 
bribery had taken place during the tender adjudication process where Advocate (Adv.) Norman 
Arendse, who was chair of the BAC and author of the Narrative Report, alleged that  
 
while he was deliberating on a R7-billion state tender in 2008 he was offered an ‘open 
chequebook’ bribe by an individual claiming to represent Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) 
… Arendse named prominent sports administrator Gideon Sam when he recorded the 
incident (McKune, 2012a). 
 
The alleged attempted bribery would again resurface in June 2016, when GroundUp investigative 
journalists published an article reporting that an anonymous e-mail sent “to key officials of the 
Commonwealth Games Federation and SASCOC [South African Sports Confederation and 
Olympic Committee], drawing their attention to corruption allegations in 2008 against Sam and 
asking both organisations to take action against him”. Attached to the e-mail was a statement by 
Adv. Arendse (2009), as well as a supporting statement by his secretary at the time, Colleen 
Beverley Bainbridge (2009). This was the first instance in which these statements had been made 
publicly available and were independently verified by GroundUp (Bejoy, 2016). When confronted 
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with these allegations, denials were put forward by all the implicated parties. Serge Belamant, the 
CEO of Net1 UEPS Technologies Inc. (Net1), which owns CPS, stated that he had never heard of 
Sam. In turn, Sam denied that the incident had even occurred, saying, “No, no. Not at all. I’ve never 
done social pensions. I am a sportsperson” (Bejoy, 2016). 
 
Adv. Arendse reportedly confirmed that this incident was reported to the BAC, and the GroundUp 
article noted that “[t]he committee decided on approaching the government with the corruption 
allegations was not necessary as the Director General of the Department of Social Development 
[Vusi Madonsela] was part of the committee and aware of the allegations”. It is understood that the 
statements made by Adv. Arendse had also been sent to the relevant officials in the United States 
Department of Justice (US DOJ), while they were investigating Net1/CPS for possible corruption in 
relation to being awarded the 2011 tender for payment services, which would ultimately be found to 
be an invalid tender by the Constitutional Court (Bejoy, 2016). It would, however, appear that with 
regard to this specific allegation of corruption, no official follow-up action was initiated, nor was 
any investigation undertaken.
 
 
 
Following the failure to award a tender, the DSD was forced to extend the contracts with the various 
companies in the respective provinces to ensure that grants continued to be paid, including contracts 
that existed with CPS, Empilweni, and AllPay at the time. This would be the first instance when the 
DSD and SASSA would experience the risks that come with the outsourcing of services to the 
private sector first hand – where a private company attempts to hold the country’s most vulnerable 
people hostage and leaving the government with no option but to concede to its demands. On 25 
March 2009, the CEO of SASSA at the time, Fezile Makiwane, released a statement with regard to 
the arrangements for the continuation of grant payments; in effect calling out CPS for being the 
only service provider that had not agreed to continue services under the terms that were imposed by 
NT and the Auditor-General. The statement made was as follows: 
 
Regarding Empilweni and AllPay, we have received assurances that payment will be 
effected for the month of April. As far as CPS is concerned we understand that payment will 
not be effected unless CPS is granted a two-year contract at the same terms and conditions 
as the expiring contracts. The Agency is unable to grant CPS a two-year contract given the 
grant conditions by the National Treasury and the Auditor-General that all cash payment 
contractors must get an interim contract for a period of one year and that a new tender be 
must be published and finalized within that fiscal year (2009/2010) (DSD, 2009a).  
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It would appear that the release of this statement placed sufficient pressure on CPS to agree to 
SASSA’s terms, as later the same day another statement was issued, indicating that CPS agreed to 
the one-year contract extension (DSD, 2009b). CPS would, however, use this act of “good faith” to 
supplement legal action that it would institute against SASSA for entering into an agreement with 
SAPO.  
 
5.2.2 CPS versus SASSA and SAPO 
 
Since 2002, the Minister is on record as having expressed his preference for the Post Office 
as government’s service provider of first choice, as a matter of policy. To this end, in May 
2007, SASSA, the South African Post Office, supported by the Departments of Social 
Development and Communications, respectively, entered into a Memorandum of 
Understanding in terms of which SASSA and the Post Office agreed to further their 
collaboration to, at a minimum, leverage each other’s expertise with the key short-term 
focus being to effect a partnership in the implementation of a back office system in the social 
grants payment process (DSD, 2009c). 
 
The statement above was made on behalf of Minister Zola Skweyiya in 2009. It indicates that the 
establishment of a mutually beneficial relationship between SASSA and SAPO was envisioned as 
far back as 2002, with the intention of inter-governmental agency cooperation being the most 
desirable way forward because it would mean leveraging existing public infrastructure, an 
improvement of public sector operational capabilities, and an improved payment experience for 
beneficiaries. In July 2009, SASSA concluded the Letter of Agreement with SAPO to provide 
specific payment services to beneficiaries. According to the court papers, the agreement (signed in 
July) was backdated to be effective from 5 January 2009 (Supreme Court of Appeal of South 
Africa, 2011). 
 
CPS was not happy with the arrangements made between SASSA and SAPO, and initiated litigation 
against SASSA for entering into the agreement with SAPO without following necessary 
procurement procedures, which would stretch from October 2009 (High Court) until March 2011 
(Supreme Court of Appeal). The case brought forward by CPS sought to have an urgent interdict 
placed against SASSA and SAPO entering into an agreement for providing grant payment services. 
The High Court found in favour of CPS’s argument, but this decision would later be overturned by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal; in effect making the agreement between SAPO and SASSA valid 
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2011). This outcome would, however, be of no 
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consequence as in the month that followed, SASSA would initiate a fresh tender process for 
identifying a service provider for the payment of grants. 
 
It is at this stage that the agreement between SAPO and SASSA would became void, marking a 
significant turning point both in the manner in which SASSA and the DSD envisioned grant 
payments being made, as well as the overall strategic approach that the Agency would adopt. This 
turning point coincided with a change in leadership in the country and in turn in the Ministry and 
SASSA. Following the national election, President Zuma appointed Edna Molewa as minister of the 
DSD and Bathabile Dlamini as deputy minister in May 2009. Zola Skweyiya, a champion of 
progressive social policy and public sector leadership, was pushed aside. Unsurprisingly, he became 
a prominent member of the veterans group that emerged to oppose Zuma in 2017.  
 
It is worth noting that the secondary argument that was put forward by CPS (on which the High 
Court did not make any finding) with regard to its request to overturn the agreement between 
SASSA and SAPO was that “the Agency failed to obtain the concurrence of the Minister to enter 
into the Letter of Agreement as is required by sec. 4(2)(a) of the SASSA Act” (North Gauteng High 
Court, 2009: 8). There are two potentially significant insights that might be gathered from this 
argument put forward by CPS. The first is that the then CEO of SASSA, Mr Fezile Makiwane, had 
by inference entered into the agreement with SAPO either without the minister’s consent or 
knowledge of the agreement. The second and perhaps more curious insight is that at some point 
CPS was made aware of this assumed fact. As with most internal departmental management 
matters, one would assume that this information would not be readily available to the public. This 
begs the question as to how it was that CPS was informed of the fact that the minister had not 
provided concurrence for the agreement. This is perhaps the reason why the Letter of Agreement 
signed in July 2009 came into effect in January 2009. As this argument was not pursued by the 
court, it will remain unknown as to what the minister’s view on the matter was. However, given that 
CPS was confident enough to include this in its legal argument, one might assume that the minister 
would have been called upon to testify in favour of CPS.  
 
On 16 July 2009, SASSA CEO, Mr Fezile Makiwane, was placed on “special leave” following a 
probe by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU). At first it was reported that Makiwane had 
instructed CPS to pay R2.5 million from SASSA’s Reconstruction and Development Fund (a fund 
that was used and controlled by payment service providers for maintaining and upgrading payment 
facilities) towards funding a party for Jacob Zuma in December 2008 at Nkandla (Maphumulo, 
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2009). The fund was subsequently closed. It is unknown if any charges were ever laid against 
Makiwane or CPS, or if indeed any evidence was found in support of this allegation.  
 
It was then further alleged that Makiwane “had contravened the rules of the Public Finance 
Management Act in relation to irregular procurement practices involving 11 transactions amounting 
to R10 million” (South African Press Association [Sapa], 2010). In January 2010, Makiwane 
submitted his resignation, but this was rejected by Molewa, citing that he had not given the required 
three months’ notice. On 23 April 2010, Fezile Makiwane was dismissed (Sapa, 2010) and Molewa 
appointed Coceko Pakade, the then chief financial officer (CFO) of the DSD to the acting CEO 
position at SASSA (Maphumulo, 2009). 
 
Makiwane challenged the dismissal in labour court (Labour Court of South Africa, 2010) and it was 
revealed that the motivation for his resignation was “influenced solely by the extent to which the 
working conditions had been rendered unbearable” (Staff Writer, 2010). In the court papers he 
detailed how he had been asked to respond to what was referred to as the so-called “Penultimate 
Report”, which had been completed two years earlier and concerned property acquisitions. He 
responded to all the requests put to him, but received no response or feedback and at  
 
the end of January [2010] he was ‘at his wits end’ as he had been suspended for six and a 
half months, had responded to allegations against him and still was not being allowed to 
return to work, despite what he believed to be the absence of any good reason to prolong his 
‘special leave’ (Labour Court of South Africa, 2010: 3). 
 
It would thus appear from the filings in the court processes and the lack of any public information to 
the contrary that none of the allegations against Makiwane was ever substantiated. Makiwane later 
sued the DSD for reputational damages, resulting in a R6.7 million payout (Magubane, 2016). In 
hindsight, this is a story that appears to be replicated throughout the various examples of state 
capture, as outlined in the Betrayal of the Promise report and other supplementary reports.  
 
The removal of Fezile Makiwane from SASSA allowed for a change in the approach of the Agency 
to the distribution of grants and how it should be undertaken. Text Box 2 outlines the pertinent 
details of the envisioned payment system, prior to the Zuma administration.  
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Text Box 2: South African Postbank payment model  
 
Context and objectives:  
The 2007 RFP set out the challenges that SASSA was experiencing at the time in relation to the grant 
payment system, namely that (Adjudication Committee, 2008): 
 approximately 70% of payments are done at paypoints, ranging from buildings that comply with the 
national norms and standards to structures with inadequate shelter, ablution facilities, and security; 
 the beneficiaries experience long queues and are exposed to harsh weather conditions; 
 in many urban townships, and at most rural and deep rural paypoints, there is a complete lack of 
permanent and secure building structures with ample seating, ablution facilities, and water; and 
 the security measures at these paypoints are not in line with the requisite norms and standards. 
 
In response, service providers were required to provide SASSA with services that would: 
 enhance payment services to beneficiaries, inclusive of a technological solution that addresses the 
current challenges;  
 qualitatively enhance the beneficiaries’ experience; and  
 reduce the cost.  
 
Payment methods: 
The proposed solution was required to take into account the fact that beneficiaries have an option to choose 
one of the following payment methods: 
 bank payments;  
 cash payments using a contractor; or  
 post office payments. 
 
In the agreement between SASSA and SAPO it was indicated that “[w]hen new beneficiaries applied to 
SASSA for a grant, they would be asked if they had an existing bank account, and if not, whether they would 
like to open a Postbank account. If they did, SASSA would on behalf of the beneficiary open a Postbank 
account if the particular SASSA office was online or it would refer the beneficiary to any post office to do so 
… Within some eight months, 460 377 beneficiaries had opened Postbank accounts under the scheme” 
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2011: 8). SASSA would have to continue contracting service 
providers to meet the demand for cash payment of grants. With the SAPO agreement it was envisioned that 
there would be a steady increase in grants being paid electronically and the need and associated cost of 
distributing cash would decrease over time.  
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Card specifications and biometric verification: 
SAPO would issue the beneficiary with a Mzansi bank card. The Mzansi bank card was a specialised account 
that was carried/accepted by all major banks (linked into the NPS and was thus an open-loop model) and 
offered reduced service and transaction fees specifically for low-income account holders. The Mzansi bank 
card programme did not achieve the critical mass required to ensure that it was financially sustainable for all 
of the banks and most of the large banks have since developed their own low-cost bank account services. The 
Postbank, however, still offers the Mzansi bank card.  
 
Costs: 
At the time, costs varied between service providers. At that stage AllPay was the cheapest (as it had already 
started moving towards electronic payments) and CPS was the most expensive (as it mostly distributed 
grants through cash payments). The “average handling charge of contractors amounts to R32.11 per 
transaction”. SAPO proposed “a once-off fee of R13.68 for every beneficiary account opened and thereafter 
a monthly fee of R14.59 per beneficiary” (Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2011: 7-8). 
 
Ownership of data: 
At the time, “[t]he contractors were the repositories of the data and the enrolment payment system. Thus, the 
contractors were and are in control of the process of taking the biometric data of the beneficiaries, including 
verifying the beneficiaries’ details up to the payment stage. All this data remained with the contractors” 
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2011: 6). 
In the court filings it was noted that “[o]ne of the advantages of the [SAPO] system as far as SASSA was 
concerned was that whereas in the past the beneficiary’s details would remain in the contractor’s system, the 
beneficiary’s account details would now be captured in the SASSA system” (Supreme Court of Appeal of 
South Africa, 2011: 7). 
 
5.3 The Invalid 2012 CPS Contract  
 
In November 2010, arguably the most visible strategic move by the Zuma-led power elite to 
repurpose state institutions took place in the form of the first cabinet reshuffle, which included the 
appointment of Malusi Gigaba as Minister of Public Enterprises. Molewa was relocated to become 
Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, and Bathabile Dlamini was appointed Minister of the 
DSD. At the time, Coceko Pakade was the acting CEO of SASSA (Maphumulo, 2009) and Vusi 
Madonsela was still the DG of the DSD.  
 
Minister Dlamini appointed Ms Virginia Petersen as CEO of SASSA on 21 April 2011 (Cabinet, 
2011), four days after the new RFP was released on 17 April. The importance of specifying these 
dates is to highlight that in terms of exposure to the complexities of the services that SASSA was 
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seeking to acquire and the technical complexities around how the RFP was constructed, it would be 
reasonable to assume that Ms Petersen was most likely not readily in a position to make executive 
interventions in the bidding process. However, it was Petersen who, on 10 June, issued Bidders 
Notice 2, which was intended to clarify the requirements for biometric identification and was 
ultimately the main reason for CPS being awarded the tender on 17 January 2012 (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2013). 
 
A number of the losing bidders, particularly the other provincial service providers (hereafter 
referred to as “AllPay”), were aggrieved by the bid evaluation process and the awarding of the 
contract to CPS and collectively resolved to institute litigation against the DSD, SASSA, and CPS. 
First was a High Court application that sought to attain an interdict preventing SASSA from taking 
any steps to implement the tender (which was later dropped) and then to have the tender reviewed.  
 
In August 2012, the High Court found that the tender process was to be declared illegal and invalid 
“but declined to set the award aside because of the practical upheaval this would have involved” 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 4). This was due to the complex practicalities that 
would be involved in attempting to find a “just and equitable” remedy for correcting the flaws of 
the tender process. AllPay then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal to seek further relief in 
terms of a remedy to the SASSA tender. In March 2013, “the Supreme Court of Appeal, in the end, 
found that there were no unlawful irregularities” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 5). 
The Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the cross-appeal (filed by CPS); in 
effect making the tender outcome legal (Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, 2013). 
Aggrieved by this judgement, AllPay, joined by Corruption Watch and the Centre for Child Law 
Amicus Curiae (friends of the court), approached the Constitutional Court, seeking leave to appeal 
against the adverse orders made by the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
 
On 29 November 2013, the Constitutional Court held that the award of the tender to provide 
services for payment of social grants to CPS was constitutionally invalid (AllPay 1) and on 17 April 
2014 a remedial order (AllPay 2) was handed down, where the court suspended the declaration of 
invalidity. The suspension of the declaration was based on the premise that a new tender would be 
awarded after a proper procurement process and to ensure that the payment of grants was not 
interrupted, meaning CPS would continue to provide payment services in the interim. SASSA was 
ordered to report to the court on progress in respect of the new tender process and its outcome 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2014).  
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The details that emerged through these court cases, including how the tender process unfolded and 
the various irregularities that occurred along the way, demonstrate and provide insight into how 
tender processes can be manipulated (intentionally or unintentionally) to benefit specific bidders or, 
alternatively, to disqualify others. This is an important tool in the state capture handbook. It shows 
the accumulative impact that “minor” missteps, infractions, and misinterpretations at various stages 
within a procurement process could have in determining who is awarded a government contract. As 
in the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, the central arguments put forward by AllPay to the 
Constitutional Court focused on the alleged irregularities in the procurement process, namely:  
 
a) the requirement of separate bids for the nine provinces; 
b) the composition of the BEC; 
c) the attendance of members when the BAC made its final decision; 
d) the assessment of the functionality of the BEE component of CPS; and 
e) the nature and effect of Bidders Notice 2. 
 
On the surface, the tender for the payment services for grants followed the general procurement 
processes, where an RFP was developed by a Bid Specification Committee (BSC) consisting of the 
appropriate technical and operationally competent officials; and a BEC evaluated the bids by 
following a two-stage evaluation process. The first stage entailed the assessment of the technical 
proposals that bidders put forward in response to the requirements of the RFP, where bidders who 
scored below a prescribed minimum threshold of 70% fulfilment would be eliminated from the 
bidding process. Those bids scoring above the 70% technical scoring would then be evaluated on 
costs and other remaining requirements, including BEE. The BAC would then examine the 
recommendations of the BEC and the evaluation process itself to determine if the recommendation 
is acceptable; if so, the contract would be awarded.  
 
A total of 21 bids were submitted in response to the RFP and of those submitted, only AllPay and 
CPS were able to meet the initial technical evaluation threshold of 70%, with the former scoring 
70.42% and the latter 79.79%. Both entities were asked to deliver oral presentations on their 
technical capability in order for the BEC to make a final determination for the first stage of the 
evaluation. Following the presentation, the BEC revised the scores of the two bidders, where 
“AllPay’s score fell to 58.68% and Cash Paymaster’s score rose to 82.44%” (Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, 2013: 9), effectively leaving CPS as the only service provider in the running for 
being awarded the tender. The BEC being “satisfied with Cash Paymaster’s proposal on its financial 
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and preference-point merits” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 9)recommended it to the 
BAC, who then approved that CPS be awarded the tender.  
 
Several additional arguments were put forward by AllPay regarding the irregularity of the tender, 
which were dismissed by the courts, such as the “procedural unfairness” with regard to the short 
notice given for delivering an oral presentation and the last-minute application to include what the 
court determined was inadmissible hearsay evidence of potential corruption (this will be dealt with 
in later chapters). However, the five factors listed above speak directly to the modus operandi of the 
state capture project and will thus be elaborated on further. The first of these is the requirement for 
separate bids for the nine provinces, where bidders were allowed to submit proposals for any 
number of provinces.  
 
The High Court had found this argument compelling because “the decision to overlook CPS’ failure 
to comply with the RFP [was] not rationally connected to the purpose of the tender as a whole, 
namely, to ensure proper comparative scrutiny of the bids across different provinces” (North 
Gauteng High Court, 2012: 31). Conversely, both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the fact that CPS had failed to comply with the RFP, by only 
submitting one bid as opposed to a bid for each province, did not have sufficient bearing to warrant 
a review of the tender. It was the courts’ understanding that it was always SASSA’s intention to 
award a contract to a single service provider to provide all the required services nationwide. This 
assumption (although most likely an assertion made based on SASSA’s representations at the time) 
is in contradiction to the concerns that the Agency had raised previously with regard to the risk of 
enabling monopolisation of grant payment services, as highlighted in the previous section.  
 
The second and third arguments, which were also ultimately not deemed to have sufficient 
motivation for declaring the irregularity of the contract, centred on the composition of the BEC and 
the number of members in attendance at the final meeting in which the BAC decided to award the 
tender to CPS. In terms of the composition, the BEC consisted of a four-member panel (none of 
whom was a supply chain management [SCM] practitioner), which was not in line with SASSA’s 
own SCM guidelines that required the BEC to consist of five members, one of whom should be an 
SCM practitioner (North Gauteng High Court, 2012). The courts received arguments from SASSA 
as to why this point was not relevant, which the courts accepted. Still, the composition of the BEC 
in terms of who the actual members were and how the bid evaluation unfolded are relevant in 
relation to Bidders Notice 2. The fact that a member was not present at the final BAC meeting was 
also viewed as a non-issue in terms of influencing the overall tender-awarding outcome, as there 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 88 | P a g e  
was unanimous agreement between the other four members of the BAC that the contract should be 
awarded to CPS. What is relevant is that the absent member, Mr Mathebula of NT, was the only 
BAC member who had raised red flags with regard to the change in biometric specifications and 
how it influenced the bid evaluation, and that there appeared to be no comparative assessment on 
provincial level and the change in scoring, which was made following the oral presentations 
(AllPay, 2013). 
 
Ultimately, the Constitutional Court found that the contract awarded to CPS was irregular due to the 
established fact that Bidders Notice 2 constituted a significant change in the terms of reference of 
the RFP and that because of the lack of clarity with regard to the requirement, the awarding of the 
contract should be declared invalid. Bidders Notice 2 served as a declaratory document to the 
bidding participants, which was to provide clarity on specific requirements in the RFP that bidders 
were to address in their proposal. The notice was issued on 10 June 2011, just five days prior to the 
original scheduled date of submissions (15 June 2011), which was extended to 27 June. The 
significant change comes down to the change of just one word, where the authentication of life for 
the monthly payment of a grant to a recipient (read biometrics) had gone from being a “preferred” 
requirement to a “must”. Both the competing bidders (AllPay and CPS) provided for the use of 
fingerprint biometrics in the process of beneficiary enrolment and reconciliation (proposed by both 
AllPay and CPS). However, as the diverse payment methods of direct transfers, ATMs, PoS, etc., 
which are included in the NPS, were not yet enabled for biometric verification, AllPay was not able 
to meet this change in requirement. It was only CPS’s proposal that offered an alternative method of 
biometric verification in the form of voice biometric technology, which was never properly 
implemented.  
 
In the court judgement it was highlighted that both the BEC and the BAC had in fact found it 
difficult to approach the evaluation of the bids, given the lack of clarity around the change that 
Bidders Notice 2 inferred in relation to the original RFP. The notice was at first not included in the 
BEC assessment, as the committee itself found it difficult to align the RFP with the change implied 
by Bidders Notice 2. However, it was later included in the reassessment, which took place 
following the oral presentations by the two qualifying bidders. As highlighted previously, the result 
of this change in the technical specification is what motivated AllPay’s bid score to be reduced to 
below the qualification threshold of 70% and left CPS as the only bidder to proceed to the second 
stage of the evaluation. For reference, Table 6 provides a breakdown of the members of the BEC 
and the corresponding technical scores that they allocated before and after the oral presentations. As 
can be seen from the table, very little change in scoring was recorded from the two BEC members, 
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Ms Raphaahle Ramokgopa (project manager at the time) and Mr Frank Earl (then acting 
programme manager: DSD). AllPay’s score was, however, reduced across all categories by both Mr 
Wiseman Magasela, Deputy DG: Social Policy in the DSD, and Ms Vuyelwa Nhlapo, CEO of the 
National Development Agency (NDA).  
 
Table 6: Breakdown of BEC scoring for SASSA 2012 tender 
  
Ramokgopa Magasela Earl Nhlapo Total 
AllPay CPS AllPay CPS AllPay CPS AllPay CPS AllPay CPS 
Before presentation  
Enrolment  3,60   3,60   3,76   3,96   2,88   3,36   2,92   3,88  16,45 18,50 
Payment solution  3,67   4,50   2,70   4,42   3,33   3,42   3,58   3,92  26,56 32,52 
Security  4,10   3,95   4,00   5,00   4,00   3,80   4,00   4,05  12,08 12,60 
Phase-in/out  3,83   4,50   3,67   5,00   3,50   3,17   3,67   3,67  7,34 8,17 
Mitigation  4,00   5,00   4,00   4,00   4,00   4,00   4,00   4,00  8,00 8,00 
                  70,42 79.79  
After presentation  
Enrolment  3,60   3,60   2,32   3,96   2,72   3,36   1,84   4,56  13,1 19,35 
Payment solution  3,42   4,50   2,58   4,42   2,83   3,42   2,25   4,33  22,16 33,34 
Security  4,10   3,95   3,60   5,00   4,00   3,80   2,30   4,25  10,5 12,75 
Phase-in/out  3,83   4,50   2,33   5,00   3,50   3,17   2,17   4,33  5,915 8,5 
Mitigation  4,00   5,00   3,00   4,00   4,00   4,00   3,00   4,00  7 8,5 
                  58,675 82,44 
Difference  
Enrolment  -   -   -1,44   -   -0,16   -   -1,08   0,68   -3,35   0,85  
Payment solution  -0,25   -   -0,12   -   -0,50   -   -1,33   0,41   -4,40   0,82  
Security  -   -   -0,40   -   -   -   -1,70   0,20   -1,58   0,15  
Phase-in/out  -   -   -1,34   -   -   -   -1,50   0,66   -1,42   0,33  
Mitigation  -   -   -1,00   -   -   -   -1,00   -   -1,00   -  
Source: Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (2013): AllPay Judgement 
 
In the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, AllPay put forward that there was a conflict of 
interest with at least one of the BEC members, namely Ms Nhlapo, who was the BEC chairperson at 
the time. They highlighted that she had a previous business relationship within one of CPS’s 
empowerment partners, Mr Yako. Ms Nhlapo and Mr Yako had previously served on the board of a 
company called Reflective Learning Resources. As the company had no involvement in the bid or 
the tender, both no longer sat on the company’s board, and had had little interaction with each other, 
the court agreed that the allegation of bias could not be established (North Gauteng High Court, 
2012). The Constitutional Court did, however, find the effect of Bidders Notice 2 and the 
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consequential bid evaluation process unfair, thus rendering the contract between SASSA and CPS 
invalid.  
 
In the judgement on the AllPay case, the Constitutional Court detailed how it took great exception 
to the fact that very little consideration was given to the assessment of CPS’s empowerment model:  
 
There was an obligation on SASSA to ensure that the empowerment credentials of the 
prospective tenderers were investigated and confirmed before the award was finally made. 
That obligation became even more crucial when there were no other competitors left in the 
second stage. There is then an even greater obligation for the tender administrator to 
confirm the empowerment credentials of the winning bidder. Cash Paymaster claimed that 
its equity partners would manage and execute over 74% of the tender. Its tender did not 
substantiate this … Despite this failure, SASSA did not call on Cash Paymaster to 
substantiate its claimed empowerment credentials, presumably because by that stage the 
preference points could not have affected the outcome. This effectively made the 
consideration of empowerment an empty shell, where preference points were calculated as a 
formality but where the true goal of empowerment requirements was never given effect to 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 40).  
 
It would later emerge, through investigative reporting by amaBhungane (McKune, 2016), that the 
agreement between CPS and its consortium partners (which had not been submitted to the courts) 
provided an empowerment model that was in fact nothing more than an “empty shell”. In its 
response to the RFP, CPS stated that 74.57% of the contract value would be allocated to its 
consortium partners. In the consortium memorandum of agreement (MoA), however, there was a 
clause that in effect rendered the partners’ active participation in the provision of services to 
SASSA moot. The contract indicates that the consortium members were to form a new company 
(Newco) and this company would then enter into a “Services Agreement” with CPS, wherein CPS 
would then render “certain support services to Newco, against payment of 74.45% of the 
Transaction Fee” (Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd, Born Free Investments 272 (Pty) Ltd, Ekhaya 
Skills Developments Consultants CC & Reties Trading CC, 2011: 6). This in effect meant that 
CPS’s empowerment partners would only be allocated 0.12% of the R10 billion contract amount. 
The issues around CPS and the various empowerment partnerships will be dealt with further in the 
following chapter.  
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The case that was brought before the Constitutional Court centred on the tender process and as such 
it was not within the scope of the court proceedings to establish whether or not there was any form 
of corruption involved. The court did, however, see fit to include the following statement in its 
judgement:  
 
As Corruption Watch explained, with reference to international authority and experience, 
deviations from fair process may themselves all too often be symptoms of corruption or 
malfeasance in the process. In other words, an unfair process may betoken a deliberately 
skewed process. Hence insistence on compliance with process formalities has a three-fold 
purpose: (a) it ensures fairness to participants in the bid process; (b) it enhances the 
likelihood of efficiency and optimality in the outcome; and (c) it serves as a guardian 
against a process skewed by corrupt influences (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 
16).  
Text Box 3: CPS payment model  
 
Context and objectives:  
By 2011 there were approximately 14.5 million beneficiaries, when the bid document was issued, where 
approximately 58% of the total 9.2 million recipients were paid electronically into a bank account (Pulver & 
Ratichek, 2011).  
 
The objectives of the payment services contract included: 
 enhance payment services to beneficiaries, with the focus on protecting beneficiaries’ dignity; 
 to move beneficiaries away from more expensive cash delivery toward electronic delivery (this 
would reduce cost); 
 interoperability for electronic payments nationwide (able to operate within the NPS); and 
 introduce the new requirement of biometric verification.  
 
Payment methods: 
A re-registration process was undertaken, whereby each grant recipient was issued with a special Grindrod 
bank account, linked to a SASSA-branded smart card. Recipients could then choose one of the following 
payment methods: 
 payment into personal bank payment;  
 ATMs;  
 participating merchants (retail outlets); and 
 designated paypoints where cash payments are distributed. 
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“Net1’s payments are accomplished by the use of a biometrically enabled smart card. 
Beneficiaries/Recipients use the card to access their store-of-value, receiving cash at unique, single-purpose 
cash-dispensing machines. These machines are mounted in vehicles that arrive at designated paypoints at the 
scheduled time of payment. Though this method uses an electronic store-of-value, the payment is 
considered/categorized by SASSA as ‘cash-based’” (Pulver & Ratichek, 2011: 34). 
 
Card specifications and biometric verification: 
Each grant recipient received a SASSA-branded smart card. This card utilised CPS’s proprietary technology, 
which is supposed to require biometric verification before payment can take place.  
Participating merchants and the designated paypoints were also required to utilise specific technology-
compatible payment devices to do fingerprint biometric verification. Where recipients wanted to access their 
grants either through non-participating retailers, transfers into personal bank accounts, or non-CPS/Grindrod 
ATMs, voice biometric verification was required before payment would be made into their account.  
CPS is a non-bank payment service (partnered with Grindrod, but is not directly linked to the NPS) and with 
the proprietary biometric technology (which is not included in government standards and not compatible 
with most transaction devices), this is a closed-loop system.  
 
Costs: 
SASSA paid a fixed monthly fee of R16.44 (including VAT) per recipient (a recipient can receive more than 
one grant and/or could receive a grant payment for more than one beneficiary).  
If payment is made into a recipient’s personal bank account, they would pay associated banking fees. 
The smart card is interoperable with the NPS (i.e. can be used with other devices); however, transaction fees 
are charged to recipients, for example ATM withdrawals and purchases at non-participating merchants. 
 
Ownership of data: 
CPS retained control over all the beneficiaries’ data, including biometrics and personal information. 
*Voice verification was only implemented in 2014 and was then halted the same year – this does not appear 
to have been implemented and a normal PIN is used with the card (Staff Writer, 2014a). 
 
5.4 Ministerial Committees, Task Team, and Work Streams 
 
When I joined the Department of Social Development in 2010, I was presented with a report 
by SASSA which was developed by a panel of independent advisors who analysed the 
challenges relating to the then payment system, problems faced by beneficiaries and the 
administrative issues within SASSA. It contributed to the decision of establishing the 
Ministerial Advisory Committee [MAC] (Dlamini, 2017a: 1). 
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Following the two attempts to find a solid solution for distributing grants, the first being abandoned 
and the second being found invalid by the Constitutional Court, the DSD set about the task of 
attempting to once again carve out a way forward. As can be seen from the statement above, 
utilising outside players to provide expertise and advice to government institutions is not new. This 
pre-Zuma trend became more pronounced and widespread after Zuma became president. There 
were two consequences that are significant for this analysis: it exacerbated the institutional 
weaknesses of key state institutions, and created a powerful network of seemingly “independent” 
experts and advisors. The line between advising and decision making tends to fall away in the 
context of the emergence of a “shadow state”. This is where the decisions made by so-called 
“Kitchen Cabinets” are carried through into state institutions and legitimised via repurposed tender 
procedures for the appearance of upholding the constitutional state facade.  
 
5.4.1 Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC) 
 
Before departing from her position as minister of the DSD, Molewa had established “a number of 
committees” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group [PMG], 2017a: 4), similar in nature and seemingly 
with some of the same members. The MAC effectively evolved into the so-called work streams in 
2016. Little information is available in the public domain regarding these committees, with only a 
brief reference made to them by Ms Zodwa Mvulane (project manager at SASSA for Payment 
System) on 28 February 2017, when she indicated that there were in fact a number of committees, 
one of which “looked at norms and standards at paypoints”. Yet, no further detail could be provided 
on who was on these committees, how many committees there were, or what their various functions 
or objectives were. It could be assumed that one of these was the committee Dlamini referred to in a 
Social Development Parliamentary Committee meeting on 22 February 2017, at the height of 
tension around the CPS contract coming to an end. In her answer to a question posed by a member 
of parliament (MP), on the background to the MAC, Dlamini indicated that “the committee” had 
been established long before and was in fact established by her predecessor (eNCA, 2017). This 
would seem to confirm Molewa’s appointment of such a committee and that it was constituted with 
some of the same members. It would appear that this was, however, an attempt to pass the buck 
backwards, as Dlamini announced in a public statement the appointment of the MAC in 2013, 
which in turn established the process for SASSA to take over payment of grants from CPS (SASSA, 
2013a).  
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On 13 August 2013, SASSA released a press statement indicating the Agency’s intention to take 
over the payment of grants from CPS by 2017, and in order to achieve this mammoth task the 
minister appointed the MAC. The role of the MAC was to  
 
investigate and advise her on the best payment options for social security. Amongst other 
things, the committee is tasked with the responsibility to explore the existing market for a 
suitable payment model that will make it possible for SASSA to pay social grants in-house  
(SASSA, 2013a).  
 
In her statement, the minister emphasised how the members were “key expert sectors such as 
accounting, banking, legal, ICT [information and communications technology], payment systems” 
(breakdown provided in Table 7). However, it is important to highlight that none of the committee 
members were actually from the DSD or from SASSA (SASSA, 2013a: 1). Only one member had 
direct qualifications and expertise in social protection, namely Prof. Ann Skelton, Director of the 
Centre for Child Law and a professor at the University of Pretoria. Mr Tim Masela, Head of the 
NPS Department at the SARB, had the necessary expertise with regard to the national banking 
system.  
 
Table 7: List of MAC members 
Name Qualification (s) Experience 
Mr Themba Langa (chairperson) LLB Extensive experience in law 
Mr Mark Davids National Higher Diploma: 
Electrical Engineering 
Extensive experience in business development 
and management in the ICT sector 
Mr Sipho Majombozi BEd Extensive experience with regulatory bodies, 
policy, and government 
Mr Tim Masela BCom Extensive experience in central and commercial 
banking 
Mr Patrick Monyeki MBA Extensive experience in the ICT sector 
Mr Sizwe Shezi MA in Social Policy Project management, relationship management 
Dr Makhozi Khoza PhD in Administration Financial management, total quality management 
Ms Tangkiso Parkies Honours in Sociology Project management 
Prof. Ann Skelton PhD in law restorative and child 
justice 
Local and international experience on child law 
and justice, family law 
Mr Sanjiv Mital Engineering Degree Information 
Technology (IT) / Management 
Degree 
Engineering and IT 
Mr Barend Petersen Honours BCompt. ICT and ICT infrastructure 
Mr Tim Sukazi LLM in Commercial Law Commercial law 
Mr Andile Nyhonyha LLB Local and international commercial law 
Source: Written Reply for Question to the Minister of Social Development: 295/2015 (DSD, 2015b)  
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In December 2014, the committee submitted a report in which it recommended that SASSA should 
develop its own payment system and that work streams should be established to facilitate the 
implementation of the committee’s recommendations. It was in this report that the first suggestion 
was put forward that “in order to speed up the in-sourcing process”, some members of the MAC 
could be retained. In August 2015, the committee recommended that it be disbanded in order to 
speed up the implementation of the recommendations (Dlamini, 2017a: 2).  
 
By the time the MAC had issued the December 2014 report, CPS had been providing SASSA with 
payment services in accordance with the ruling of the Constitutional Court. This included the 
massive task of re-registering grant beneficiaries, which had already been undertaken, and SASSA 
was in the process of advertising a new tender in line with the court order. The new tender was 
initially advertised in December 2014. There were, however, disputes around the RFP, where CPS 
took exception to the lack of clarity around the technicalities of the tender and around the use of 
beneficiary data, to which the Black Sash Trust raised concerns. The Constitutional Court was 
required to provide guidance, in the form of a follow-on judgement to the AllPay 2 ruling, on the 
revision of the RFP and set out the timeframes by which SASSA and the DSD were required to 
complete the process. The RFP was revised and then issued on 24 March 2015 (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2015). 
 
In May 2015, Net1/CPS released a statement announcing that it would not be submitting a proposal 
for the new tender. AllPay also did not submit a proposal and in the end the tender was not awarded 
to any of the other three submitting bidders. It was suggested at the time that the tender was 
engineered to fail, citing two specifications that made the tender commercially unviable. The first 
was the price, where SASSA had stipulated a maximum fee of R14.50 per recipient per month, 
which is an 11.8% decrease on the fee that CPS was charging, and the second being the biometric 
(proof of life) requirement, which CPS initially approached the courts to have SASSA revise. Two 
of the bidders were disqualified for not meeting the biometric requirement and the last bidder was 
excluded for providing a bid that was above the ceiling price (Sole & McKune, 2017).  
 
The tenders were adjudicated in October 2015, in line with the Constitutional Court timelines and 
on 5 November 2015, SASSA filed a progress report to the Constitutional Court informing it of the 
outcome of the tender process and outlining the steps that SASSA proposed to take in order for the 
Agency to take over the payment function itself after 31 March 2017. On 25 November, the court 
issued an order indicating that it was satisfied with the proposal put forward by SASSA to take over 
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the payment of grants and the court discharged its supervisory jurisdiction over SASSA, as it was 
no longer viewed as necessary (Dlamini, 2017a). 
 
5.4.2 The work streams 
 
In July 2015, Minister Dlamini sent the then CEO of SASSA, Virginia Petersen, a letter instructing 
her to appoint various work streams, based on the recommendations of the MAC. In the letter the 
minister gave the following instructions:  
 
I have decided that in order to roll out implementation process diligently, we need to retain 
the collective knowledge and institutional memory of the key members of the Committee. 
Given their knowledge and expertise, these members will lead the work streams and work 
jointly with you and the SASSA Executive Management team so as to ensure that the various 
work streams are adequately resourced to execute their respective mandates in a speedy 
manner without any disruption, and to minimise delays in the implementation of the third 
recommendations. 
 
To this end, I have decided to retain the services of the following individuals who were part 
of the Committee for the implementation of the third recommendations: Mr Andile Nyonyha 
(Team Leader), Mr Tim Suzuki (Legal), Ms Tankiso Parkies (Social Benefits), Mr Sizwe 
Shezi (Economic Development) and Mr Patrick Monyeki (Information Communication 
Technology). Although this panel will account directly to me during the implementation 
process, I request SASSA appoints hosts, provide resources and compensates the panel on 
behalf of the Department, subject to the applicable laws (Constitutional Court of South 
Africa, 2017b: 9). 
 
Of the five individuals listed above, only three of the respective work streams were actually 
appointed, and a year lapsed between when this letter was sent and when the work streams were 
actually appointed in July 2016, by then acting CEO, Ms Raphaahle Ramokgopa. It is unknown as 
to why there was a delay in appointing the work streams, but one possible reason could be that their 
appointment (which was budgeted for R47 million over three years) was not in line with PFMA 
requirements of going on an open tender process. In a statement by Dlamini, the motivation for 
appointing the work streams without following the required SCM process was, firstly, that SASSA 
did not have the necessary “expertise within the organisation because this function it was planning 
for [paying grants], was always outsourced”, and, secondly, that “SASSA’s management team had 
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their day-to-day running of the organisation and could not simultaneously run a hugely complex and 
intense transition project” (Dlamini, 2017a: 2). Still, this motivation does not provide clarity as to 
why the appointment of the work streams was to be undertaken by SASSA when they were 
instructed to report directly to the minister. It would appear that this was the real source of the 
confusion surrounding how SASSA was to meet its obligations for taking over the payment of 
grants come 1 April 2017. Further discussion on the role the work streams played in the culmination 
of the ‘self-made crisis’ of March 2017 is provided in Section 5.6.  
 
With the 2017 crisis averted, following the Constitutional Court proceedings, the then CEO of 
SASSA, Thokozani Magwaza, decided to cancel the work stream contracts in July 2017, after 
having received a letter from NT informing him that the procurement process followed was non-
compliant with the SCM requirements and was thus regarded as irregular.  
 
Running a brief Internet search on some of the individuals named in the minister’s request provided 
cross-referencing links to other state capture projects, which need to be highlighted in the context of 
this case study. The two MAC members not appointed to the work streams are Andile Nyhonyha 
and Sizwe Shezi. Mr. Nyhonyha is a founder and director of Regiments Capital, which is linked 
through work that it undertook together with McKinsey at Transnet and Eskom (it should be 
pointed out that this was prior to the fallout between them and Eric Wood/Trillian) (Association of 
Black Securities and Investment Professionals [ABSIP], 2016). Mr Shezi, who has served as a 
trustee of two of Zuma’s trusts (namely the Friends of Jacob Zuma Trust and the Jacob Zuma RDP 
Children’s Trust), was reported to have benefited from a R1.7 billion deal that was partly funded by 
the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) for the purchasing of a 22.95% stake in oil company Total 
SA. Shezi’s company, TheMan Investments, was reported to have received shares worth an 
estimated R122.4 million through the deal (Thamm, 2016).  
 
Of the five work streams that were identified in the MAC final report, three were established in July 
of 2016, namely:  
 
 Legal and regulatory work stream, which was led by Mr Tim Sukazi of Tim Sukazi Inc. and 
was responsible for reviewing and ensuring that there was legal and regulatory compliance 
to the proposed solution (DSD, 2017a). The value of the appointment was R7.6 million 
(DSD, 2017b). 
 Benefits and local economic development work stream, which was led by Ms Mpolokeng 
Tankiso Parkies and was responsible for identifying the potential benefits and local 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 98 | P a g e  
economic initiatives that could be achieved as a result of implementing the proposed work 
stream solution (DSD, 2017a). The value of the appointment was approximately R4.4 
million (DSD, 2017b).  
 Business information, banking services, and project management work stream, which was 
contracted to Rangewave Consulting and led by Mr Patrick Monyeki. This company was 
responsible for the bulk of the work relating to developing a plan and the technical system 
requirements which would need to be implemented in order for SASSA to take over 
payment of grants come 1
 
April 2017. The contracted value for the work was R35.8 million 
(DSD, 2017a).  
 
Patrick Monyeki has played a central role in not only the technical IT-related project of SASSA’s 
grant payment system, but has also been linked to a number of other potentially dodgy dealings 
within the government. Two are worth mentioning here. The first is related to allegations of 
collusion in a contract between the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and the SA Security 
Solutions and Technologies (Sasstec) group, of which he is a 15% shareholder (Serrao, 2017). The 
contract involved the development of an Integrated Inmate Management System (IIMS); in effect a 
system “to keep track of South Africa’s 160 000 strong prison population” (Sole, 2017).  
 
The second is linked to the investigations around unexplained money transfers to the South African 
Revenue Service’s (SARS) second-in-command, Jonas Makwakwa, Chief Officer: Business and 
Individual Taxes. Investigative reporting on the matter appears to link Monyeki to a “February 2015 
payment of R17.87 million by the Department of Water and Sanitation [DWS] in favour of a debt-
collection company called New Integrated Credit Solutions”. New Integrated Credit Solutions then 
transferred precisely 25% of the value of its shares (approximately R4.5 million) to a company, of 
which Monyeki is the sole director, called Mahube Payment Solutions. Makwakwa is reported to 
have received money from the same initial payment made by the DWS, through a complex web of 
money transfers and exchanges. The details of the alleged corruption and money laundering 
emerged when the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) flagged several suspicious payments to 
Makwakwa, following which he was suspended and investigations ensued. After an internal 
enquiry, he was cleared of all charges and reinstated. The Hawks are still currently investigating the 
matter (Haffajee, 2017). The link between Monyeki and Makwakwa appears to be related to the 
close friendship between Monyeki and SARS Commissioner, Tom Moyane (Serrao, 2017). The two 
have also been linked to the awarding of the 2012 SASSA contract to CPS. Further discussion on 
Monyeki and Moyane will be presented in the next chapter.  
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The work streams started their work in August 2016 and in just three months had “fleshed out the 
advisory committee’s proposal and developed a project plan and preliminary costing for the 
project” (Dlamini, 2017a: 2). In October 2016, the work streams had issued their first draft report, in 
which they outlined the “optimal model” and approach that SASSA should adopt for taking over the 
payment of grants from CPS. In a statement defending the work streams, Dlamini praised that “[i]t 
was through their analysis that we appreciated the complexity of the programme and that the initial 
timelines that were presented to the [Constitutional] Court underestimated the effort and capacity 
required to prepare SASSA for the in-sourcing process” (Dlamini, 2017a: 2).  
 
Text Box 4: Work streams payment model 
 
In November 2016, there were more than 17 million beneficiaries and approximately 10.5 million recipients. 
It is unclear what the exact breakdown of payment methods according to category of beneficiaries per 
received grant is. However, based on a presentation by former Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan in 
parliament, it is estimated that approximately 4 million (38%) recipients received grants at paypoints and 
participating merchants, 1.6 million (15%) had direct transfer to a separate bank account and 4.9 million 
received grants through other banks’ ATMs (which charge recipients a transaction fee) (Minister of Finance, 
2017). It is estimated that there are between 1.5 million and 2 million recipients who have their grants 
automatically transferred to an EasyPay Everywhere (EPE) account, a Net1 subsidiary, which is also a 
Grindrod-held bank account (The Black Sash Trust, 2017; Van Rensburg, 2017).  
 
In terms of payment type, 35% of transactions (there can be more than one electronic transaction by a 
recipient) take place at paypoints (this is an increase from before CPS) and only 7% at biometric-compatible 
ATMs or PoS devices, 18% with regular PIN-based PoS and 40% from standard ATMs. This means that 
more than half of the transactions made under the CPS system did not meet the biometric verification as 
required by SASSA (SASSA, 2017c). 
 
It is important to note that the scope of the work streams extended beyond just the payment system and 
covered all of SASSA’s internal operations as well. From documents and information available, the 
following are understood to be the principal objectives of the work streams’ proposed model: 
 
 To develop an entirely new integrated web-based system, which would replace the legacy grant 
administration (social pension, or SOCPEN) system.  
 Biometric verification would remain a mandatory requirement.  
 Cards should be prepaid debit cards, linked to the SASSA holding account (closed-loop system, 
similar to that of CPS).  
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 SASSA should produce its own specialised bank card, which would include biometric verification 
for every transaction and be able to “enforce spending at specific merchants”, “manage/restrict debit 
orders”, and “provide protected and unprotected spending”, such as barring spending on alcohol 
(Sole & McKune, 2017). 
 This would require compatible ATMs and PoS devices to be distributed to participating merchants, 
agreements with whom SASSA would have control over. 
 No debit orders or deduction would be allowed (excluding a 10% funeral policy allowance in line 
with regulations). 
 SASSA to have ownership and control over beneficiary and recipient data, including transaction 
data.  
 
Important to note is that in the 2014/2015 annual report, SASSA indicated that “[t]he effectiveness of the 
proof of life verification solution is dependent on compatibility with payment Cardholder Verification 
Method (CVM) solutions in the NPS and as such necessitates the development of Biometric Standard for 
CVM in the NPS infrastructural environment” (SASSA, 2015: 22). In July 2016, PASA announced “a new 
specification for biometric authentication on payment cards across the country” (Staff Writer, 2016a).  
 
5.4.3 Inter-ministerial Committee (IMC) 
 
The Betrayal of the Promise report highlighted that ad hoc IMCs were key components of the 
constellation of Kitchen Cabinets that the Zuma-centred power elite used to exercise power. Many 
references have recently been made to the IMC on Comprehensive Social Security. The initial 
reference to this IMC was in connection with the release of the draft plans for a Comprehensive 
Social Security Document (CSSD), which was tabled at the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council (NEDLAC) in November 2016. References to the IMC became more frequent once 
it started to emerge that there was a looming crisis because SASSA found itself unable to take over 
from CPS on 1 April, thus placing social grant beneficiaries at risk of not receiving the monthly 
income on which they depend.  
 
The structure and tasks of the IMC (in its current form) are seemingly undefined as there has been 
no recent media statement clarifying the objectives of the IMC, other than non-specific references 
to its composition.  
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The only reference in which the members of the IMC are clearly stated is in relation to a statement 
made, indicating that the president was going to take over as chair of the IMC (“focus on 
comprehensive social security reforms”, De Villiers, 2017) from 19 March 2017:  
 
The IMC was established last year [assume this is November 2016] and it includes the 
Ministers of Social Development Bathabile Dlamini and Finance Pravin Gordhan as co-
chairpersons. Other members are the Ministers of Labour, Mildred Oliphant, Transport, 
Dipuo Peters, and Health, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi … The IMC will now also include the 
Ministers of Telecommunications and Postal Services, Dr Siyabonga Cwele, 
Communications, Faith Muthambi, and Home Affairs, Malusi Gigaba. The Directors-
General of the Department of Social Development and National Treasury will co-chair the 
technical task team and lead the IMC secretariat (Staff Writer, 2017a). 
 
The statement above was made following the ruling made by the Constitutional Court, which 
ultimately ordered that the invalid contract between SASSA and CPS be extended for a year, in 
order for SASSA and the DSD to devise a solution for taking over the payment of grants. It is 
unclear, however, if this is the same IMC as the one referenced in the Minister of Social 
Development’s speech, with regard to the 2012 CSSD, which was released in November 2016, 
where she indicated that the IMC was established in 2006, which was chaired by the Minister of 
Finance (Dlamini, 2016a). 
 
The CSSD is a policy document that puts forward a proposal for structural reform for South 
Africa’s broader social protection system. Some of the proposed changes include consolidating the 
various social protection programmes such as the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF), the Road 
Accident Fund (RAF), etc. under a single management structure called the National Social Security 
Fund (NSSF), and expanding social assistance for Child Support and Old Age grants to cover all 
citizens who fall in the relevant age brackets (making these grants universal). Perhaps the most 
impactful would be the introduction of a National Pension Fund, which would operate on a similar 
basis as the UIF (Inter-departmental Task Team [IDTT], 2012). 
 
The relevance of the proposed CSSD, which was prepared by an IDTT, is that it would undoubtedly 
add an increased level of complexity to the challenge of SASSA taking over the payment of grants 
in the near future. The potential ramifications of attempting to establish a realistic short-term 
solution in the context of the larger aspirations laid out in the CSSD could be substantial. An 
important technical aspect that should be noted is that the proposed reforms stipulated that an 
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integrated payment system would need to be established, which would be connected to the NPS. 
Further discussion on implications regarding the long-term strategy for the DSD and SASSA is 
provided in Section 8.3. 
 
The challenge of wanting decisions to be made in an IMC setting is that this may in fact escalate the 
problem, due to conflict either in individual cabinet members’ mandates or their approaches to 
finding a solution. This may lead to members using the lack of cooperation as an excuse to bypass 
accountability (relaying the notion of collective accountability) or lead to paralysis in finding a 
solution to the problem at hand. This is highlighted in the following comment, which was made at 
the time:  
 
The IMC on Comprehensive Social Security was activated in November 2016. Its two 
chairpersons, Dlamini and Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan, did not see eye to eye. It is on 
public record that as the situation escalated in recent weeks, Social Development fingered 
National Treasury for refusing to sign off on the legally required deviation needed for this 
contract extension despite legal advice that the court needed to be approached, while 
finance officials insisted approval from the Constitutional Court was required beforehand 
(Merten, 2017). 
 
This case study serves as a prime example, as further discussed in Section 5.5, of where the work of 
the government reaches a deadlock. NT refused to make a decision that it knew to be 
unconstitutional. SASSA seemed to be attempting to bypass its obligation to report to the 
Constitutional Court on its inability to take over payment of grants on 1 April 2017, for reasons that 
to this day remain unclear.  
 
5.5 In the Meantime  
 
Although no formal record can be found in the media, it would seem that by October 2012, Vusi 
Madonsela had had enough and left the DSD. He was transferred and appointed DG of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA), but would later be transferred again, leaving CoGTA 
under Minister Des van Rooyen, to become DG of the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development (Staff Writer, 2016b). Following Madonsela’s departure, Coceko Pakade was 
appointed acting DG, and for a brief time Wiseman Magasela also fulfilled this role (Van Onselen, 
2017). By May 2013, Pakade had officially been appointed as DG of the DSD, a position which he 
would hold for less than two years, and by March 2015 Thokozani Magwaza would be appointed as 
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acting DG (Van Onselen, 2017). Magwaza would remain in an acting capacity for over a year and a 
half, before being appointed as the CEO of SASSA. Why no formal appointment was made, given 
the importance of the role, has never been made clear, but this undoubtedly influenced the way in 
which the situation at SASSA unfolded. As in any organisational structure, when undertaking a role 
in an acting position, the ability of individuals to take long-term strategic decisions is restricted by 
the fact that their responsibility is temporary and the continued implementation of decisions is 
uncertain.  
 
While all the changes within the DSD’s management were taking place and the litigation around the 
CPS contract was unfolding, with the MAC plotting a way forward, day-to-day operations 
continued at SASSA. The invalid and in effect illegal appointment of CPS as the service provider 
for the distribution of grants was of course the largest and arguably most significant contract that 
SASSA entered into at the time, but it is only one of the many services that the Agency procures 
from the private sector. Over the years there have been several contracts/expenses that raised 
eyebrows and some are worth noting for this case study, given that they took place under the watch 
of the former SASSA CEO, Ms Virginia Petersen. The details of the various instances of “fruitless 
and wasteful expenditure, maladministration, and possible fraud/corruption” only really started to 
emerge once Ms Petersen had left her position as CEO in May 2016 (Dlamini, 2016b) and is an 
ongoing concern for the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in parliament.  
 
The escalation of irregular expenditure at SASSA over the years can best be expressed in the 
comparison of the amounts recorded in the annual reports. In 2010/2011, the year in which Dlamini 
became minister and following which Virginia Petersen become CEO of SASSA, the accumulated 
amount, from 2007, only stood at R8.8 million (SASSA, 2011). By 2012/2013, the recorded amount 
allocated as irregular expenditure for that year was R47.4 million (SASSA, 2013b) and in the 
2016/2017 annual report it was recorded that the closing balance in terms of irregular expenditure 
stood at a staggering R1.4 billion (of which R1.1 billion had been carried over from the previous 
year in which Petersen was still the CEO) (SASSA, 2017a). That equates to an increase of more 
than 15 000% in just six years.  
 
It is important to highlight that this increase might only be a result of the high values attached to the 
irregular contracts and not in actual fact to the number of irregular contracts. Other than 
highlighting the large-value contracts, little information regarding the number of instances of 
irregular procurement is available in the public domain. In the 2016/2017 financial year, confirmed 
by information available to parliament (PMG, 2016), there were details as to some of the larger 
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contracts that have resulted in the recording of R1.4 billion in irregular expenditure. Some of the 
payments involved the renewal of leases (R358 million), the appointment of forensic investigations 
(R75 million), and procurement of security services (R414 million), but perhaps the most relevant 
was the appointment of the work streams, to which R43 million of the original budgeted R47 
million had been paid prior to the cancellation of their contracts, and the payment to CPS (R316 
million) for the “re-registration” of additional social assistance grants beneficiaries (SASSA, 
2017a). 
 
The payment that SASSA made to CPS, which was approved on 25 April 2014, was taken to court 
by Corruption Watch (2015) in an effort to have it reviewed and with the hope that the appropriate 
remedial action would follow. In the court papers filed by Corruption Watch, it highlighted that 
throughout the RFP and in the contract between SASSA and CPS it was clear that the requirement 
had always been for the service provider to include the bulk enrolment of beneficiaries in a fixed-
pricing model. Corruption Watch further argued that even if this was not the case, SASSA had not 
followed the appropriate SCM processes that were necessary to allow for an “extension” of the 
contract. CPS first argued that the contract price was limited to the registration of only 9.2 million 
beneficiaries (and recipients) and that while undertaking the re-registration process, the number had 
“more than doubled” (an additional 11.9 million), according to a report by KPMG. The limitation 
on the number of beneficiaries, however, is not recorded in the service-level agreement or the RFP 
(Corruption Watch, 2015). 
 
The re-registration of grant beneficiaries was to take place over six months, between July and 
December 2012. By that time, re-registration had only covered grant recipients who received cash 
payments and it was necessary to extend the re-registration for banked beneficiaries from January to 
July 2013. This appears to be the motivation put forward by Mr Frank Earl of SASSA in his 
submission to the BAC. It implied that the additional cost was due to the resources that were 
required to extend the re-registration timeframe. SASSA initially intended to oppose the legal action 
(Corruption Watch, 2015). However, in May 2017 the then CEO, Thokozani Magwaza, decided that 
the Agency would withdraw.  
 
5.6 Self-created Crisis of 2017 
 
If you’ve got to choose between paying the grants and irregular. And if the country’s going 
to burn on the 1
st
 of April and the irregular, I choose the country not to burn (SABC Digital 
News, 2017). 
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This statement, made by the then SASSA CEO, Thokozani Magwaza, during a presentation to the 
parliamentary PCSD on 1 February 2017, highlights the two crises that were unfolding before South 
Africa’s eyes in March 2017. The first was the potential risk that some 17 million grant 
beneficiaries would not receive the grants that they depend on come 1 April – an eventuality which 
by that point was unthinkable. So unthinkable was this idea that admittedly almost everyone at the 
time was in agreement that this could not come to pass and that one way or another there was no 
option but to ensure that the payment of grants would continue. Yet, until there was clarity on how 
grants would be paid, the assurances given by the president and the minister provided little 
reassurance to the millions of children who were at risk of going hungry, nor would that alleviate 
the anxiety of the elderly who could be left homeless due to not being able to pay their rent. Had it 
materialised, this would have been a socio-political crisis of mammoth proportions. Thankfully, 
however, through the instructions of the Constitutional Court, this crisis was averted.  
 
The underlying cause of this crisis, however, is the second crisis – the governance crisis – whose 
story this section will unveil. As the Constitutional Court (2017a: 23) concluded: 
 
The constitutional right to social assistance that for many, especially children, the elderly 
and the indigent, provide the bare bones of a life of dignity, equality and freedom is directly 
involved, across the land. The conduct of the Minister and SASSA has created a situation 
that no one could have contemplated: the very negation of the purpose of this Court’s 
earlier remedial and supervisory order. The matter can be decided on facts that are not 
disputed. Due to the time constraints of the emergency created by the Minister and SASSA, 
the forum for effective final relief is this Court.  
 
As pointed out previously, in November 2015 SASSA filed what was expected to be its final report 
to the Constitutional Court, outlining the merits and proposed recourse it would follow in order to 
ensure it would, in its own internal institutional capacity, take over the payment of grants from CPS 
on 1 April 2017. As noted in the scathing Constitutional Court judgement, the promise that it made 
in that submission never materialised.  
 
On 15 March 2017, the Constitutional Court was called upon by a collective of NGOs, namely the 
Black Sash Trust, Freedom Under Law, and Corruption Watch (Amicus Curiae), among others, to 
seek urgent legal remedy to the impending potential crisis, of which SASSA and the DSD would be 
unable to ensure the payment of grants on 1 April due to the invalid contract with CPS coming to an 
end. The urgency of the court application, given the limited time available for addressing the 
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imminent crisis, was not disputed; nor was the required outcome in terms of CPS needing to 
continue to pay grants. In the court application, the minister and SASSA declared that “CPS is the 
only entity capable of paying grants for the foreseeable future after 31 March 2017” (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2017a: 8), a situation that the court did not take kindly to. 
 
This Court and the country as a whole are now confronted with a situation where the 
executive arm of government admits that it is not able to fulfil its constitutional and 
statutory obligations to provide for the social assistance of its people. And, in the deepest 
and most shaming of ironies, it now seeks to rely on a private corporate entity, with no 
discernible commitment to transformative empowerment in its own management structures, 
to get it out of this predicament (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 8).  
 
Ultimately, the court ruled that the invalid contract between SASSA and CPS would continue for a 
year (with changes to pricing being determined by NT) and that the court would resume its 
oversight role by appointing a panel of experts to monitor the progress in finding a solution to take 
over the payments from CPS by 1 April 2018. The fact that the court had to appoint such a panel as 
a governance mechanism reveals how deeply dysfunctional the Executive had become in the eyes of 
the court. As highlighted in the Constitutional Court judgement, 
 
[s]ince April 2016 the responsible functionaries of SASSA have been aware that it could not 
comply with the undertaking to the court that it would be able to pay social grants from 
01 April 2017. The Minister says she was informed of this only in October 2016. There is no 
indication on the papers that she showed any interest in SASSA’s progress before that. 
Despite repeated warnings from [the] advising counsel and CPS, neither SASSA nor the 
Minister took any steps to inform the Court of the problems they were experiencing. Nor did 
they see fit to approach the Court for authorisation to regularise the situation 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 8).  
 
5.6.1 How Did We Get Here?  
 
The events that led the Black Sash Trust to approach the court were extensively covered in the 
media at the time, making the public well aware of the imminent crisis. These reports exposed the 
confusion surrounding the grant system, leaving many anxious about the uncertainty as to what was 
going to happen come 1 April 2017. The court sent questions to the DSD and SASSA to seek clarity 
on what had happened since it relinquished its supervisory role in November of 2015, after 
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receiving the progress report that indicated that SASSA would take over the payment of grants. The 
minister and SASSA’s joint affidavit, drafted by Wiseman Magasela, who was acting CEO at the 
time, provided an account of the events that led up to the court proceedings (Magasela, 2017). 
 
Little detail is provided about what had happened prior to June 2016, which is most likely due to 
Ms Petersen not being able to provide input prior to the filing of the affidavit. It was indicated that 
following the filing of the progress report, SASSA conducted a number of studies to establish the 
technical requirements that would need to be met in order for SASSA to take over the payment of 
the grants. Initially, “SASSA believed the plan was ambitious but capable of implementation”. 
After undertaking a gap analysis on the Agency’s capabilities and further investigations, by April 
2016 SASSA’s project manager, Ms Zodwa Mvulane, had become aware that it would not be able 
to take over the payment of the grants. She concluded that SASSA would most likely require two 
years to do so and that it would require CPS to continue providing payment services in the interim. 
The technical work stream would later advise that “the plan [presented in the progress report] was 
overly optimistic, unrealistic, and underpinned by insufficient research” (Magasela, 2017: 11). 
What remains unknown is who exactly was responsible for drafting the plan in the first place, what 
was outlined in the progress report, and what role the MAC (which the work streams were part of) 
may have played in developing this plan.  
 
Armed with this foresight, Ms Mvulane sought legal advice on how to approach the dilemma 
regarding the potential extension of the contract with CPS (or entering into a new one) and what 
this would mean given the Constitutional Court rulings. On 19 April 2016, the Office of the State 
Attorney was requested to provide SASSA with a legal opinion on the matter and the CEO of 
SASSA at the time, Ms Petersen, was informed of the situation.  
 
In June 2016, Adv. Nazeer Cassim Senior Council (SC) provided SASSA with the first of three 
separate written legal opinions, which indicated that SASSA was to approach the Constitutional 
Court before taking any legally binding decisions on how it would proceed. The main debate that 
the various legal opinions centred around was the legalities of SASSA either extending the existing 
contract or signing a new (non-competitive) contract with CPS for providing payment services 
beyond 1 April 2017. From the Constitutional Court judgement it would seem that all three legal 
opinions that were provided to SASSA were correct in their advice, as the court stated:  
 
[SASSA] intends to enter into a contract with CPS without a competitive tender process as 
required by section 217 of the Constitution in order to continue the payment of social 
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grants. In so doing it has walked away from the two fundamental pillars of this Court’s 
remedial order in AllPay 2. That is serious enough, but it has also broken the promise in its 
assurance to this Court in November 2015, that it would take over the payment of social 
grants by 31 March 2017, which formed the basis of the withdrawal of the supervisory order 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 9).  
 
The legal opinion of Adv. Cassim SC was shared with the then acting CEO, Ms Ramokgopa. As 
previously noted, it was Ms Ramokgopa who, while in the acting role of CEO, appointed the work 
streams in mid-July and started working on finding the “best” possible way for SASSA to proceed. 
By September the work streams had formulated a plan, which proposed a phased transition of 
payments from CPS to SASSA to take place over two to three years, reiterating the requirement for 
CPS and SASSA to enter into an “arrangement”. The work streams’ plan would, however, entail a 
change in the conditions of the contract between CPS and SASSA and as such it was their view that 
an extension of the contract was not desirable and that it would be preferred that a new contract be 
instated. It was at this stage that the second legal opinion was requested from Adv. Wim Trengove 
SC, procured by the work streams. He also reiterated that SASSA should approach the 
Constitutional Court as a matter of urgency. It was further recommended that SASSA should 
approach NT and the Auditor-General because any arrangement that it might enter into with CPS 
would be non-competitive and fall outside of general SCM practices, and therefore written approval 
would be required.  
 
Just prior to Magwaza taking up the mantle of CEO on 1 November 2016, several large 
meetings/workshops were held between the work streams and various officials at SASSA. The 
proposed plan was presented and discussed in detail. It is unknown who was present and at which 
meeting the decision was made that SASSA would enter into a new contract with CPS. This 
decision was then brought into question when the third legal opinion was obtained from Adv. Muzi 
Sikhakhane SC on 10 November. Sikhakhane emphasised that the court was the correct place to 
seek clarity on how to proceed because it had already noted that any new contract with CPS would 
be non-competitive. He further highlighted that in terms of section 238 of the Constitution, it could 
be argued that if SASSA could not take over the payment of grants, the “best option was a 
delegation to another organ of state” (Magasela, 2017: 18) (possibly implying the South African 
Postbank).  
 
From November 2016 to January 2017, SASSA met with a number of stakeholders, including NT, 
the SARB, MasterCard, and others regarding various possible options available to SASSA. Serious 
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concerns emerged from the consultations, particularly with regard to what would be the “optimal” 
technical model for SASSA to pay grants. It is recorded that in a meeting on 12 December there 
was clearly no agreement within SASSA, or between SASSA and the minister, on when a report 
should be submitted to the Constitutional Court or what the content of the report would be. This is 
the first indication that there was a disagreement – between Magwaza and the then DG of the DSD, 
Zane Dangor (who had also only just been appointed on 2 November) and the minister – on the 
proposed model for SASSA taking over the payment of grants.  
 
On 9 December, SASSA issued a public Request for Information (RFI), which was to be submitted 
by 10 February 2017, in order to better determine the parameters of any possible future RFP and to 
establish who in the private sector would be able to meet SASSA’s requirements and how.  
 
In between all the interactions taking place with and within SASSA, letters were exchanged 
between the project manager, Ms Mvulane, and CPS. CPS first initiated the communications in 
May 2016, enquiring as to how SASSA planned to take over grants, and CPS raised technical issues 
that SASSA would have to deal with, such as the extension of the use of cards. On 22 December 
2016, Mvulane sent a letter to Net1/CPS indicating that SASSA intended engaging CPS regarding 
possibly having to continue providing payment services beyond March 2017.  
 
On 19 January 2017, a Technical Task Team (TTT) was constituted by the CEO of SASSA, the DG 
of the DSD, the DG of NT, and the Deputy Governor of the SARB, comprising technical managers 
from each institution, who were tasked to develop the most viable options to enable SASSA to pay 
social grants in the short and medium term. The TTT determined six potential options (listed in 
Text Box 5). In the affidavit it was stated that “[t]here have been and remain differences of opinion 
within SASSA and amongst SASSA’s stakeholders as to how best to proceed in a manner which 
prioritises the best interests of beneficiaries” (Magasela, 2017: 24). 
 
Text Box 5: The TTT’s options  
 
 Option 1: continuing with an arrangement with CPS.  
 Option 2: procuring the service from Grindrod Bank (which services the majority of the social grant 
beneficiaries). 
 Option 3: procuring the services of all banks wishing to comply with the SASSA requirements. 
 Option 4: procuring the services of all banks wishing to comply with the SASSA requirements for 
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those beneficiaries who have access to banking infrastructure and procuring the services of another 
service provider for grant recipients who are currently using cash paypoints.  
 Option 5: procuring the services of SAPO. 
 Option 6: appointing a service provider for cash distribution to grant recipients who are currently 
using cash paypoints and utilising existing bank accounts to distribute grants through the banking 
sector to those beneficiaries with bank accounts (Magasela, 2017: 24). 
 
The first two options would inevitably have the same effect, primarily because Grindrod would still have to 
partner with CPS (or a similar partner) to distribute grants. The implications of the remaining four options, 
however, all point toward a solution that would/could be connected to the NPS and be based on an open-
architecture / open-loop model.  
  
It would seem the first option was preferred by Dlamini as it was the most aligned with the work 
streams’ proposal. It is public knowledge that, conversely, NT preferred the last option. Following 
the pronouncement in parliament on 1 February that SASSA would be engaging with CPS to 
continue providing payment services, the CEO of SASSA sent a letter (7 February) to NT 
requesting approval for deviation from the normal competitive bidding process “specifically 
seeking the Treasury’s support to extend the existing contract with CPS to enable a negotiation to 
appoint CPS for a period of 12 to 18 months” (Magasela, 2017: 25). NT swiftly responded on 
8 February, indicating it could not sanction the request for deviation without the Constitutional 
Court having been informed and approval obtained for SASSA’s proposal. 
 
On 22 February 2017, in a briefing to the Social Development Committee in parliament on the plan 
for addressing the crisis, it would seem that SASSA had adopted a new approach whereby it would 
no longer approach the court for approval for entering into negotiations with CPS, but would 
instead file a “supplementary report” informing the court of the outcomes of the negotiations. It was 
indicated in the meeting that the new approach was based on new legal advice. There appears to be 
no written legal opinion that supports this decision, and it is unknown from whom this advice was 
received. It contradicted the three legal opinions already provided by three advocates.  
 
On 28 February, supported by an affidavit by Magwaza, SASSA “instituted an application in the 
Court requesting its assistance in ensuring that CPS could continue rendering its current grant 
payment services” (Magasela, 2017: 26). Shortly thereafter it was withdrawn by the minister, with 
little explanation.  
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On the same day, the Black Sash Trust instituted an application in the court, in the hope that a 
remedy could be found for the looming crisis. SASSA would later file a “follow-up report”, which 
was signed by the then acting CEO of SASSA, Ms Mzobe, which provided very few details and 
was not quite up to the standard that the court had expected.  
 
To make matters worse, the Minister and SASSA did not deign to inform the Court of these 
developments until 28 February 2017 when SASSA and its CEO launched an application on 
an urgent basis for an order authorising it to take further steps to ensure payment of social 
grants from 1 April 2017. In an unexpected about-turn, SASSA sought to withdraw that 
application the next day. On 3 March 2017 it filed a “follow-up report” with limited 
information on how this had arisen and what might happen in the future. The Court issued 
directions in response to this report. An answer of sorts was received only just the day 
before the hearing … (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 10). 
 
On 1 March, SASSA and CPS started negotiations regarding a new contract for providing payment 
services beyond April 2017. This, however, was short-lived. A Ministerial Task Team (MTT), 
which was formed on 8 March and comprised ministers J. Radebe (chairperson), S. Cwele, M. 
Gigaba, P. Gordhan, M. Mahlobo, and N. Pandor, instructed SASSA to terminate the negotiations 
and indicated that they were only to enter into fresh negotiations if and when NT gave its prior 
written approval for a deviation. The hearing of the court case then unfolded.  
 
As part of the court application, the NGO parties sought the court to rule that the minister be held 
personally accountable for the crisis and be ordered to pay the costs for all council. In the 
judgement, it stated:  
 
The Black Sash Trust submitted that the Minister misled Parliament during her appearance 
before the Parliamentary Committee in November 2016. There is little doubt that the 
Minister and SASSA are liable in their official capacity for the costs, but in view of the 
possibility that individual conduct may have played a material role in the matter, the order 
will also provide for further opportunity for explanation in that regard (Constitutional Court 
of South Africa, 2017a: 34). 
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5.6.2 The Parallel Governance Structure 
 
There must be public accounting for how this was allowed to happen. Accountability is a 
central value of the Constitution. It accompanies the conclusion of procurement contracts 
for the procurement of public functions. This judgment is the judicial part of that 
accounting. It is founded on the commitment to openness and responsiveness the 
Constitution requires. It is important to note that this particular role, at this particular time, 
is not one of the Court’s choosing (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 10). 
 
As part of the March 2017 judgment, the minister was called upon to motivate why “she should not 
be joined in her personal capacity; and she should not pay costs of the application from her own 
pocket” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 39). It was this order that would bring to light 
the details with regard to by whom and how decisions were actually made and highlighted how 
legitimate governance structures were side-lined, resulting in the “self-created” crisis. In her 
affidavit, Minister Dlamini provided an outline of events, wherein she in effect attempted to pass 
the blame onto SASSA’s CEO at the time. The Constitutional Court of South Africa (2017b: 3) 
stated: “In the main she sought to place the blame for what went wrong on officials from the third 
respondent (SASSA) and the Department of Social Development (Department)”.  
 
In response to this affidavit, the then CEO of SASSA, Thokozani Magwaza, aggrieved by the 
versions of events that the minister had put forward and with a view that they were inaccurate and 
misleading, filed a responding affidavit detailing his interpretation of events and requested the then 
DSD DG, Zane Dangor, to do the same. What emerged from these two accounts, together with 
supporting documentation and other first-hand accounts, is a very mindboggling and dangerous 
landscape of confusion and institutional chaos, which they attributed to the minster’s formation of a 
parallel reporting and decision-making structure (in the form of the work streams). They asserted 
that this is what had led them to conclude that the crisis around the payment of grants was in fact 
“self-made”. They were both clear that there had been bias all along towards ensuring that CPS 
would be awarded a new (and admittedly illegal) contract. “The thrust of their affidavits is that the 
Minister had established parallel decision-making and communications processes that bypassed 
SASSA and Department officials”  (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017b: 3). 
 
Faced with the contradictory affidavits and versions of the events and the serious allegations 
contained therein, the Constitutional Court initiated a process of a Section 38 Inquiry (hereafter 
referred to as the Inquiry), presided over by Justice Ngoepe, which was heard in January 2018 in 
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order to determine if the minister should in fact be held liable in her personal capacity. The 
testimonies provided during the Inquiry substantiated, confirmed, and provided additional insight 
into exactly what had happened at SASSA and how the SASSA-Gate crisis unfolded. 
 
It would seem from Magwaza and Dangor’s affidavits (and subsequent testimonies) that up until 
October 2016, shortly after Magwaza became CEO, the SASSA Executive had effectively no (or 
very minimal) knowledge or involvement in the development of the plans and decisions around how 
it was to take over payment of grants come 1 April 2017, except for the project manager, Ms 
Mvulane. Dlamini declared that she only became aware of the situation late in October 2016, when 
she was provided a legal opinion by the work streams. This was a central issue of dispute during the 
Inquiry; as the notion that she was unaware of the fact contradicted her testimony that she 
frequently received updates from Mvulane directly during the year (SABC Digital News, 2018a). 
For example, there is a letter, sent to her on 12 September 2016 by the Black Sash Trust (co-chair of 
the MTT regarding the illegal and immoral deduction from grants), which had requested that an 
update be given on SASSA’s progress. It was Ms Mvulane who replied to the letter, declining to 
meet with the MTT, even though it had been addressed to the minister. The question is whether the 
minister had agreed to this response, in which case she would have been aware that SASSA was not 
in a position to act accordingly, or Ms Mvulane was not being forthright with the minister. The 
motivation given for why the presentation could not take place was that the work streams had only 
been on the job for eight weeks at that point and had not yet finalised a “firm plan”, which begs the 
question: What had SASSA been doing since it filed the progress report in November 2015?  
 
As previously shown (in Section 5.4.2), it is known that in July 2015 a letter instructing the 
appointment of the work streams had been sent from the minister to the then CEO of SASSA, Ms 
Peterson. The appointments would only take place a year later (July 2016), after Peterson had 
stepped down and was replaced by Ramokgopa as acting CEO in June. This was also an issue of 
contention during the Inquiry, as the motivation for the irregular appointment of the work streams 
(bypassing normal procurement processes) was that their services were required as a matter of 
“urgency”, which is contradicted by the year delay in their actual appointment (SABC Digital 
News, 2018b). During the Inquiry it was also implied on several occasions that Ramokgopa was 
“bullied” (SABC Digital News, 2018c) into appointing the work streams, even though she had been 
advised against it (SABC Digital News, 2018d). It is also important to note that, as highlighted 
previously, in a DSD press statement on 10 June 2016, it was indicated that Magwaza had been 
appointed as CEO of SASSA. At the time Magwaza was the acting DG of the DSD. This means 
there was a period of at least five months in which arguably the two most important senior official 
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positions, the accounting officers for the payment of grants, were only being filled by persons in an 
acting capacity. It is within these five months (where these bureaucrats in acting positions were 
stifled in terms of their ability to take long-term strategic ownership of plans or projects) that the 
work streams (which were mainly external, private sector businesspeople) were handed the 
enormous task of deciding how an organ of the state is going to function. These are important 
factors that undoubtedly had a major impact on the DSD’s and the Agency’s ability to effectively 
address the challenge of developing a plan for taking over grants in the near future. The minister 
herself urged the court to take into account the “turnover of leadership at SASSA between 2012 and 
2016” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017b: 8). It is still unclear as to why there was a 
delay in Magwaza moving over to SASSA. 
 
Concerned by the apparent lack of progress, Zane Dangor (who at the time was special advisor to 
the minister and co-chair of the MTT regarding deductions on grants), together with Mr Sipho Shezi 
(also a special advisor to the minister), approached the then acting CEO of SASSA, Ms 
Ramokgopa, and Ms Mvulane at the beginning of October 2016. In his affidavit, Dangor 
emphasised that it was at that point that it became clear that the acting CEO had very little 
knowledge of what the work streams’ plans entailed or what SASSA intended to do (Dangor, 2017). 
During the month of October 2016, a number of meetings were held in which the work streams 
presented their proposals for a way forward and it was at this stage that both Magwaza and Dangor 
raised concern over the fact that the work streams were reporting directly to the minister and not to 
SASSA, and in effect “created parallel reporting structures” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
2017b: 10). 
 
It was shortly after these meetings that Dangor (who had by then been appointed DG on 
2 November), Magwaza (then CEO), and Shezi started engaging with other organs of state that 
would either be directly affected by or have a direct impact on the implementation of any plan that 
SASSA would put forward to address the looming crisis, in particular NT, the SARB, PASA, etc. 
What seems to have emerged from those meetings was that there was a strong objection to the 
ultimate solution as envisioned by the work streams; in particular there was substantive 
disagreement over the proposed payment model being a closed-loop system, which would mean it 
was disconnected from the NPS (see details of the implications of this provided in Section 8.2). It 
was this fundamental disagreement over which payment model SASSA needed to implement that 
created the conflict between Magwaza, Dangor, Shezi, and the minister. 
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Two significant moments are detailed in Dangor’s affidavit, where it would appear that the minister 
deliberately subverted the attempts by officials to put forward a solution that minimised CPS’s role 
in the payment of grants going forward. The first was regarding the work that had been undertaken 
by the TTT, which was officially established on 19 January and consisted of technical managers 
from the DSD, SASSA, NT, and SARB, and included Ms Mvulane. They were due to present their 
findings and the six options they had developed on 24 January to the various department heads. The 
TTT was by then pushing for an open-loop / open-architecture model (i.e. to connect to the NPS) to 
be adopted as both short- and long-term solutions for the payment of grants, which would remove 
CPS from the equation. The minister, however, not being in favour of these options, had on 23 
January (the day before the TTT would present its options) sent a document to then Finance 
Minister Pravin Gordon, titled Briefing Notes for the Minister of Social Development to the Minister 
of Finance. This document “appeared to have little or no correlation between the discussions that 
were taking place by the technical team” (Dangor, 2017: 8) at the time. Instead, it presented 
arguments against SASSA adopting an open-architecture model and in effect motivated the work 
streams’ closed-loop model of payment. Neither the DG nor the CEO of SASSA were aware of 
where this document came from or who had prepared it. It has, however, been suggested that this 
was done by Ms Mvulane.  
 
At the meeting on 24 January 2016, it was agreed that due to the time constraints and the risks 
involved that any short-term solution would require CPS to continue to pay grants for the next 12 
months. “The meeting also agreed that this extension would be undergirded by an agreement that 
this extension was predicated on the long-term ‘firm plan’ being that grants would be paid 
according to the Open Architecture model” (Dangor, 2017: 9). An additional requirement for the 
parties to allow for an extension of CPS’s contract was for SASSA to present a “firm plan” as to 
how it was going to proceed and obtain consent from the Constitutional Court for the extension.  
 
Based on the outcome of this meeting, SASSA (assisted by Adv. Cassim) proceeded to draft a 
report for submission to the Constitutional Court. There was some disagreement on the contents of 
the report by the minister and Wiseman Magasela, newly appointed advisor to the minister. Their 
concerns were seemingly addressed and at a meeting on 16 February, which was chaired by Shezi 
and attended by Magasela, Mvulane, two members of the work streams, and Ms Busisiwe 
Mahlobogoana (SASSA legal advisor), the details of what would be presented to the Constitutional 
Court was agreed on by all members. It would later emerge, however, that on the same evening, the 
minister contacted Ms Mahlobogoana and instructed her not to make the submission “as the 
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minister needed to do further consultations over the weekend”. Neither the CEO of SASSA, the DG 
of the DSD, nor Mr Shezi was informed of this at the time (Dangor, 2017: 15).  
 
What took place over that weekend and who the minister consulted have not yet fully come to light 
in any of the legal filings. It was indicated by Dangor’s testimony (during the Inquiry) that the 
minister had travelled to KwaZulu-Natal to meet with President Zuma (SABC Digital News, 
2018c). Media reports allege that at the meeting the minister met with, among others, Mr Michael 
Hulley, President Zuma’s lawyer, and that it was he who advised the minister (McKune, 2017a). 
The advice was that SASSA did not need to seek consent from the Constitutional Court for 
extending CPS’s payment services, but should rather inform the court once negotiations of a new 
contract had been finalised. There appears to be no written legal opinion justifying this new 
approach, which is in stark contradiction to the three other legal opinions that had been obtained 
thus far. Hulley’s role will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.  
 
As previously mentioned, Magwaza and Dangor were only made aware of this “new approach” to 
addressing the grants payment crisis during a presentation by Ms Mvulane to the Social 
Development Portfolio Committee on 22 February. It seemed that there were also additional 
changes to what had previously been agreed on, in that it was now proposed that the contract with 
CPS be extended to cover a period of two years, as opposed to only one year. Upon lobbying to 
have a report filed with the Constitutional Court as soon as possible, rather than leaving it until the 
eve of the existing contract’s expiry, the minister agreed on condition that the report was compiled 
by the work stream legal team, led by Mr Tim Sukazi.  
 
By 27 February, no report had yet been filed with the Constitutional Court and when contacted, 
Mvulane indicated that the document was not ready yet as consultation with the minister was 
ongoing. It was at this stage that Ms Mahlobogoana (SASSA’s lawyer) indicated that a report had 
been prepared, supported by an affidavit signed by Magwaza, who was on sick leave at the time, 
which would be filed the following day, on the 28
th
. Although various reasons were presented as to 
why this report was withdrawn, it would seem that the content of the report did not have the 
minister’s approval. The content of the report, which was prepared by Mvulane and the work 
streams, is still unknown, but given the court’s dissatisfaction with the “follow-up” report, it is clear 
that not seeking consent from the court (as was advised in the three legal opinions) was a serious 
error in judgement by the minister.  
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In Magwaza’s affidavit he stated:  
 
I waited for the Minister’s instructions pursuant to her proposal to consult on the affidavit 
but given the fact that the deadline of 31 March 2017 was imminent and upon legal advice 
provided to me, I took a decision to file the application on 28 February 2017. I submit that 
in doing so, I was not required to consult with the Minister. I am not required to consult the 
Minister on every operational aspect of the work of SASSA (Magwaza, 2017: 11). 
 
The issues around the legitimacy of Magwaza’s actions and the assertion he made in the statement 
above highlight the institutional and governance challenges that resulted from the manner in which 
the Agency had been established in terms of the SASSA Act, which states that “[t]he Minister may 
override any decision taken by the Chief Executive Officer” (RSA, 2004b). The seeming confusion 
around the allocation of the roles, functions, responsibilities, and legal obligations of the various 
players in the management of the country’s social welfare system was the central debate of the 
Inquiry into determining Dlamini’s potential personal liability for the SASSA-Gate debacle. During 
the Inquiry, on several occasions, Dlamini appeared to be under the impression that “whatever the 
CEO does there has to be [in] concurrence with the minister also” (SABC Digital News, 2018e). 
This is not what the SASSA Act prescribes (which only states concurrence as a requirement for 
entering into third-party agreements and opening of a bank account) and the only way in which this 
approach to the Agency’s governance could be legitimate would be if it was outlined in an oversight 
compact agreement (RSA, 2004b). 
 
At a SCOPA briefing, which also took place on 28 February, MPs questioned Dangor and Mvulane 
on the negotiations that took place between SASSA and CPS. Mvulane indicated that negotiations 
were only set to start on the next day, 1 March, but it was then revealed by one of the MPs that they 
were in possession of correspondence between the two organisations. A letter written by Magwaza 
indicated CPS asking for the fixed beneficiary fee to be increased from R16.44 to between R22 and 
R25 per beneficiary (PMG, 2017a). It was shortly after this confrontation that Dangor decided to 
resign. He indicated that his decision to resign was based on the fact that he had been lied to by his 
colleagues and he could no longer remain in an environment of governance chaos.  
 
As previously mentioned, Mr Magwaza had been placed on two weeks’ sick leave (for 
hypertension) in late February and only returned to work on 13 March. During this period, there 
were rumours that he had been suspended for “stabbing [Dlamini] in the back by having meetings 
with the Treasury” (Wa Afrika & Saba, 2017). Ms Thamo Mzobe, who is the CEO of the NDA, was 
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appointed as acting CEO of SASSA. She too was placed on sick leave for hypertension after only 
being on the job for about a week. She had signed off on the follow-up report that was filed with the 
court and was required to lead the negotiations between SASSA and CPS, which took place 
between 1 and 3 March. Effectively, a person with no prior knowledge of the complex challenges 
involved in the payment of grants and the technical nuances involved was expected to sign an 
agreement that she would not oversee or be responsible for in the future. According to a report in 
The Sunday Times,  
 
[s]he was frantic, saying she had no idea why she was brought in to head up SASSA and left 
on her own … She was scared that she was going to make a mistake by signing the contract 
and wanted it to wait for the return of the real accounting officer (Wa Afrika & Saba, 2017).  
 
It was said that after being summoned to sign the contract, she suffered a mild stroke (Wa Afrika & 
Saba, 2017). It was during this time that Dangor resigned, on 3 March, citing that he could no 
longer continue as DG of the DSD due to the deterioration of his relationship with the minister. In 
his resignation letter he emphasised that the “parallel decision-making processes that essentially 
excluded both accounting officers of SASSA and the DSD and a trusted Special Adviser like Sipho 
Shezi from key decisions regarding this matter have given rise to the kinds of tensions that have 
emerged” (Dangor, 2017: 21).  
 
With Mzobe also on sick leave, Wiseman Magasela was appointed as acting CEO of SASSA. He 
then compiled and signed the initial DSD and SASSA affidavit to the court. As previously noted, an 
MTT, chaired by Minister Jeff Radebe (chairperson) was formed on 8 March and instructed that all 
negotiations be scrapped and should start afresh only once written approval was received from NT. 
Magwaza returned to work on 13 March, thereby quashing the rumours of his suspension.  
 
In his closing statement, Dangor levied a serious allegation against the minister that, based on 
Magwaza’s and his own versions of the events between October 2016 and March 2017, “the parallel 
decision-making structures in the form of work streams may have been deliberate to ensure a 
continued relationship with CPS under conditions favourable to CPS, through a self-created 
emergency” (Dangor, 2017: 19).  
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 119 | P a g e  
In the initial judgment on the 2017 SASSA-Gate crisis, the Constitutional Court stated the 
following regarding Minister Dlamini’s responsibility with regard to what unfolded:  
  
The Minister bears the primary responsibility to ensure that SASSA fulfils its functions. She 
appoints its CEO. There is little the CEO can do without her direction. Attempts to obtain 
evidence of what steps she took after AllPay 2 to ensure that beneficiaries would continue to 
be well catered for drew a blank … The office-holder ultimately responsible for the crisis and 
the events that led to it is the person who holds executive political office. It is the Minister 
who is required in terms of the Constitution to account to Parliament. That is the Minister, 
and the Minister alone (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 34).  
 
5.7 Summary   
 
This chapter outlined and provided a detailed account of how, from the perspective of the 
constitutional state, State Capture manifests within a government institution. It illustrated several 
aspects of the State Capture modus operandi that were identified in Chapter 2. First was the 
securing of control over the public service, in particular through the appointment of cabinet 
ministers. Initially, Zuma appointed Edna Molewa as the minister of the DSD in 2009; however, she 
was later relocated to the Department of Environmental Affairs and was replaced by her deputy 
minister, Bathabile Dlamini, in 2010.  
 
The second component of the State Capture modus operandi entailed the intentional weakening of 
key technical institutions and formal executive processes. In this case it was by removing key top 
officials and replacing them with people who would not be obstructionist. Having officials only in 
acting positions limits their ability to take long-term strategic decisions. Persons who appear to be 
part of the shadow state, such as Michael Hulley, were involved in the procurement process. Also 
worth noting was the appointment of the work streams and the instruction from Dlamini not to 
interfere, which limited the ability of the Agency officials to carry out their mandate. 
   
The third element of State Capture from within government entailed securing access to 
opportunities for repurposing the state by manipulating or changing the directives or objectives of 
the government. In this case in particular, it involved the manipulation of tender processes that 
resulted in the contract between SASSA and CPS for the nationwide payment of social grants. This 
was achieved by changing just one word in the tender specifications, where “preferred” changing to 
“must”, changed the rules of the game.  
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In cases where the shadow state objectives are for the purposes of accruing wealth, this type of 
manipulation of procurement processes often centres around large-scale projects/contracts. The 
tender for the payments of social grants was worth an estimated R10 billion and was the largest 
contract of its kind in South Africa at the time. There is also often an element of “scope creep” in 
contracts, where the value is increased or the contract is extended, potentially indefinitely. As 
previously indicated, there was the irregular extension of the “re-registration of grant beneficiaries” 
and there were the seemingly deliberate delays that led to the Constitutional Court having to extend 
the invalid contract in March 2017. 
 
The last aspect of State Capture that takes place both within and outside of government, is the 
creation of parallel political, governmental, and decision-making structures that undermine the 
functional operation of government institutions. In this case, it was the establishment of a parallel 
governance structure where the recommendations of an external advisory team (the work streams 
that reported directly to the minister) were elevated above those of SASSA officials. The meetings 
with Michael Hulley (advisor and lawyer to Zuma) also played a key role in this aspect. 
   
There is one aspect of the shadow state operations that takes place both within and outside of the 
government that should be recognised, namely that there is often a concerted effort by those in the 
shadow state to stifle/remove the competition or critics. In this case, some examples include 
changing the biometric requirement, the minister attacking/rejecting the banks as an option for the 
payment of grants, the various law suits Net1 lodged against SASSA (including the case against 
SASSA/SAPO agreement), the attacks on NT for not consenting to a new illegal SASSA/CPS 
contract in 2017, and many more examples.     
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 Chapter 6: Probably Corrupt  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Having fleshed out the details of what has evolved within the formal bounds of the constitutional 
state in the previous chapter, this section now seeks to locate the actions that unfolded within the 
broader context of state capture as the Zuma-centred political project that relies on the construction 
of a shadow state. This chapter will focus on two fundamental elements of this political project. The 
first is an examination of the role and motives of the corporate companies involved. The second is 
the role of the players who appear to reside within the shadow state and act behind the scenes to 
ensure that the objectives of state capture are achieved.  
 
6.2 What is the Deal with CPS? 
 
6.2.1 Radical Economic Transformation (RET) and White Monopoly Capital (WMC) 
 
Substantive empowerment, not mere formal compliance, is what matters. It makes a mockery 
of true empowerment if two opposite ends of the spectrum are allowed to be passed off as 
compliance with the substantive demands of empowerment. The one is a misrepresentation 
that historically disadvantaged people are in control and exercising managerial power even 
when that is not the case. That amounts to exploitation. The other is to misrepresent that 
people who hold political power necessarily also possess managerial and business skills. 
Neither situation advances the kind of economic empowerment that the Procurement and 
Empowerment Acts envisage. Both employ charades (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 
2013: 33). 
 
The BEE component of the 2012 tender and the failure by SASSA and the bid committees to 
properly examine the veracity of the claims made by CPS were two of the central issues addressed 
in the judgement made by the Constitutional Court. In its finding, the court lambasted CPS and 
SASSA for not adequately addressing this aspect in what was at the time one of the largest single-
supplier government contracts. This lack of appreciation for the underlying purpose of a preferential 
procurement mandate highlights the hypocrisy of the power elite’s professed commitment to RET 
and its opposition to WMC.  
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The history of CPS and Net1 goes back to the 1990s. Net1 UEPS Technologies Inc., which is now 
the parent company of a range of subsidiaries that provide a variety of payment technology 
solutions and financial services, including CPS, was incorporated in Florida in May 1997 and later 
listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market in 2005. In 2004, the company acquired a South African 
company, Net1 Applied Technology Holdings Ltd (or Aplitec), which was a public company listed 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). It was in fact Aplitec (a smart card company, whose 
founder and CEO was Serge Belamant) that had initially bought CPS from First National Bank 
(FNB). At the time (1999), CPS had contracts to distribute grants to some 1.2 million people in 
South Africa and Namibia worth R54 million (Staff Writer, 1999). In the years that followed, 
Aplitec would go on to acquire Moneyline (Pty) Ltd and New World Finance (Pty) Ltd (both micro-
lending businesses) (Net1, 2006) and later in 2006 Prism Holdings Ltd, which focused on “secure 
transaction technology, solutions and services”, which later became the owner of EasyPay Ltd 
(Net1, 2008).  
 
When it emerged in March 2017 that Allan Gray held the second largest stake in Net1 (16% 
shareholding), there was a strong outcry from the public, to which it swiftly responded. Allan Gray 
engaged with Net1 and applied sufficient pressure (it would appear) on the company for its founder 
and CEO, Serge Belamant, to resign in May 2017 and decried the announcement that a multi-
million-rand golden handshake went with it (Lapping, 2017). What had not been as prominently 
covered in the news media was that the largest investor in Net1 was in fact the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), which is the World Bank’s investment arm, with a 19% share in the company. In 
April 2016, the IFC invested $107.7 million (almost R1.6 billion) in Net1 (Torkelson, 2017a). 
Corruption Watch‚ the Black Sash Trust, and Equal Education have since filed a complaint with the 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) of the IFC, requesting “the CAO to investigate the 
investment‚ because it was ‘made despite the existence of overwhelming evidence of unlawful and 
unethical practices involving Net1 subsidiaries’” (Gouws, 2017).  
 
Being a US-listed company makes it difficult to determine the degree of adherence of the company 
in terms of transformation outside of formally structured empowerment deals. These types of deals 
do not, however, necessarily translate into actual empowerment in terms of actively participating in 
the business or its operations – as was clearly a requirement of the 2012 tender, which CPS clearly 
had no intention of fulfilling, and which is supposedly a condition for RET. As highlighted earlier, 
in the MoA with its empowerment partner there was a sly clause that implied that of the 74.54% 
that CPS indicated the empowerment consortium partners were to “manage and/or execute” 
(McKune, 2016), they would enter into a “service agreement” whereby CPS would actually do the 
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work for 74.45% of the transaction fee (CPS (Pty) Ltd et al., 2011). This would undoubtedly be 
considered by some as fronting and potentially fraud. The validity of the MoA, which is in the 
public domain and was part of CPS’s proposal, and its contents have never been disputed by 
SASSA or Net1/CPS. It is important to note that it would appear that this MoA was not disclosed in 
any of the court filings. It would seem that this information was only really scrutinised towards the 
end of 2016 by amaBhungane, presumably after all investigations by the various authorities had or 
were in the process of being suspended (amaBhungane, 2017). 
 
The companies and individuals who were signed on to be CPS’s empowerment partners at the time 
were never fully discussed by the courts. Yet, investigative reporting by amaBhungane revealed 
that of the three BEE partners, CPS’s Serge Belamant (Net1/CPS CEO) only knew one well, 
namely Born Free Investments 272 (Pty) Ltd, who had been a CPS empowerment partner for a long 
time. The other two partners were small businesses, both apparently in the process of closing when 
the SASSA contract came along, and which in no way appeared to have been in any position to 
undertake the mammoth task of delivering grants to some 15 million beneficiaries across the 
country. The first, Retles Trading Close Corporation (CC), was a company established in 2008 and 
involved Bulelwa and Jongi Makoetlane, who supplied textbooks to schools in the Western Cape 
from their modest home in Gugulethu, Cape Town. The second company, Ekhaya Skills 
Developments Consultants CC, was a “small outfit, run by one woman who advertised that she 
provided ‘skills training’ for employers” (McKune, 2016).  
 
There was a second clause in the MoA that effectively made the agreement invalid due to litigation 
pursued by AllPay and the contract being declared invalid in November 2013. Specifically, it stated 
that a condition of the agreement was for a successful defence of any review process instituted by 
the aggrieved bidder (read AllPay) (CPS (Pty) Ltd et al., 2011). 
 
On 26 January 2012, just nine days after having been awarded the SASSA grants payment contract, 
Net1 entered into what appears to be a second BEE deal with a consortium called Business Venture 
Investments 1567 (Pty) Ltd (BVI) – a special purpose vehicle that “represents a consortium of black 
South Africans, community groups and the Net1 Foundation” (Net1, 2012a: 1). The consortium is 
led by Mosomo Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Mosomo), whose CEO is Mr Kgomotso Brian 
Mosehla. At the time, Serge Belamant (CEO of CPS/Net1) denied that this BEE deal was connected 
to being awarded the tender (Brümmer, 2012). It is thus assumed that this deal was not a 
replacement or alternative to the consortium that signed the MoA and was submitted as part of the 
bid for the payment of grants.  
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This deal entailed “a one-year option to purchase up to 8,955,000 shares of the Company’s common 
stock, equal to 19.9% of the Company’s current issued and outstanding shares, with an exercise 
price of US$8.96 per share” (Net1, 2012a: 1). The deal hinged on the idea that the share price 
would increase. However, with the tender being challenged by AllPay and the investigations into 
alleged corruption being undertaken, it did not materialise and the option to purchase was never 
exercised.  
 
Then, towards the end of 2013, after CPS had undertaken the re-registration of the grant 
beneficiaries and shortly after the Constitutional Court had declared the contract between SASSA 
and CPS invalid, it was announced that Net1 would enter into a new B-BBEE deal. This time the 
deal would include both Mosomo (in the form of BVI) and Born Free Investments, where the 
companies would be allocated 4.1 million and 300 000 shares respectively. The cost of the shares 
was R60/share (25% of the JSE market price at the time) (Wierzycka, 2017). It is important to note 
that due to the Constitutional Court’s rulings, it is also at this stage that the MoA relating to the 
invalid 2012 contract between CPS and its empowerment partners would have been void. This is 
possibly the reason for Born Free Investments being included in the new Net1 B-BBEE deal. It 
remains unclear as to who CPS’s empowerment partners were in the distribution of grants, what the 
extent of their involvement was, or if there even was a signed empowerment partner for the 2012 
contract. The potential legal issues around the contractual obligations with regard to empowerment 
in the contract between SASSA and CPS are also unknown. It would seem this is not something any 
of the parties were interested in following up on.  
 
On 16 April 2014, Net1 announced that it had concluded the conditions of the deal in which 
4.4 million shares were issued to the B-BBEE partners under a five-year loan agreement with Net1. 
The conditions also included two specific caveats, namely that the deal would allow Net1 to 
purchase back shares if the market price increased above R120/share and that “Net1 could replace 
the Net1 shares with shares in CPS at its discretion” (Net1, 2016).  
 
Just a day after the announcement, on 17 April 2014, the Constitutional Court handed down the 
AllPay 2 remedial order, which suspended the ruling of invalidity to ensure that the payment of 
grants would not be negatively impacted. Thereafter, Net1’s share price started to recover and by 
June would reach the magic R120/share mark. Later that same month, on 25 April 2014, SASSA 
approved the R316 million payment for the “re-registration” of grant beneficiaries, a payment that 
has since been deemed irregular and has been taken to court for review. Excluding value-added tax 
(VAT), the value of the payment is approximately R277 million.  
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With the share price of Net1 reaching the target of R120/share in June 2014, Net1 repurchased just 
under 2.43 million (55%) shares from the B-BBEE partners for approximately $24.9 million 
(±R267 million at the time). The money was then used by the B-BBEE partners to repay the loan 
owed to Net1. Within just three months, BVI and Born Free Investments had acquired just fewer 
than two million shares (worth approximately R237 million) in Net1 with no upfront investment 
and no debt. In August 2014, BVI would sell back the remainder of its shares (1.8 million) for a 
cash amount of R97.4 million and a 12.5% ownership in CPS, and it would appear that Born Free 
Investments retained its remaining 134 446 shares in Net1 (Net1, 2016). 
 
The timing of the R277 million windfall (from the “re-registration” payment) and the gifting of two 
million Net1 shares to its B-BBEE partners (after settling the loan agreement) appear to cancel each 
other out, with the net result that the entire deal cost Net1 nothing. This could, however, be just one 
big coincidence.  
 
Without any additional information available, it is unknown at this time what benefit the various 
other members of the BVI 1567 (Pty) Ltd consortium might have derived from this B-BBEE 
transaction or if Retles Trading CC and Ekhaya Skills Developments Consultants CC were ever 
brought into any of the grant payment operations. From the investigative reporting on the dealings 
of Net1/CPS and its empowerment partners, it would appear as though they were simply left behind 
or forgotten. This seems to not be something that CPS, Net1, SASSA, or the DSD saw as being 
important enough to reflect on at any stage over the years. With so much focus now placed on RET 
and calls for an end to WMC dominance in the economy, it needs to be asked why there would 
appear to be such preference given to a US-based company with such a deplorable track record 
regarding empowerment and transformation.  
  
6.2.2 How to milk money from the poor 
 
No party has any claim to profit from the threatened invasion of people’s rights 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 28). 
 
This was potentially one of the most damning statements levelled against CPS in the March 2017 
Constitutional Court judgement. It relates to the debate around the contractual arrangements that 
were to be made in the proposed new contract for CPS to continue to distribute grants beyond 
1 April 2017. 
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CPS is correct in submitting that its continued constitutional obligation to provide services 
for payment after 31 March 2017 exists only if there is no-one else to provide those services. 
It is also correct that it will not be in a position to perform its continuing constitutional 
obligation for payment of social grants if the reciprocal obligations of SASSA and CPS in 
relation to that payment are not specified. But it is not correct that those obligations can 
only be specified by way of a negotiated contract between itself and SASSA (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2017a: 27). 
 
Explicitly debated in the court, it was an accepted fact that when SASSA and CPS entered into 
negotiations for the signing of a new contract (an illegal process that was stopped by the MTT), the 
result would be a pricing structure that would generate considerable profits for CPS. In the 
exchange of letters between SASSA and CPS, which were submitted to the court as an affidavit by 
CPS, it was indicated by CPS that the cost to SASSA for the continuation of grant payments would 
need to be increased from R16.44 to between R22 and R25 per beneficiary. This would have 
resulted in an increase in the service fee from a budget allocation of R2.6 billion to at least 
R3 billion – an increase of at least R400 million a year (Raborife, 2017). These figures were made 
public before the negotiations began and it would appear that due to the strong backlash these 
figures received in parliament, the costing approach was revised.  
 
During negotiations it was proposed that over the transition period, CPS would receive a fixed 
amount of R194 million per month, as opposed to the then approximately R174 million per month, 
regardless of the number of beneficiaries paid by CPS (SASSA, 2017d). This would have reduced 
the impact on SASSA’s budget shortfall. However, as the plan was for payments to be transferred 
from CPS to either SASSA or another service provider, the number of beneficiaries that CPS would 
pay would reduce over time. Because SASSA would also have had to pay for the new payment 
services, there would have been a period during which there was effectively a double cost being 
incurred by the state for the same service. In addition, it should be pointed out that by this stage all 
CPS’s start-up costs should have been recovered, meaning little investment would be required other 
than covering ongoing operational expenses. In either scenario, it is clear that CPS stood to make 
significant profit from the new (illegal) contract. This contrasts with the AllPay 2 judgment, which 
declared that as the initial contract was invalid and irregular, CPS should not profit from the 
contract. The March 2017 ruling made a similar declaration. 
 
As was established in 2014 (see Section 5.5), the contract with CPS was irregularly “extended”, 
resulting in the payment of R316 million for the re-registration of grant recipients. This payment 
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was declared irregular by the Auditor-General and is currently the subject of litigation proceedings. 
This payment coincided with the settlement of the B-BBEE consortia (consisting of Mosomo and 
Born Free Investments) loan agreement for its shares in Net1, resulting in a debt-free ownership of 
just under two million shares worth approximately R237 million.  
 
Over and above the irregular contracts, it would appear that the actual benefit that Net1 derived was 
as an indirect result of its appointment to pay grants, primarily from the sale of secondary financial 
services to grant beneficiaries. The problem here is not the pursuit of profit, but rather how the 
interests of this private company became the interest of certain state institutions. A lucrative state 
contract was used by the company to gain preferential access to a market consisting of poor and 
vulnerable people.  
 
The supply of secondary financial services has always been part of the Net1 business strategy and 
was in fact documented in the company’s 2008 annual report, from which the following was 
extracted:  
 
1. Disciplined Approach to New Markets … Where we believe it makes sense, we will use 
partnerships or make acquisitions to accelerate our entry into new markets …  
2. Unlock Target Markets with a Key Product. The first step in establishing our system within 
a new province or country is to establish a broad base of smart card users around a single 
application. One of our preferred routes is to secure contracts to implement payment 
systems for government programs having large numbers of potential card holders …  
3. Expand Our Products within the Markets We Serve … As part of broadening our card 
holders’ options, we will also sell our smart card readers and PoS devices to merchants to 
enable them to enter into transactions ... 
4. Provide Products and Services Ourselves Where the Profit Potential is Compelling … For 
instance, we engage in lending in South Africa.  
5. Establish Partnerships or Make Acquisitions When Appropriate … (Net1, 2008: 6).  
 
In the MoA, CPS indicated that the service-level agreement with SASSA would require at least the 
provision of, among others, “[g]ranting CPS the right to provide value-added services, such as the 
sale of prepaid utilities and the provision of financial services, such as money transfers, credit 
facilities, insurance products, and debit orders to all beneficiaries” (CPS (Pty) Ltd et al., 2011: 6). 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 128 | P a g e  
What is important to highlight is that this business strategy has long been known to veteran DSD 
officials, such as Zane Dangor, who led the negotiations with the various service providers in 
2008/2009. It is a practice that has been frowned upon by those who understood the potential 
negative ramifications that could result from allowing a company that pays grants to also sell 
secondary financial services to beneficiaries. The 2012 contract between SASSA and CPS stated 
that the “Contractor [CPS] shall not use data belonging to SASSA for any purpose other than for the 
performance of the services” (McKune, 2017b). Even though over the years SASSA has threatened 
to cancel its contract with CPS, it would seem the restriction on the use of beneficiary data was 
never properly enforced. As a result, Net1 was able to move directly from establishing access to the 
market to pushing its proprietary financial services that had nothing to do with the service provided 
to the state.  
 
Herein lies the genius of its business model: it was paid to establish a massive client base and to 
ensure the payment technology is adopted by the major commercial businesses involved; it then 
leveraged beneficiary data and information to which only it had access to sell financial products, 
knowing that there is minimal risk of non-payment. Net1 highlighted that “[it is] able to offer this 
service at a lower interest rate than competitors due to our ability to deduct interest and principal 
directly from a borrower’s smart card and our knowledge of that individual’s payment history” 
(Net1, 2008: 6). It would appear from a statement made when responding to the 2015 tender that 
Net1 no longer viewed the distribution of social grants as essential to its business development:  
 
[I]ts business plan, which focuses on providing a comprehensive suite of transactional 
products and services, will allow it to service all SA’s unbanked and under-banked citizens, 
including social grant beneficiaries. However, this can now be done independently and 
without SASSA's limitations and constraints. Net1 says the business plan includes the 
continued successful deployment of its EasyPay Everywhere bank account, its biometric 
ATMs and mobile portal, its suite of financial and added value services, and the company’s 
proven and innovative technological systems. The company believes these activities will 
ensure a sustainable business model that will, over time, far exceed the benefits that could 
be realised from being the successful bidder for the SASSA RFP (Staff Writer, 2015).  
 
It is the selling of secondary financial services that became a bone of contention between CPS and 
SASSA. The issue was CPS’s ownership and control of grant beneficiary data. This matter was 
raised in the Constitutional Court hearing in March 2017 and was the reason for the establishment 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 129 | P a g e  
of the MTT, co-chaired by the DSD and the Black Sash Trust, to find solutions that would prevent 
Net1 and others from making “illegal” and immoral deductions from social grant beneficiaries.  
 
Since the appointment of CPS, SASSA has become increasingly aware of “deductions” being made 
from grants – a significant number of which were linked to the products supplied by other Net1 
subsidiaries such as Moneyline (micro-loans), Smart Life (life insurance), Manje Mobile (airtime), 
etc. In an effort to stop deductions being made from grants, in May 2016 the DSD issued new 
regulations (Regulations 21 and 26A to the Social Assistance Act, No. 13 of 2004) that limited the 
type and amount of deductions that could be made from grants, to only allow a maximum of 10% of 
the grant from being deducted and only for the purposes of funeral cover (Matshediso, 2016). 
 
In response to the new regulations, Net1, Grindrod (the bank that is partnered with CPS and which 
provides bank account services for grant recipients), and others approached the High Court to 
provide clarity on the regulations. The issue of the legal deductions from grants payments is not a 
straightforward or simple matter, as it is not something that can be governed or controlled by 
SASSA once a grant is transferred to an individual’s private bank account, which is regulated by the 
normal commercial banking laws of the country. In May 2017, the High Court ruled in favour of 
Net1; the main reason being the conditions of the contract between SASSA and CPS, in that 
SASSA does not have a direct contract with Grindrod Bank (which falls under standard banking 
regulations). When grant recipients are enrolled by CPS, they enter into an agreement to open 
individual bank accounts. This agreement is therefore between Grindrod Bank and the recipient and 
not with SASSA, and as such is governed by standard commercial banking regulations. This is just 
one of the many factors that must be considered in SASSA’s approach to paying grants in the future 
and which will be discussed in Chapter 8. SASSA is now in the process of possibly appealing this 
ruling, with a view that the Grindrod accounts are for the specific purpose of the payment of grants 
(special accounts) and as such should not be treated as ordinary private bank accounts (Maregele, 
2017).  
 
The question of the “illegality” of the deductions would seem to have not yet been fully examined 
in any civil or criminal court. Complaints have been lodged by the National Credit Regulator and 
with the Competition Commission of South Africa, but there have been no conclusive findings 
against Net1 to date (several matters are ongoing). The main allegation levied against Net1 
concerns the use of grant recipients’ personal information and data, held by CPS in terms of the 
payment services contract with SASSA. It is alleged that this information is exchanged between and 
within the Net1 group of companies. Particular focus has been placed on Moneyline, which 
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provides micro-loans. By virtue of the fact that it has access to and knowledge of a beneficiary’s 
income significantly reduces risk for the business, which means it has an unfair advantage over 
other competitors in the market. The second advantage derived is that the enrolment process of 
beneficiaries for these services is made both easier and cheaper for Net1 companies. The third 
allegation involves the use of beneficiaries’ personal details, such as contact numbers, for marketing 
products and services (“ambush” marketing practices) (De Lange, 2017; Staff Writer, 2017b; Van 
Zyl, 2016; Mawson, 2015).  
 
It should be noted once again that the issues around the legality of Net1’s business practices have 
not yet been established and, in its defence, it commissioned a report by KPMG to address the 
various allegations.  
 
One key unanswered question that the KPMG report skirts is how many EPE (a subsidiary of Net1 
that operates separate and standalone Grindrod Bank accounts) clients are grant recipients. The 
KPMG report showed that almost 70% of the Moneyline account holders had EPE cards (also 
referred to as green cards). It did not, however, indicate how many Moneyline accounts belonged to 
grant recipients (KPMG, 2017). Since the adoption of the new regulations that the DSD instituted, it 
became mandatory for those wanting to receive a loan to open an EPE account. Given that the EPE 
account is also with Grindrod, they only require consent from a grant recipient and thereafter all 
subsequent grant payments are directly deposited into this standalone account, which then allows 
for deductions under standard banking regulations.  
 
Another question would be: Given that the report appears to focus primarily on transactions relating 
to Moneyline and Smartlife, what other Net1 companies are involved in selling products and 
services to grant recipients? A table in the report indicated that over 50% of the electronic funds 
transfer (EFT) debits from grant recipient accounts were for products and services related to these 
two Net1 companies alone (KPMG, 2017).  
 
Are Net1’s business practices illegal? Probably. Are they ethical? Highly unlikely. Is the company’s 
business strategy sound? Arguably yes, if profits are all that matter.  
 
Beyond the mindboggling complexities described above, what matters is the harsh reality of the 
grant recipients. The monthly experience of grant beneficiaries has been well documented by 
reporting by GroundUp and NGOs such as the Black Sash Trust.  
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Below are just a few examples of beneficiary experiences:  
 
In other cases where deductions of loans and prepaid electricity were made, some grant 
recipients have admitted entering into such deals. ‘I know about deductions. I took a loan of 
R1 000 from SASSA in November, and they deduct R200 every month. I also buy electricity 
with my EasyPay card and they deduct that R50,’ said 70-year-old Angelina Mese. 
‘Although there are rumours the EasyPay card is illegal, I was enjoying using it because I 
can also access my money at banks. I can even buy airtime when I need it,’ she said. 
However, some recipients who admitted to signing contracts complained that the deductions 
were continuing even after the contracts had lapsed. ‘I took a R700 from Net1 in March last 
year and I paid it in September. But even today, they still take my money,’ said a mother of 
four who only identified herself as Anna (Manyane, 2017).  
 
Nomalanga’s story began with her unwitting acceptance of monthly airtime deductions, 
which she has tried desperately to stop. Despite ‘smashing’ her old SIM card, and buying a 
new one, Nomalanga still faces deductions for a cellphone number she no longer uses. She 
has sought help from SASSA, from CPS and from the Net1 Financial Services office, without 
any success. Because Grindrod Bank has no physical branches or even ATMs, Nomalanga 
cannot walk up to a customer service counter and ask for a stop order on the transactions. 
Because SASSA has no jurisdiction over EasyPay accounts, Nomalanga cannot turn to the 
Agency for help. Instead of receiving what she is due, she is stuck trying to beg Moneyline 
for a loan (Torkelson, 2017b).  
 
The complexity arises from the conflation of two separate systems: the first is the right to social 
assistance to alleviate extreme poverty and inequality – the state’s mandate; the second is Net1’s 
business strategy to use “our smart card-based alternative payment system for the unbanked and 
under-banked populations of developing economies” (Net1, 2012b). There are no simple solutions 
to the complexities that have emerged. To attempt to isolate the payment of grants from the rest of 
the country’s finance industry would not be possible, and to imagine that simply “removing” Net1’s 
services from the equation would solve the problem, would be equally naive. A precedent has been 
set and millions of grant recipients now have experience of and will continue to enjoy the benefits 
of having bank accounts, regardless of who pays the social grants, and Net1 is not the only provider 
of these services (although it would appear to have the monopoly). The void created by the 
withdrawal of these services would just be filled by some other company. If a solution were to be 
found, it would require active participation from all role players, within and between the different 
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government institutions, as well as those in the financial sector. The de facto operational conflation 
of SASSA, CPS, Grindrod, and various Net1 companies without clear agreements, mandates, and 
accountabilities has resulted in a deep structural institutional quagmire that cannot be unravelled 
and solved quickly. The litigious appetites of the players, the opacity of the shadow networks, and 
the weak governance and institutional weakness of the DSD and SASSA all combine to prevent any 
quick solutions.  
 
6.3 In the Shadows 
 
One of the critical questions that remain to be determined is: What are the possible financial 
benefits that could have been derived from the shadow deals and who, other than those already 
mentioned, might be involved? Unlike what has been established in terms of the Zuma-Gupta 
network, through the revelations from the Gupta Leaks and documents from whistle blowers, in the 
case of the DSD and SASSA many intricate details remain hidden. However, from interviews and 
the information contained in the numerous court cases, investigative reporters, NGOs, and others 
have managed to piece together the puzzle that might reveal the true motivation behind all that has 
unfolded over the years.  
 
It is important to note that following the initial Constitutional Court ruling in 2013, due to Net1 
being a US-listed company, both the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under instruction from 
the US DOJ and the US markets regulator, the Securities and Exchange Commission (US SEC), as 
well as the Hawks on two cases, undertook investigations into the allegations of corruption levelled 
against Net1/CPS. The SEC closed its investigation in May 2015 with the disclaimer that this “must 
in no way be construed that the party has been exonerated” (US SEC, 2015). The US DOJ  in July 
2017 also closed its investigation, with a similar caveat: “If the Department learns additional 
information, it may reopen its inquiry” (US DOJ, 2017). The Hawks’ investigation appears to have 
found no actionable evidence of wrongdoing. It should be noted, however, that in a statement on the 
matter, Net1 indicated that   
 
[t]he Company has now received a written notice from the Hawks, stating that both cases 
were investigated and brought before two separate prosecutors for decisions. As both 
prosecutors declined to prosecute these matters, the Hawks have closed the investigations 
and regard the matters as finalized (Chopra, 2015).  
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This indicates that there was potentially a case that could have been pursued. As there is no other 
readily available information on the cases, the details around the investigations remain unknown. 
 
6.3.1 The BEE partners and Lunga Ncwana 
 
As was highlighted and detailed in the previous chapter, rumours of corruption have surrounded the 
various attempts made by SASSA to secure a service provider for the nationwide payment of grants 
since the first 2007 tender was issued. This was, however, not the first time that CPS was caught in 
litigation and being party to irregular tender processes, with fingers pointing towards corruption of 
some kind.  
 
In March 2009, City Press published an article alleging possible corruption in the then cancelled 
2008 tender, referring to a legal case that had been taken to court in 2005, in which it was found that 
the Limpopo Tender Board had irregularly awarded a grants payment contract to CPS for services 
over the period 2003 to 2006. The case was also the subject of an investigation by the Scorpions in 
2004, in which high-profile ANC officials were implicated (such as former premier Ngoako 
Ramatlhodi) and involved allegations of tender manipulation and channelling funds into the 
provincial ANC (Wa ka Ngobeni & Brümmer, 2004). Even though the details of the court case 
revealed a strong resemblance to the contracts of those with SASSA, it shall not be unpacked 
further here. What is relevant is that at the time it was alleged that there was a link between CPS 
and the minister’s wife, Mrs Thuthukile Mazibuko-Skweyiya, in the 2007 tender. The minister 
responded to these allegations by releasing the Narrative Report of the Adjudication Committee in 
Respect of Payment Tender Service, and making transparent the reasons for cancelling the tender 
(DSD, 2009c).  
 
As previously mentioned, it later emerged that there was an apparent attempt of bribery that had 
taken place during the tender adjudication process involving Adv. Norman Arendse, who was chair 
of the BAC for the 2007/2008 grant payment tender. The statements made by Adv. Arendse (2009) 
and his secretary at the time, Colleen Beverley Bainbridge (2009), paint a graphic picture of how 
bribery might be instigated and pursued within the corridors of power. According to the statements, 
on Sunday 21 September 2008, while working on finalising the BAC report (which ultimately 
recommended cancelling the tender) to be submitted to the SASSA CEO the next day, Adv. 
Arendse agreed to meet with Mr Gideon Sam, the then president of SASCOC. The meeting was 
requested “to discuss a ‘sports matter’ and a ‘business opportunity’”.  
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After an estimated 20-minute conversation around the “sports matter” to which Sam referred, the 
conversation turned, where Arendse (2009: 4) indicated:  
 
I gained the impression that this second matter was what Mr Sam had really come to see me 
about. The second matter related to the social grant tender referred to above. As mentioned 
above, I was at this stage involved in the finalisation of the draft report of the [B]AC. 
 
Mr Sam appeared to be very aware of the tender process although he did not mention the 
names of persons or any details of the bidders or potential bidders. 
 
Mr Sam advised me that he had been approached by Cash Paymaster Services (‘CPS’) since 
he knew me ‘pretty well’ and that I would be ‘more likely’ to listen to him. He described 
himself as a ‘consultant/lobbyist’ for CPS and said that he had an open chequebook.  
 
The meeting would end shortly thereafter with Arendse saying, “Just leave my chambers. You have 
a cheek, and you have abused your knowledge of me” (Arendse, 2009: 4). 
 
As highlighted previously, the supporting statements of both Adv. Arendse and Ms Bainbridge have 
been published online and were independently verified by GroundUp (Bejoy, 2016).  
 
In an article by amaBhungane in 2012, the first insights into the connections between CPS, its BEE 
partner (Born Free Investments 272), and this alleged attempt at bribery began to emerge. The 
connection stems from the overlapping relations and friendships that existed between Mazwi Yako 
(the owner of Born Free), his “cousin-brother” Monwabisi Yako, and Gideon Sam. Sam confirmed 
that he was “friends” with Mazwi and that he and Monwabisi were business partners. When 
confronted with the allegations of the attempted bribe, there were denials all round. Serge 
Belamant, the CEO of Net1, which owns CPS, stated that he had never heard of Sam and in turn 
Sam denied that the incident had even occurred, saying, “No, no. Not at all. I’ve never done social 
pensions. I am a sportsperson” (McKune, 2012a).  
 
Fast-forward to the allegations of corruption that were hinted at in the 2012 tender. As detailed in 
the previous chapter, the main allegations of possible corruption centred around the BEC and the 
changing of the bid scores after the oral presentations. AllPay, the losing bidder, was particularly 
aggrieved by the fact that its score had been reduced significantly by two BEC members, across all 
of the scoring factors and not just those relating to biometrics (see Table 3). The two members were 
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Mr Wiseman Magasela, Deputy DG: Social Policy in the DSD, and Ms Vuyelwa Nhlapo, CEO of 
the NDA. AllPay further argued that there was a conflict of interest for Ms Nhlapo (who was also 
chair of the BEC) and who “was in a business relationship” with CPS’s empowerment partner, 
Mazwi Yako from Born Free Investment. AllPay declared this was a “conflict of interest” and that 
she had “irrationally lowered AllPay’s scores to Cash Paymaster Services’ benefit” (McKune, 
2012b). These allegations were put forward in AllPay’s original affidavit to the High Court in 2012. 
The court, however, found that no “notable” conflict of interest could be determined and it was thus 
not considered a factor in the case. Yako and Nhlapo were both board members of Reflective 
Learning Resources until early 2010 (McKune, 2012b).  
 
During both the Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court hearings, AllPay sought to 
introduce new evidence in the form of a transcript of a recording of a conversation between John 
Tsalamandris (a senior SASSA employee who was the secretary to the bid committees) and Roedolf 
Kay (the national coordinator of the SA Older Persons’ Forum) (Staff Writer, 2013b). Tsalamandris 
alleged that the tender process was rigged. Neither court allowed the evidence: the Supreme Court 
of Appeal because the recording and transcriptions had not been adequately interrogated or 
corroborated by Tsalamandris; and in the case of the Constitutional Court, there was an affidavit by 
Mr Tsalamandris in which he disavowed any implication of irregularity or wrongdoing in the 
procurement process. The court ruled that “[i]t remains hearsay evidence and introduces no new 
independent evidence of major irregularities” (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013: 53). It 
should be noted that when the transcript was revealed in the Supreme Court of Appeal court case, 
SASSA interviewed Tsalamandris and he indicated that there was “no factual evidence of 
corruption to follow up”.  
 
At the time, Corruption Watch said that according to the court papers it was clear that 
“Tsalamandris feared for his life and his job at SASSA” (Sidimba, 2013) when he indicated on the 
recording that “I don’t want to be seen because these guys are dangerous and there’s nothing that’s 
beyond them” (Sole, 2013).  
 
You know I’ve been involved in both bid committees. The first one [2007/2008 tender] we 
didn’t award because of the minister. This time [the 2012 tender was awarded] especially 
because of the minister. It doesn’t matter who gets it. But it was just so blatantly dirty (Sole 
& McKune, 2017).   
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To understand why Minister Dlamini would be referred to during a conversation in which 
Tsalamandris was speaking in confidence, it is necessary to return to CPS’s BEE partners and their 
various connections with a close, personal friend of Dlamini’s, namely Lunga Ncwana.  
 
Lunga Ncwana is arguably best known for his relationship with the now deceased mining magnate, 
Brett Kebble. Ncwana, who was a vocal and active ANC Youth League (ANCYL) member at the 
time, together with several others, became wealthy by signing up as Kebble’s empowerment 
partners in numerous businesses. It is also well known that Ncwana channelled funding to various 
ANC structures on Kebble’s behalf (Deane & Wa ka Ngobeni, 2005). It would later be revealed that 
Kebble had apparently committed fraud to the value of approximately R2 billion and had dished out 
millions to various political parties and influential politicians, including a company that was run by 
Mazibuko-Skweyiya (wife of former DSD minister, Zola Skweyiya) (Staff Writer, 2014b).  
  
Investigating the empowerment partnerships that CPS entered into for the 2012 tender for the 
payment of grants, excluding Born Free Investments, which has been a long-standing BEE partner 
of Net1 (discussed above), it is curious how or why the two small businesses, with arguably no 
experience or expertise in social grant payments, were included as partners in the proposal. As a 
reminder, the first, Retles Trading CC, was established in 2008 by Bulelwa and Jongi Makoetlane, 
to supply textbooks to schools in the Western Cape from their modest home in Gugulethu, Cape 
Town. The second company, Ekhaya Skills Developments Consultants CC (Ekhaya), was a “small 
outfit, run by one woman who advertised that she provided ‘skills training for employers’” 
(McKune, 2016). 
 
amaBhungane investigated the two businesses and revealed that both were indirectly connected to 
Lunga Ncwana. First, it was revealed that the modest home in Gugulethu was “just around the 
corner from Lunga Ncwana’s mother’s house.” When approached, Bulelwa confirmed knowing 
Ncwana, stating: “Yes, I grew up with Lunga”, but later she refused to answer further questions. 
amaBhungane then revealed that in the case of Ekhaya, the owner’s brother, Patrick Ntshalintshali, 
had been doing work related to Net1 at the time. They approached Ntshalintshali to establish his 
involvement in the tender, but he denied having anything to do with the deal. This, however, would 
appear not to be true as he had signed “Ekhaya’s contract with Cash Paymaster and attended 
SASSA’s bid presentations on behalf of the consortium” (McKune, 2016). Ntshalintshali was also 
working for Ncwana at the time, including “being the public face for a company that was secretly 
95% owned by Ncwana’s family trust” (McKune, 2016).  
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A more direct link can be established in the major BEE deal that was undertaken between Net1 and 
the BVI consortium, led by Mosomo Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd, whose CEO is Mr Kgomotso 
Brian Mosehla (Net1, 2012a). Mosehla and Ncwana are business partners and close friends. 
Mosehla was the best man at Ncwana’s wedding, which was also attended by Dlamini and Zuma’s 
lawyer, Michael Hulley. As previously discussed, the BEE deal between BVI and Net1 effectively 
resulted in a 12.5% ownership in CPS and a R97.4 million cash payout, of which R83 million had 
allegedly been paid directly into Mosehla’s personal bank account, with no debt, no investment, and 
at no cost to Net1 – thanks to the windfall received from the irregular payment by SASSA for the 
“re-registration” of beneficiaries (McKune, 2017c).  
 
As mentioned previously, a number of investigations were undertaken in the USA, as Net1 (the 
parent company of CPS) is registered on the Nasdaq and subject to US anti-corruption laws. A class 
action lawsuit was launched against Net1 with the US District Court: Southern District of New 
York by disgruntled shareholders, who had suffered significant losses following from the negative 
impact of the various AllPay court cases. The case was ultimately dismissed, but it is worth noting 
that one of the arguments that was put forward by the plaintiffs involved the then Minister of 
Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale (Ramos, 2015). In their complaint, based on media reports at 
the time, they highlighted two specific links between Sexwale and the 2012 tender. The first was in 
relation to Mosehla, who was a former “key official” at Sexwale’s company, Mvelaphanda 
Holdings (also referred to as the Mvela Group). An article published by amaBhungane (Brümmer, 
2012) outlined the ways in which, through various business ventures, connections can be drawn 
between Sexwale, various people associated with the Mvela Group, and Mosehla. One such Mvela 
associate was none other than Patrick Ntshalintshali. The Mvela Group, however, “flatly denie[d] 
that Sexwale or Mvela Holdings have any financial interest, direct or indirect, in Mosomo 
Investment”. 
 
The second connection with Sexwale related directly to the 2012 tender itself, namely that the then 
DG of his department, Thabane Zulu, sat on the BAC. It was alleged that one month prior to the 
BAC awarding CPS the contract, an amount of R1.4 million was “mysteriously” transferred to his 
account. The story was first published by The Sunday Independent in 2012, in which it claimed to 
possess documentation indicating that an unnamed “intermediary deposited R2 m into the business 
account of African Access Information and Communication Technology, on behalf of the BEE 
company” (Staff Writer, 2012). Presumably, this was one of the BEE companies tied to CPS’s bid, 
although this was never stated in the article. A few days later, Africa Access then paid Zulu R1.4 
million. The allegations were at first met with vehement denials by all parties concerned. But their 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 138 | P a g e  
stories changed once they were confronted by amaBhungane with evidence in the form of bank 
records. Both Zulu and Africa Access Holdings admitted to the payment taking place, but provided 
an explanation that the amount was “related to his employment [as a director] at an African Access 
Holdings subsidiary”, which he had left some 16 months prior to the payment. The matter was taken 
to the Public Protector and the SIU for further investigation (McKune, 2012c). 
 
It would also seem that over and above connections with CPS’s empowerment partners, Ncwana 
appears to be linked to at least one of the work stream leaders, who were appointed by and reported 
directly to Dlamini, namely Mr Tim Sukazi. Prior to his appointment to the MAC in 2013, Sukazi 
was best known for being an agent and manager for soccer players and coaches in South Africa, as 
well as an owner of the Mpumalanga-based TS Galaxy Football Club. In March 2017, it was 
rumoured that he was looking to take over Cape Town-based Igugu Lekapa’s All Stars from its sole 
owner, Lunga Ncwana. The rumour was strongly denied at the time, but it is worth noting that 
Sukazi is the manager of All Stars coach, Patrick Mabedi (Soccer Laduma, 2017). 
 
Whenever allegations of corruption were posed to then Net1 CEO, Serge Belamant, they were met 
with outright denials, obfuscation, and/or claims of ignorance. However, over the years several 
statements have raised important questions:  
 
2005:  We don’t get a R1,7-billion contract without being pretty close to the minister 
nationally as well as to the [provincial ministers] (Brümmer, Sole & Wa ka 
Ngobeni, 2005). 
2012:  Our BEE I won’t even argue, was probably not the best BEE deal. But we thought, 
you know what, if we’re going to win this or lose this because of BEE, well, so be it 
(McKune, 2016). 
2016:  I cannot comment on Mr Ncwana specifically (I believe that I have met him a 
number of times – regarding, amongst other things, the funding of a soccer club – we 
did not fund it), except that if he did or does form part of our black empowerment 
lobbying group and assists with our business objectives, we would have no problem 
with his involvement or that of any other person(s) for that matter as long as these 
individuals adhere to [the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] rules and regulations 
(McKune, 2016). 
2017:  (Post-resignation): We have been acclaimed worldwide. We have won many different 
awards, very important awards. We have people like the ANC buying into the 
company and it took a long time to convince them (Hogg, 2017). 
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There is nothing new about lobbying in South Africa and it is well known that most special interest 
groups provide funding in a variety of ways to influence government policy, including research, 
sponsorship, etc. Still, unlike the USA and other developed democracies, South Africa does not yet 
have the same extensive regulations and laws that recognise and account for this type of activity in 
our political system. Only recently has parliament started the process of looking into party political 
funding.  
 
According to numerous media reports over the years, Ncwana has been actively involved in the 
operations of the DSD for years, so much so that the DSD, responding to an article by The Sunday 
Times in March 2017, stated:  
 
It is disappointing that a newspaper of The Sunday Times’ stature would not take this old 
and tired story forward by providing their facts and evidence to South Africans or at least 
quote people who are prepared to speak on the record …  
 
For the past four years different media have been writing about this alleged relationship [of 
corruption between Minister Dlamini and CPS] but none of these investigations are 
bringing forth anything new but only speculation. 
 
It would have been easier and more credible of The Sunday Times to provide the evidence 
that the Minister received a bribe and at least show South Africa that these messages were 
indeed from the Minister (DSD, 2017c). 
 
The article revealed that there does in fact appear to be hard evidence of a possible corrupt 
relationship between Minister Dlamini and Ncwana, in the form of an SMS that the minister sent to 
Zane Dangor. At the time of receiving the SMS (March 2017), Dangor was still the DG of the DSD, 
but he resigned a few days later. The SMS read: “You and Sipho [Shezi, adviser to the minister] 
have been used by [SASSA CEO Thokozani] Magwaza who is a friend to my former boyfriend who 
wanted to extort money from Lunga and could not” (News24 Correspondent, 2017). 
 
Dlamini’s “former boyfriend”, only referred to as an intelligence official by the name of Cessaro, 
was reportedly side-lined when CPS was awarded the contract in 2012. The Sunday Times indicated 
that it was originally Cessaro’s plan to set up a BEE partner. But it was then arranged that Ncwana 
would be the one to structure the deals.  
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It is further alleged that  
 
[t]he night after it was confirmed that CPS has won the contract, Lunga ... came to 
celebrate at the minister’s house. Cessaro was asked to give them some space. When he 
realised this, he was told he would get his share and he shouldn’t worry (Saba, 2017).  
 
The following is an interesting comment that Dlamini made to a journalist, at the time of the 
reporting on her and Ncwana’s relationship: “You are not going to tell me who I am close with. 
Because then you must look at all politicians and who they are close to and who is funding their 
parties” (McKune, 2016). 
  
6.3.2 Behind the scenes: Hulley, Monyeki, Moyane, and more 
 
When asked in an interview when he had first met Michael Hulley, Zane Dangor indicated that it 
was the night after Molewa’s inaugural budget speech, on 8 July 2009. Dangor, who was the COO 
and negotiating the extension of contracts for payment service providers at the time, was requested 
by Molewa to attend the meeting. The meeting had allegedly been arranged by Deputy Minister 
Dlamini. In attendance were Michael Hulley (Zuma’s personal lawyer) and Duduzani Zuma. The 
discussion was on the first 2007/2008 tender that had been cancelled and the challenges the DSD 
and SASSA were having with CPS in the various litigations and the negotiations of extension of 
payment services contracts. Hulley and Zuma suggested working with CPS to find a solution, but 
this could only happen if Adv. Arendse’s recommendation to cancel the tender was not 
implemented. Dangor flatly rejected this, advising Molewa that this would be in direct 
contravention of the legal procurement processes, and the meeting ended shortly thereafter. Molewa 
agreed with the recommendations made by Dangor (Foley & Swilling, 2018).  
 
This intervention by Hulley and Duduzani Zuma took place just three months after Jacob Zuma’s 
inauguration. It suggests that Net1/CPS enjoyed access and influence at the highest level. It also 
explains why Dlamini, a Zuma loyalist, so relentlessly supported the CPS approach after she 
became deputy minister and then minister. Repurposing South Africa’s grant system was clearly a 
key element of the Zuma-centred power elite’s political project.  
 
During the various court cases around the invalid 2012 tender, Michael Hulley’s involvement in the 
tender evaluation process became public knowledge. It would appear that the revelations about 
Hulley’s involvement came from the Tsalamandris transcripts. Hulley’s involvement, however, was 
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also confirmed by SASSA, that he had been appointed to provide “commercial, financial, legal, and 
operational advice” on the tender (McKune, 2012b). Corruption Watch was specifically concerned 
by the fact that SASSA never actually paid Hulley for these services, as it was alleged in the 
Tsalamandris recording that he was being paid by CPS. SASSA’s explanation for this was that “Mr 
Hulley did not claim payment from SASSA since he rendered advice on an ad hoc basis, as part of 
his broader relationship with government” (Ramokgopa, 2012: 73). SASSA, in an affidavit 
submitted by Ms Ramokgopa, who was the project manager at the time, also flatly denied that 
Hulley had “worked for two years on the matter”, indicating that Hulley’s services were “only used 
when necessary” (Ramokgopa, 2012: 80).  
 
It would seem that this denial was false and misleading, based on two accounts. The first account is 
by Serge Belamant himself, CEO of Net1/CPS. In an interview with the Mail & Guardian in 2012 
he indicated that, in addition to providing the BEC and BAC with advice, Hulley had been brought 
in before 2012 to deal with the various lawsuits that existed between SASSA and CPS at the time. It 
can be assumed that this included the litigation around SASSA’s agreement with SAPO, as well as 
the litigation CPS was pursuing against SASSA for its agreement with several banks, which 
involved directly paying into beneficiary bank accounts. Belamant, seemly foreseeing the potential 
conflict of interest, indicated that once the new tender had been issued, these investigations were 
halted. In the interview he stated that “this entire investigation into the lawsuits was halted because 
they [SASSA] didn’t want anybody to somehow infer that these lawsuits and their resolution had 
anything to do with a potential tender award” (McKune, 2012b). 
 
The second account comes from the interview with Zane Dangor, who was part of the BSC that 
prepared the RFP for the 2011/2012 tender. Dangor indicated that, upon the insistence of the then 
Deputy Minister Dlamini, citing a lack of security at SASSA’s offices and the need for a location 
that could be secured by state security, the meetings and preparation of the tender documents took 
place in Michael Hulley’s offices. It was indicated that Hulley would sit in on the discussions on the 
requirements for the payment of grants. The dignity of beneficiaries was the principal requirement 
of the BSC and it was agreed that there needed to be interoperability for electronic payments 
(meaning that it needed to be able to be done within the NPS). It was during these meetings that the 
biometrics issue was first introduced. It was apparently agreed within the BSC that biometrics could 
be included in the tender. It was not, however, a mandatory requirement. Once the tender was 
issued, the BSC’s involvement ended. This means that the BSC was not part of the decision to issue 
Bidders Notice 2, which changed the requirements of biometric identification from “preferred” to a 
“must” (Foley & Swilling, 2018). This was one of the main reasons that the Constitutional Court 
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declared the contract invalid, as did Tsalamandris, when he noted that “at a very late stage of the 
process, it changed the rules of the game. All of a sudden people are being told they must have 
biometrics. They were using biometrics as the key thing to kill AllPay” (Sole, 2013).  
 
Tsalamandris also indicated that three other technical advisers had been appointed to advise the 
BEC and BAC. They were paid “half a million” each by SASSA, and he insinuated that these 
advisers were chosen specifically because they “would support what they [SASSA] were doing” 
(Sole, 2013). One of these advisers was none other than Patrick Monyeki, who would later be 
appointed to the MAC and go on to become the technical work stream leader. According to 
Tsalamandris, Monyeki was instrumental in how the bid evaluation process played out, as he “was 
used to justify why we’re blocking technical” (Sole & McKune, 2017). 
 
As was previously noted, Monyeki was allegedly involved in several other potentially corrupt deals. 
The first was related to allegations of collusion in a contract between the DCS and the Sasstec 
group, of which he is a 15% shareholder (Serrao, 2017). It should be noted that during the Inquiry, 
Magwaza indicated that Monyeki’s name appeared on an NT letter, in reference to potentially 
blacklisted individuals / service providers relating to DCS procurements (SABC Digital News, 
2018d). It is reported that the initial contract that was awarded in 2012 while Monyeki was a 
technical adviser ballooned from R500 million to more than R1.4 billion in 2015 (Serrao, 2017). 
The second is linked to the investigations of unexplained money transfers to SARS’s second-in-
command Jonas Makwakwa, which had been flagged by the FIC. A complex web of alleged 
corruption and money laundering emerged from the investigations, all tied to a February 2015 
payment of R17.87 million from the DWS in favour of a debt-collection company called New 
Integrated Credit Solutions. Monyeki was the sole director of Mahube Payment Solutions, which 
appears to have received a payment of approximately R4.5 million from New Integrated Credit 
Solutions, the reasons for which have yet to be fully explained (Serrao, 2017). Both of these alleged 
incidences of potential corruption are still currently under investigation, the first by the SIU and the 
second by the Hawks.  
 
Both of these instances of alleged corruption have one thing in common: they are both linked to 
institutions that were under the leadership of Mr Tom Moyane. In 2012, Moyane was the National 
Commissioner of Correctional Services. He was appointed in 2014 as Commissioner of SARS by 
President Zuma, even though this is a decision for the Minister of Finance to make – the Minister of 
Finance at the time, Nhlanhla Nene, was instructed to simply ratify this appointment. It is 
Monyeki’s “close friendship” with Moyane that is reported to be the main link to Makwakwa 
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regarding the unexplained payments. Significantly, Tom Moyane was also the chair of the BAC for 
the 2012 SASSA grants payment tender. According to court records, Moyane convened the final 
BAC meeting, which took place in the absence of the only BAC member (NT official Willie 
Mathebula) who had raised concerns around CPS’s BEE proposal and the BEC’s decision to change 
the scoring after oral presentations. Moyane was informed that Mathebula would not be able to 
attend the meeting. Moyane convened the meeting anyway, stating that Minister Dlamini was really 
unhappy that the meeting would be postponed. Moyane obtained a legal opinion – assumed to be 
from Hulley – which indicated that the meeting could take place without Mathebula being present. 
In the final BAC meeting, Moyane told the other committee members that in his opinion the issues 
and questions raised by Mathebula were “really not serious questions that could have led us to 
postpone the discussions” (McKune, 2012d). 
 
As was discussed in detail, Monyeki, as member of the MAC and the leader of the technical work 
stream, has since played a significant role in the events that led to the “self-created” crisis in March 
2017. It was also noted in Section 5.6.2 that in 2016/2017 Hulley entered the fray once again. There 
were three meetings at which Hulley was reported to have been present: the first on  
18 December, which took place at the Intercontinental Hotel at O.R. Tambo International Airport, 
which was attended by Dlamini, Dangor, Magwaza, and Ramokgopa. The second was on  
30 December, allegedly at Hulley’s offices in Durban, which was attended by both work streams 
and senior officials of SASSA and the DSD. However, Dangor refused to attend. At these meetings 
it appears that Hulley strongly supported the idea of negotiating a new contract with CPS. When 
questions were posed to Hulley, he initially denied any involvement in the matter. He later 
admitted: “My advice was sought [by Dlamini] upon what is permissible in terms of what the 
[Constitutional] court order says and what is impermissible” (McKune, 2017d). 
 
The third meeting was over the weekend before the presentation to SCOPA on 22 February, where 
the proposed way forward for SASSA had changed dramatically. As indicated in Section 5.5.2, 
during Dangor’s testimony (at the Inquiry into Dlamini’s potential personal liability for the legal 
cost of the Constitutional Court hearing in 2017), he indicated that the minister had travelled to 
KwaZulu-Natal to meet with President Zuma on the Sunday (19 February), but cross-examination 
did not establish the purpose of the meeting (SABC Digital News, 2018c). Although there are not 
many details of this meeting in the media, it is alleged that present at the meeting was a select group 
that included Hulley, Mvulane, and possibly even Tim Sukazi (McKune, 2017a). It is believed that 
it is in this meeting that it was decided that a “new” approach would be adopted, i.e. for SASSA to 
sign a new contract with CPS for a period of two years and that they would only inform the 
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Constitutional Court of the new contract as opposed to first consulting the court with regard to their 
plans.  
 
Dlamini’s decision to act against the advice given in three separate legal opinions to approach the 
Constitutional Court regarding the extension of CPS’s services was based on an unseen “new legal 
opinion” that one can only assume came from Hulley. Significantly, this decision appears to have 
taken place outside the formal government structures, namely SASSA and the DSD, as well as 
outside the “recommendations” of the irregularly appointed work streams. 
 
It does indeed appear that Hulley’s involvement in the SASSA saga was of major concern to 
SASSA and DSD officials, and both Magwaza and Dangor objected to the new approach that was 
recommended by Hulley. The concern around Hulley’s involvement was known by Dlamini, as is 
evident in an alleged exchange that took place in a SASSA Executive meeting (called by Magwaza) 
on 20 February. Dlamini arrived uninvited to the meeting and “caused a scene, accusing the CEO of 
being a ‘traitor’” for meeting with NT and added that “people should stop questioning Hulley’s role 
as there was nothing wrong with him as he is President Jacob Zuma’s legal adviser” (Wa Afrika & 
Saba, 2017). During the Inquiry, Magwaza testified to the heated exchange. Even though he did not 
highlight Hulley’s role in the Inquiry, he indicated that the minister was adamant that the SASSA 
executives were not to interfere in the undertakings of the work streams and presumably the parallel 
shadow structures (SABC Digital News, 2018d).  
 
Shortly after the media started reporting on these meetings, the Presidency released a statement that 
it had no knowledge of Hulley’s involvement, and the DSD released a statement obfuscating the 
matter, by neither confirming nor outright denying Hulley’s involvement. Instead, the DSD 
challenged reporters to produce evidence of the meetings. It is therefore highly certain that Hulley 
was involved. Given that he was probably not paid by the DSD/SASSA and that he was historically 
involved because of his “broader relationship with government”, the only possible conclusion is that 
he was directly representing President Jacob Zuma (DSD, 2017d). All his interventions seem to 
have been to bend the rules in favour of CPS, especially with respect to shifting the biometric 
requirement from a “preferred” to a “must” condition.  
 
6.4 Summary  
 
This chapter explored and unpacked the aspects of the shadow state that take place outside of the 
government. In terms of the State Capture modus operandi, the characteristics, structure, and 
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formation of Net1, its subsidiaries, and the contractual agreements with the BEE partners all have 
similarities to those described in the conceptual framework. The first aspect is that when Net1 
(Aplitec at the time) originally acquired CPS in 1999, CPS was already established (owned by 
FNB) and was already operating as a grant payment service provider. Up until that point, Net1 was 
primarily a technology development company, concerned with the development of IT systems for 
managing payments, but did not offer physical payment services. The second characteristic is the 
complex and opaque joint venture agreements of the BEE partnerships and the agreements between 
Net1 subsidiaries and Grindrod Bank.  
 
The second aspect of the State Capture project that this chapter highlighted is the organisational 
“structure” of the shadow state and the various roles that are filled by various members of the power 
elite. In the SASSA case, for example (hypothetically or illustratively), Bathabile Dlamini would be 
considered part of the “elite” due to her position as Minister of the DSD and as president of the 
ANCWL. Michael Hulley (Zuma’s former lawyer), who played an active role in providing “legal 
opinions”, both in the awarding of the 2012 CPS contract and the 2017 SASSA-Gate crisis, could 
therefore be considered a “fixer”. The fixer creates an accountability buffer between the “elite” and 
any illicit activities that are taking place within government (i.e. Dlamini did not directly interfere 
in the bid evaluation). Lunga Ncwana could then be the “broker/middleman”, due to his personal 
and business relationships with Dlamini and Hulley (in government), and with multiple individuals 
who are involved with the BEE partnerships/deals with Net1. Without having any direct 
involvement in any of the formal contracting, the middleman is free to interact with and between 
both parties. 
 
The figure in Appendix B provides a hypothetical example of the network of persons identified as 
potentially being part of the shadow state, with labels assigned to those who are specifically part of 
the power elite. It is important to note that this description and the figure are not intended to imply 
or insinuate corruption or illegality by any of the specific individuals listed. Rather, these serve as 
illustratively examples of how the power elite and shadow state operate, based on the conceptual 
framework and the evidence available in the public domain.   
 
The last point worth noting with regard to this chapter is that it provided insight as to how the 
attitude, or rather the demeanour, of the government under the Dlamini (Zuma) administration 
differed to that of her predecessors. Highlighting that allegations of corruption existed before the 
Zuma administration is important; first with regard to the case that concerned CPS being awarded a 
tender in Limpopo, and the second the alleged attempted bribe of Adv. Arendse in relation to the 
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first SASSA grant payment bid. However, what is interesting and evident is that the two 
administrations have distinctly different approaches to addressing and dealing with allegations of 
corruption. When confronted with allegations of corruption, Zola’s response was to provide the 
media and the public at large with greater transparency, by requesting and then releasing the 
Narrative Report of the Adjudication Committee. This response stands in stark contrast to the many 
instances of obfuscation, flat and unsubstantiated denials, and deflection that became standard under 
Bathabile Dlamini.  
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 Chapter 7: Beyond Corrupt 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The first section of this chapter outlines the party political dynamics of the ANCWL and Dlamini 
and Zuma. The second section is an assessment of the power dynamics of the events that unfolded, 
particularly with regard to the workings of the power elite in the Executive and the strategic 
manoeuvring by various Kitchen Cabinets. The third section describes an example of the other 
means by which the DSD and SASSA were repurposed, in particular with regard to the use of state 
resources to manipulate and secure legitimacy from the voting public. The last section highlights 
the role that other sectors of the state have played with regard to countering State Capture.  
 
7.2 The African National Congress Women’s League (ANCWL) 
 
The SA Constitution is hailed as the best in the world and it is evident that some clauses of the 
Constitution are exploited by opportunistic anti-transformation agents to undermine 
government programs and to reduce black people to be beggars and landless in their country 
of birth. The ANCWL joins the progressive voices which calls [sic] for a debate on whether 
SA should consider parliamentary democracy or just continue with constitutional democracy 
(ANCWL, 2016). 
 
The extract above was taken from a statement that was released by the ANCWL in February 2016. 
It was issued in response to the announcement by AfriForum, an NGO, that it would be forming a 
unit whose sole purpose would be to institute private prosecutions of winnable cases that the state, 
for one reason or another, chooses not to pursue. Significantly, this statement called into question 
the constitutional order. One interpretation is that the ANCWL concluded that too much power 
resides with the Judiciary. As argued in the Betrayal of the Promise report (Bhorat et al., 2017), the 
constitutional protection of rights is regarded by the Zuma-Gupta faction within the ANC as 
restricting the implementation of strategies that claim to be about “RET” but in reality are about 
state capture and the repurposing of state institutions.  
 
In theory, the role of the ANCWL and the other various sub-structures of the organisation is to 
provide political representation for its constituency, in this case women. However, the trajectory of 
the ANCWL since 1994 has followed the classic neopatrimonial pattern found in newly liberated 
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nations. As outlined by Tripp (2001), when a handful of political elites are brought into a 
clientelistic network, the substructure of the political party is effectively captured by individuals or 
groups who use the party to further the ends of a specific power elite. Once captured, the primary 
objective of the party political structure is to use its position to drive a specific narrative or 
directive, which might not be representative of the main party objectives or even be in the best 
interest of their constituency.  
 
In 2015, Bathabile Dlamini became president of the ANCWL. Before that, she had been in various 
positions of leadership in the league since 2001, including being the longest-serving Secretary-
General of the ANCWL, from 1998 to 2008. It was during this time that she had reportedly, to the 
surprise of the then ANCWL president, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, “engineered the surprise 
nomination of Zuma as the ANC Women’s League’s candidate to replace Mbeki ahead of the 2007 
Polokwane conference” (Ngalwa, 2015). At the conference, she became a member of the NEC of 
the ANC, as well as the National Working Committee (SASSA, 2016a). Following the national 
elections, she was subsequently made deputy and later minister of the DSD.  
 
It was shortly after the 2015 ANCWL conference that the notion of the “Premier League”, 
consisting of the Free State, Mpumalanga, and North West premiers, emerged (Davis, 2015; 
Ngalwa, 2015). Going into the conference, it seemed that there was majority support for the 
incumbent ANCWL president, Angie Motshekga. However, it is alleged that the Premier League 
intervened during the conference. A senior ANC leader told the Mail & Guardian:  
 
After the adoption of credentials, the ‘premier league’ came to the conference and 
threatened members of the [league] from Free State, Mpumalanga and North West that, if 
they did not support Bathabile, they must remain in Johannesburg. That’s when everything 
turned … The first night of the conference they disbursed a truck full of blankets and 
tracksuits to members [of the league who were] supporting Bathabile. It was a very cold 
night. There was no way those members would not support Bathabile’s group (Bendile, 
2017). 
 
The ANCWL has generated much controversy over the years. Perhaps the most notable was the 
silence of the ANCWL during Zuma’s 2006 rape trial. It was reported that “ANC Women’s League 
members demonstrated in support of Jacob Zuma outside his rape trial in 2006, carrying signs that 
included wording such as ‘Zuma, rape me’” (Davis, 2015). The ANCWL did not reprimand the then 
ANCYL president, Julius Malema, when he said that “the woman who accused Zuma of rape had a 
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good time, otherwise she would have asked for taxi money and gone home” (Gouws, 2011: 96). He 
was later found guilty of hate speech after being taken to the courts by the Sonke Gender Justice, an 
organisation of men who fight for women’s rights. This type of selective non-outrage, specifically 
reserved for political affiliate counterparts, at blatantly misogynistic behaviour is still common. In 
2017, Dlamini herself appeared to have provided protection for then Deputy Minister of Higher 
Education and Training, Mduduze Manana, who had admitted to assaulting a woman at a nightclub. 
In an interview with The Sunday Times, she indicated:  
 
Don’t start from him ... If we want to say everyone who occupies a senior position in 
government, we must know his track record. Because there are those that are actually worse 
than him. 
 
They must come out in the open. We must know them. We must know how they are going to 
be rehabilitated. As the Women's League it is our role to fight on the issues of women [like] 
gender-based violence (Shoba, 2017). 
  
The ANCWL issued a strongly worded statement in her defence. However, a recording of the 
exchange speaks for itself. The ANCWL was required to come to the minister’s defence again 
during the ANC Consultative Conference. The ANCWL had decided to include six men as part of 
its delegation. When asked what the reason for the inclusion of men in the ANCWL delegation was, 
it was reported that Dlamini said that “women were too emotional” (Tandwa, 2017). There are 
many more examples that highlight the contradictions that exist between the ANCWL’s actions and 
the gender equality struggle that it professes to espouse.   
 
7.3 The Kitchen Cabinet Shuffle 
 
Malusi Gigaba was appointed Minister of Public Enterprises and Bathabile Dlamini as Minister of 
Social Development in 2010. As argued in the Betrayal of the Promise report, this reshuffle marked 
the start of concerted efforts by the Zuma-centred power elite to repurpose state institutions across a 
range of fronts. The focus to date has been on Gupta-linked strategies to capture and repurpose state 
institutions like Eskom, Transnet, and Denel. Insufficient attention has been paid to the capture and 
repurposing of the DSD/SASSA, where direct links to the Gupta network cannot be discerned 
(despite the involvement of Duduzani Zuma). In the March 2017 reshuffle, Gigaba became Minister 
of Finance and Dlamini kept her post as Minister of Social Development. There is a clear and direct 
line between the 2010 and 2017 reshuffles.  
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Did Dlamini wilfully create the SASSA-Gate crisis? To answer this, it is necessary to consider not 
only the events that led up to the looming deadline of SASSA of 1 April 2017, but also how the 
events were presented to parliament and the public, as well as what transpired thereafter. Moreover, 
in particular, what role did SASSA-Gate play in the cabinet reshuffle in March 2017? What follows 
is a summarised recapitulation of events previously discussed, but in a chronological order linking 
together the constitutional and shadow state dynamics.  
 
By November 2016, SASSA and DSD officials were faced with the stark challenge of having to 
find a way for SASSA to take over grant payments by April 2017. What followed were numerous 
meetings with other government agencies (including NT and the SARB) that were previously 
described. They concluded that the proposal set out by the work streams (which was supported by 
the minister) should not be the preferred closed-loop payment model. In January 2017, a TTT was 
established, consisting of senior technical officials from SASSA, the DSD, SARB, and NT. They 
were given the task of developing options for how SASSA would be able to take over the payment 
of grants based on an open-architecture model. It was at this stage that the conflict between Dlamini 
and Gordhan would begin to emerge. On 23 January, Dlamini sent Gordhan a briefing note that 
promoted the extension of CPS’s services and the work streams model for the payment of grants by 
SASSA. This was just one day before the TTT would present their options to the heads of the 
respective departments for deliberation, presenting both short-term solutions for SASSA taking over 
the payment of grants in April, with the long-term objective of a SASSA system being developed, 
which would be based on the open-loop model connected directly to the NPS.  
 
On 1 February, Gordhan wrote to Dlamini indicating that his preference was not to allow the 
contract with CPS to be extended and that the preferred model from NT’s perspective was to 
negotiate with all interested banks, including SAPO. NT’s perspective was to promote the use of 
electronic payment methods (which would exclude the biometric verification requirement) as much 
as possible and that only the cash distribution grants would go out on tender. This was Option 6 of 
the various solutions that the TTT had developed. On 7 February, Magwaza wrote to NT, requesting 
approval for deviation from standard procurement processes that would enable SASSA to extend 
the existing contract with CPS. NT swiftly responded on 8 February, indicating it could not sanction 
the request for deviation without the Constitutional Court having been informed of and approving 
SASSA’s proposal. At this point it was well reported in the media that there was a disagreement 
between the two ministers, which added to the confusion and anxiety that were developing 
regarding the uncertainty around how grants would continue to be paid come 1 April. The activities 
and discussions in parliament were also contributing to the mix, where one solution would be 
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presented to the Portfolio Committee on Social Development on one day and a different plan would 
be presented at SCOPA the next day.  
 
After much debate and negotiating between and within the relevant parties, on 16 February it was 
agreed that SASSA would, dependent on the Constitutional Court’s consent, seek to extend CPS’s 
services for the period of a year in order to properly coordinate a transition of payment services 
from CPS to SASSA and the various other service providers it would procure in the medium term. 
It was agreed that a report outlining this plan would be drafted and sent to the Constitutional Court. 
It was at this point that Dlamini indicated that she wanted to further consider the solution over the 
weekend. Over that weekend, Dlamini reportedly met with Michael Hulley, who advised the 
minister to adopt the “new approach”. As previously highlighted, up until this point there was 
agreement by all parties (including SASSA and DSD officials, the TTT, and the work streams, and 
supported by three separate legal opinions) that SASSA would need to obtain consent from the 
Constitutional Court before it entered into any formal agreement that would be needed to ensure 
that grants continued to be paid after 31 March. The new approach was to adopt the work streams 
model (including biometrics, of course), as per Dlamini’s wishes; however, SASSA would no 
longer seek consent from the Constitutional Court but would instead only file a report merely 
informing the court once the negotiations were concluded.  
 
The question that needs to be answered is what advantage was to be derived from not first 
approaching the Constitutional Court? There does not appear to be any rational reason for this 
advice, other than a possible knee-jerk resistance to the Constitutional Court that has not been 
friendly when it came to Zuma’s various cases. The risk that the Constitutional Court would make a 
ruling that jeopardised the payment of grants was low. This new approach placed NT in a very 
difficult position. It had previously indicated that it would not approve any deviation without the 
Constitutional Court’s consent. If NT had approved a deviation, it would have been complicit in 
allowing for an invalid and irregular contract being entered into between SASSA and CPS. This 
would set a precedent, which, from an institutional governance perspective, would be hard to 
recover from. On the other hand, if NT continued to refuse to allow the deviation (which it most 
likely would have done) and there had not been an intervention from the Black Sash Trust and 
others, the risk of a contract not being signed increased and in turn increased the likelihood of 
beneficiaries not being paid on 1 April. Had this happened, the blame would have been placed 
directly on NT, which would have provided Zuma with a relatively legitimate reason to fire 
Gordhan.  
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In a presentation to the Portfolio Committee on Social Development on 22 February, Dlamini 
outlined the new approach, which was unknown to Magwaza and Dangor at the time. In response to 
a question regarding the discussion with NT and the filing of a report with the Constitutional Court, 
Dlamini indicated that, according to her, the “deviation [required from NT] and [the filing of a 
report with the] Concourt are separate processes” (PMG, 2017b: 6). It would seem from this 
statement that Dlamini was (either willingly or unknowingly) misleading parliament; as NT had 
previously indicated that it would not be able to approve the deviation without the Constitutional 
Court’s consent. It was at this stage that it became apparent that a concerted effort was being made 
to set up NT to take the fall should negotiations with CPS not be sanctioned.  
 
On 28
 
February 2017, a report was filed by SASSA at the Constitutional Court, signed by 
Magwaza. This was later retracted by the minister. It is at this point that the Black Sash Trust 
instituted a separate application with the court to intervene and provide clarity regarding the interim 
contract between SASSA and CPS. The negotiations between the two organisations continued, 
without NT being present and without its approval. On 8 March, the MTT instructed that the 
negotiations be scrapped and started afresh, subject to NT’s approval and the outcomes of the 
Constitutional Court hearings. On 17 March, the Constitutional Court ruled that the invalid contract 
between SASSA and CPS could be extended for a year and that in effect resolved the dispute 
between Dlamini and NT. In fact, it confirmed/supported the position NT had adopted all along, 
which was to disallow a deviation without prior consent from the court.  
 
With the CPS matter temporarily “resolved”, Zuma needed an alternative legitimate excuse to fire 
Gordhan. On 20 March 2017, just three days after the Constitutional Court handed down its ruling 
on the SASSA debacle, a highly suspect and poorly crafted “intelligence report” was presented to 
the South African Communist Party (SACP) in which it was indicated to those present why Zuma 
had grounds to fire Gordhan. This was obviously Plan B. The argument that was also made at the 
time was that there had been a breakdown in the relationship between the Presidency and Minister 
Gordhan. This, however, was well known. Without some other reason for a fall-out between the 
pair, the president would have had to provide details of the deterioration of the relationship. It 
would seem that the motivations given by the president did not suffice, as the so-called “intelligence 
report” was almost wholly rejected by those who had seen it and the backlash that followed forever 
changed the political dynamics of the country. Even the Minister of State Security claims he had no 
knowledge of the “report”.  
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7.4 SASSA’s Second Function: Blurring the Lines between Party and State 
 
‘So when the leadership of the ANC takes a decision, we all follow. In the ANC you are given 
orders, you implement. If you want to question, you question after implementation,’ she said, 
to cheers of ‘viva’ from the crowd (Du Plessis, 2017).  
 
The above statement, made by Bathabile Dlamini at a Women’s Day rally on 8 August 2017, 
highlights the underlying dogmatic ideology that serves to erase the invisible line between party and 
state that is embedded in the Constitution. This ideology directs attention away from those avoiding 
accountability and in effect allows for the emergence of the shadow state created by the silent coup. 
It is these blurred lines between party and state that perhaps “allow” the political party collective to 
turn a blind eye when state resource are utilised to the benefit of the party. This establishes an 
ethical dilemma in that it also allowed the Zuma-centred power elite to loot and plunder state 
resources for their own personal gain.  
 
Significantly, election poll research reveals that social grants are one of the main motivating reasons 
why many South Africans continue to vote for the ANC. The reality is that social assistance is a 
basic human right under the Constitution, and precedence is now set in terms of the type and scope 
of social assistance that the state is required to provide by law. Nevertheless, social grants and their 
association with the ANC are arguably one of the most powerful tools the party can leverage when 
it comes to drumming up support and winning votes in elections (Plaut, 2014).   
 
In December 2009, the Democratic Alliance (DA) lodged a complaint with the Public Protector 
against the DSD and SASSA. It was alleged in media reports that Julius Malema (then president of 
the ANCYL) handed out food parcels at events held at Heinz Park and Phillipi in Cape Town on  
1 December 2009 and that these food parcels had been purchased by SASSA. In her report, which 
was released in May 2016 and titled State and Party, Blurred Lines, the Public Protector (2016b) 
found that SASSA had indeed, on the instruction of the then minister, Molewa, organised food 
parcels for the event, which had been organised by the ANCYL. Coverage of the event by the 
SABC clearly showed ANCYL and SASSA banners standing alongside each other. In her findings, 
the Public Protector found Minister Molewa’s actions and SASSA’s involvement to be improper 
and that  
 
[t]he utilization of SASSA resources and attendance at an ANCYL political event by SASSA 
and Departmental personnel, which was commissioned by the Minister through her request 
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to the former CEO, abetted the ANCYL to achieve its party political objective and thus 
creating a conflict of interest and favouritism ... The conduct constitutes maladministration 
(Public Protector, 2016b: 8). 
 
As part of the remedial action, the DSD and SASSA were required to develop a “policy setting out 
the separation of state and party activities to ensure that no government organ be allowed to use its 
position to market political parties” (Smillie, 2016). A recent report by the new Public Protector 
found that these remedial actions still had not been adequately addressed and she again instructed 
the DSD and SASSA to implement the remedial actions (Public Protector, 2017).  
 
7.5 The Constitutional State at Work  
 
The significant role civil society groups played, by approaching the Constitutional Court, must be 
acknowledged. Together with officials who spoke out, this configuration has made it possible to 
keep the grant payment system more or less on track to the benefit of millions. Had there been no 
intervention, a likely possible scenario would have been that CPS was awarded a new contract, thus 
making possible massive profits for a company and its associated networks off the backs of South 
Africa’s poorest. Thankfully, this did not happen.  
 
This case study highlighted the various actors/institutions that played a crucial role in preventing the 
rules from being abandoned, who defended the Constitution, and cast light on the shadows in which 
the “skeletons” hide. These are the unsung heroes who speak truth to power and give voice to South 
Africa’s most vulnerable, in particular the following:  
 
 The Judiciary, who time and again has been forced to walk the line of the separation of 
powers without crossing it, to ensure that recourse is found to address the failures of the 
Executive and to ensure that those in power are at least held accountable in terms of their 
legal obligations, even though they seem impervious to political rebuke. The order it made 
was seminal – without it, 17 million South African citizens may not have received the grants 
on which they so desperately depend, through legitimate and legal means. 
 The various NGOs and civil society advocacy groups, such as the Black Sash Trust, the 
Centre for Applied Legal Studies, and Corruption Watch, which have initiated litigation on 
behalf of the most vulnerable and actively partnered and supported the government in the 
development of progressive social policy.  
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 The committed civil servants and whistle blowers, who refused to pander to political 
pressure, who dedicated themselves to serving the interest of the public good, and spoke out 
when they witnessed improper acts (or statements) by those in power.  
 The investigative reporting by brave men and women in the news media, such as GroundUp, 
Business Day, Daily Maverick, and amaBhungane, who asked the tough questions and 
exposed the lies.  
 
7.6 Summary 
 
In order to highlight the importance that the political power dynamics have in terms of how the state 
is governed, one needs to look no further than the trading of political favours (patronage) between 
Bathabile Dlamini and the Zuma-centred elites. Dlamini was a crucial political supporter of Zuma 
in the lead-up to the ANC Polokwane Conference, where in her position as Secretary-General she 
was able to mobilise significant support, resulting in Zuma being nominated for president by the 
ANCWL. For this support, Dlamini was rewarded with the position of Deputy Minister (and later 
Minister) of the DSD. Then, in 2015, her political status was elevated, allegedly through the support 
of the “Premier League”, to become president of the ANCWL.  
 
The political position of power she wields in the governing party has undoubtedly protected her 
from having to account for her potentially corrupt (alternatively, extreme incompetent) actions that 
led to the SASSA-Gate debacle. This is evident by the fact that, despite the scathing Constitutional 
Court judgement against Dlamini in mid-March 2017, Zuma did not remove her from the position 
of Minister of the DSD in the last cabinet reshuffle of his presidency in late March 2017. Instead, 
Zuma removed a comparatively competent and effective Minister of Finance (Pravin Gordhan), 
without any rational motivation given to the public. This act showed to the country that the 
decisions Zuma was making as president were not in the interest of the country and were motivated 
by selective interests.  
 
The political dynamics of the country, such as they are, mean that Dlamini is still seemingly 
protected by the political position/power she retains as president of the ANCWL. This is evident 
from the fact that President Ramaphosa (with a marginal national ANC conference victory), 
although he removed her from the position of Minister of the DSD, did not remove her from cabinet 
(transferring her to Minister of Women under the presidency). 
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On the face of it, the proposition of the actual intention behind the decision to not approach the 
Constitutional Court before entering into an agreement with CPS might seem admittedly highly 
speculative. However, without greater transparency and full ventilation of what actually took place 
over the weekend of 19 February 2017 (the alleged Kitchen Cabinet meeting that took place at 
Zuma’s residence), and without a logical explanation as to by whom or why the decision was taken, 
it cannot be discarded from the realm of possibilities. What this serves to illustrate, however, are the 
diverse roles that the power elite may play and the different tasks they undertake as part of the 
shadow state.    
 
By providing a brief summary of the findings of the Public Protector’s investigation into the use of 
state resources for party political benefits, this chapter also highlighted one of the other main ways 
in which the state is repurposed under the project of State Capture. This is to reinforce voter support 
by maintaining and reaffirming the association of delivery of public services with the governing 
political party.   
 
Lastly, this and previous chapters (and in effect this case study) served as an illustrative example, or 
rather motivation, for two of the main criticisms that were levied against the historical reductionist 
application of neopatrimonial theory. The first criticism is the lack of recognition paid to the 
contextual legal-rational bureaucratic systems that are actually in place within the given state that is 
being analysed. In the context of South Africa, it could be argued that the formal relationship 
between the accounting officer (the CEO) and the minister is not adequately defined under the 
SASSA Act. This flaw or gap in the legislation is in effect what allowed for the informal, personal 
(or political) relationships of the minister to drive the repurposing of the institution. The second 
issue is the failure to specifically recognise the other NGOs or private institutions of the state and 
the power they hold to counter the project of State Capture. The active involvement of the Judiciary 
(a pillar of the constitutional government), civil society (including the Black Sash Trust, Corruption 
Watch, Freedom Under Law, and others), independent media (investigative reporting), and 
competitive private sector market (evident by AllPay’s initial law suit against the DSD, SASSA, 
and CPS) collectively prevented the possible full-scale looting of the state from actually taking 
place.   
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 Chapter 8: What Futures May Unfold 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The underlying danger to us all is that when the institutions of government established 
under the Constitution are undermined, the fabric of our society comes under threat. A 
graphic illustration would be if social grants are not paid beyond 31 March 2017 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2017a: 11). 
 
Since the Constitutional Court ruling on 17 March 2017, much has occurred regarding the SASSA 
takeover of grant payments. Yet it seems little in practice has changed; at least up until the 
resignation of President Zuma on 14 February 2018 (Staff Writer, 2018). Ramaphosa, having 
become president of the ANC, following the party’s national conference in December 2017, was 
inaugurated as president of the country the following day. In the first cabinet reshuffle of his 
presidency on 26 February 2018, Ramaphosa relocated Dlamini to the Minister of Women in the 
Presidency and Susan Shabangu was made Minister of the DSD (Times Live, 2018). On 23 March 
2018, the invalid contract between SASSA and CPS was yet again extended for an additional six 
months, to ensure that CPS continues to provide cash payment services to beneficiaries during the 
transition to the new SASSA/SAPO payment system (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2018).  
 
This chapter seeks to contextualise the SASSA-Gate crisis within the broader context of the very 
real and difficult economic, social, and political challenges that South Africa faces going forward. It 
provides an analysis of subsequent events following from the March 2017 Constitutional Court 
judgement, particularly from the perspective of State Capture, and discusses the broader impact of 
the biometric technology in the State Capture project and in turn on South Africa’s social welfare 
system. 
  
8.2 SASSA-Gate 2.0: Motivation versus Intent 
 
On 10 April 2017, Minister Dlamini’s long-time special adviser, Sipho Shezi, was fired. This 
happened a day after The Sunday Times had reported on the SMS sent by Dlamini to Zane Dangor. 
In the SMS, Dlamini accused Dangor and Shezi of conspiring with Magwaza (SASSA CEO) and a 
former lover of attempting to extort money from businessman Lunga Ncwana (Thamm, 2017a). 
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Just prior to leaving SASSA on 17 July 2017, Magwaza terminated the contracts of the work 
streams after NT had declared their appointment as irregular. At the same time, Magwaza also 
received approval from NT, allowing for a deviation from the standard procurement process, which 
would allow for the provisioning of services between and within different government entities. 
Having received this approval, Magwaza signed a cooperation agreement between SASSA and 
SAPO (Dzonzi, 2017). 
 
On 19 July, Dlamini replaced Magwaza with “one of her close supporters and a fellow member of 
the ANC Women’s League”, Pearl Bhengu (Ensor, 2017). With all three opponents (Dangor, Shezi, 
and Magwaza) out of the way and an ally now appointed as acting CEO of SASSA, the doors were 
reopened for the minister to ensure that she got what she wanted (at least until parliament 
intervened).  
 
The March 2017 Constitutional Court judgment included the establishment of a Panel of Experts 
plus the Auditor-General to monitor and evaluate SASSA and the DSD’s progress in ensuring that 
SASSA takes over the payment of grants from CPS by 1 April 2018. This is when the extension of 
the invalid contract was set to come to an end. Towards the end of October, the panel presented a 
damning report to the Constitutional Court regarding the conduct of SASSA officials responsible 
for ensuring a grant payment system is in place by April 2018. The panel did not receive a copy of 
the SAPO RFP despite requesting it on numerous occasions from the department. They indicated 
that “the absence of a comprehensive implementation plan for SASSA’s stated objectives providing 
adequately for risk management, risk mitigation and proposed alternatives should the ‘course of 
action fail or an exit plan in respect of CPS’ presents a ‘serious risk’” (Thamm, 2017b).  
 
Alarmed by the report by the Panel of Experts and the fact that SASSA had missed four self-
imposed deadlines for signing a contract with SAPO, SCOPA and the Social Development Portfolio 
Committee called the DSD, SASSA, and SAPO to provide parliament with an update as to what had 
happened and what was intended for the way forward. As meeting after meeting unfolded, it 
became clear that the disconnect between SASSA and SAPO would require an intervention.  
 
What was revealed through these meetings was that, following Magwaza’s exit from SASSA, there 
appears to have been a marked turn for the worse in the relationship between the two SOEs. In 
summary, having received authorisation for the deviation from NT to bypass the normal 
competitive open-bid process, on 24 July SASSA issued an RFP for SAPO to submit a proposal, 
outlining which of the services SASSA required the Postbank could provide. In August, SASSA 
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indicated that a due diligence assessment, which was undertaken by the Centre for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (CSIR), was required in order to ensure the Postbank could provide the services 
it had set out in its proposal. The CSIR submitted its report to SASSA on 15 September 2017 and 
on 6 October SASSA sent the Postbank an award letter, which offered to contract it for only one of 
the four services that SASSA required, namely “an integrated payment system which can also 
handle beneficiaries’ biometric data” (Herman, 2017a). The remaining three services included the 
provision of “providing banking services (offering a prepaid debit card with a biometric data 
verification solution in line with the PASA), card production capacity for social grant beneficiaries, 
and the option of cash payments at paypoints” (Mahlaka, 2017). This offer was rejected by the 
Postbank on 20 October because it felt it had the capability to undertake the banking and card body 
production services (as these were actually its core competencies and that these services were 
inextricably connected). Furthermore, it argued that should SASSA only require the development of 
the integrated payment system, this could be better undertaken by a different state entity, such as the 
State Information Technology Agency (SITA).  
 
After the two state entities could not reach an agreement, the portfolio committees combined their 
efforts and called in NT to establish what had transpired. On 8 November, those representing the 
IMC on Comprehensive Social Security and Minister Jeff Radebe (who by then was the chair of the 
committee, even though it had been announced in March that President Zuma would undertake this 
role) reported back to parliament that it had set up a task team to intervene and that an agreement 
would be concluded by 17 November. It was in this meeting that copies of a letter from the DG of 
NT to the CEO of SASSA were distributed to the MPs. Although it is unclear who supplied this 
letter to the MPs, it nevertheless outlined serious flaws in SASSA’s handling of the matter. In the 
letter it was stated that “SASSA should not have approved the disqualification of SAPO on three 
areas but rather seek to engage and explore options on possible ways to close the capacity gap or 
seek the intervention of the Inter-ministerial Committee” (Herman, 2017b). The NT DG found that 
the BEC and BAC did not appear to have used the CSIR due diligence report in reaching its 
conclusions and recommendations, and that the RFP specifications were “biased”. This letter, 
together with the history behind the invalid contract between SASSA and CPS, caused many of the 
MPs to raise concerns that SASSA was deliberately attempting to delay implementing a takeover of 
payment services, potentially leading to yet another self-created crisis come April 2018. Once 
again, the debate had already begun as to whether the contract with CPS would either be extended 
further or would CPS have to be contracted possibly under a different name/“through the back 
door”.  
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This sentiment seems to be confirmed by the report by the Panel of Experts, which stated:  
 
The stewardship of the state’s duty in respect of social assistance needs to be addressed 
urgently by relevant role players and the measures taken by SASSA so far, together with 
proposed deadlines, are unlikely to enable a seamless transition to a new system for the 
payment of social assistance by 1 April (Thamm, 2017b).  
 
The DSD has published a copy of the CSIR report on its website, which provides great insight into 
the possible motives behind the recent course of events. Much focus has been placed on the CSIR’s 
assessment of SAPO’s ability and capacity to address SASSA’s requirements. The report also 
assessed these requirements themselves. The CSIR report indicates that the requirement for the 
payment system to be open- or closed-loop was unclear in the RFP document. This is a key point as 
it has direct implications for understanding which payment model SASSA is/was pursuing and in 
turn might provide insight into the potential underlying motivation. From SASSA’s response and 
from what was contained in the CSIR report, it can readily be assumed that the work streams model 
favoured a closed-loop system. From the statement made by Dlamini, in defence of her decision to 
only award the provisioning of the integrated payment system to SAPO, she inadvertently alerted us 
to this fact, when she explained: 
 
Inter-operability within the National Payment System (NPS), including the utilisation of the 
ATM and retail point of sale network requires for the card to be EMV compliant as 
determined by Visa and MasterCard. EMV is the standard as defined by the three 
international companies that provide for inter-operability, specifically for international 
transacting. In South Africa PASA has prescribed only the EMV standard coupled with a 
MasterCard/Visa card to operate within the NPS. Our research tells us that countries like 
Russia, China, and India utilise a white label EMV standard that allows for local inter-
operability without the exorbitant costs of international transacting (Dlamini, 2017b: 3).  
 
The term “white label EMV standard” implies that at the backend of whichever system is adopted 
for these smart cards is licensed proprietary technology, much like that which is owned by 
Net1/CPS.  
 
The initial argument for contracting with CPS was because of its biometric technology and smart 
card solution. However, in July 2016 PASA announced “a new specification for biometric 
authentication on payment cards across the country” (Staff Writer, 2016a), which would leave this 
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argument meaningless. In addition, the CSIR report indicated that SAPO (whose current banking 
services operates an open-architecture system connected to the NPS) proposed to utilise biometric 
match-on-card capability, enabling biometric verification, meaning that it would adopt a closed-
loop model up until such time as the new PASA regulations are in place. The fact that more than 
half of recipient transactions currently do not use the biometric verification is perhaps just a side 
note.  
 
With biometrics soon to be incorporated into the NPS and having proposed a closed-loop solution, 
the question as to why SAPO still was not awarded the card and banking services remains. A 
possible answer may also be revealed in the CSIR report, which raised questions around the 
requirement for the cards to be specifically a “prepaid debit card” and Special Disbursement 
Accounts (SDAs). The report highlighted the following in terms of these two aspects:  
 
The bidder is requested to provide SASSA with SDA accounts, but the type of these accounts 
is not clear and understood within the context of known forms of accounts in the South 
African banking system … The rationale behind the need to inspect beneficiary’s accounts is 
not clear, and could potentially force the bidder to be in violation of applicable laws in 
South Africa if not fully examined ... Whilst there might be a compelling business case, and 
tangible benefits that SASSA might derive, for collecting transactional information from 
beneficiaries’ accounts, issues of legality need to be properly addressed …  
 
SASSA also requested, in the RFP, that the beneficiaries be issued with a payment card, 
which is required to be a prepaid debit card ... It is difficult to reconcile the need for a 
prepaid card and SDAs. Technically, if SASSA opts for the prepaid card, it would not need 
SDA accounts as the prepaid card cannot be linked to an account … For large volumes of 
cards and transactions of the scales of SASSA (i.e. 10 million plus cards), a prepaid card 
present a systemic risk for the bidder, as it would mean that all 10 million cards would need 
to access the one account holding all the funds, potentially bringing the system down 
(Moabalobelo, Morienyane, Dube & Malumedzha, 2017: 6-7).  
 
SAPO proposed that each recipient would receive their own SDA debit bank account, much the 
same as is the case with the existing arrangement between CPS and SASSA-branded Grindrod Bank 
accounts that grant recipients currently hold. Perhaps one could assume that the SDA that SASSA is 
requesting is not an actual bank account, but rather a grant recipient registry “account”. This would 
explain the need for the card to be prepaid, where all grant funds would be held in a single holding 
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account and distributed to grant recipients based on their registry profile. However, as highlighted 
in the CSIR report, this would “present a systemic risk”, which is just one of the reasons NT was 
against the work stream model for the payment of grants. This type of payment system could only 
really be established as a closed-loop system, to which a significant number of banking regulations, 
such as Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) registration and privacy of account holders’ 
information, might not apply.  
 
Considering the challenges that have resulted from Net1/CPS’s alleged misuse of recipient data, it 
is terrifying to even contemplate what might unfold when there is even less regulatory restriction 
and legal recourse regarding how recipients’ personal data are managed. Having unrestricted access 
to the personal details of more than 17 million of the most vulnerable and economically destitute 
members within our society is a powerful tool to have, particularly come election time in 2019.  
 
Then there is the issue of “illegal” and immoral deductions from social grants. As was previously 
noted, in May 2017 the High Court ruled that the new Social Assistance regulations (restricting 
deductions from grants) could not be applied to CPS and Grindrod, as grant recipients enter into an 
agreement to open individual bank accounts, which are governed by standard commercial banking 
regulations (Maregele, 2017). Without individual bank accounts, deductions could be restricted to 
those that are in line with the new regulations. SASSA is already establishing a system by which 
authorised deductions take place before grants are transferred to recipients. This would explain why 
the DSD indicated in a statement that they “cannot afford another failed attempt by the banks to 
bank the unbanked! At least not with the social grant beneficiaries” (DSD, 2017d: 1). The irony of 
this statement, given its similarity to Net1’s motto, should not go unnoticed. The argument does 
appear to potentially have some merit. The CSIR report, however, highlighted that certain 
requirements in SASSA’s RFP would still imply that debit orders are permitted.  
 
The question that needs to be asked is whether or not removing the banking service offering from 
the grant payment model would actually address the underlying problems. I would argue not, as the 
demand for most of these financial services is now well established, the benefits which come with 
having access to banking services should not be discarded, and under the Social Assistance Act 
regulations, beneficiaries can by law choose to have their grants paid into a personal bank account. 
The problem of micro-lenders and loan sharks will not disappear because beneficiaries no longer 
have bank accounts and beneficiaries could in fact be left worse off, with less protection against 
predatory lenders. Ultimately, the regulations governing financial transactions fall under the ambit 
of the SARB and there are many possible ways in which the issues surrounding “illegal” and 
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immoral deductions, as well as other deplorable commercial and finance practices that target the 
poor, could potentially be addressed.  
 
There is one more possible motive for wanting to make the payment of grants take place via a 
closed-loop system that could be more controversial. This would be to control how and where grant 
recipients spend their grants.  
 
SASSA should produce its own specialised bank card which would include biometric 
verification for every transaction and be able to ‘enforce spending at specific merchants’; 
‘manage/restrict debit orders’ and ‘provide protected and unprotected spending’, such as 
barring spending on alcohol (Sole & McKune, 2017). 
 
As in the previous instance, the limitation on where/how recipients can spend their grants will not 
address challenges of alcohol abuse or other social issues. Perhaps more significant is that this 
motive amounts to an intentional act of social engineering, which may have problematic intended 
and unintended consequences. The ability to control and restrict where, how, and on what grant 
recipients choose to spend their grant money may be illegal and as yet there is no government 
policy on this matter. Social assistance is a constitutional right, and as such placing any restriction 
or conditionality on that right must be specified and defined in legislation before it can be enacted.  
 
8.3 The Long Game 
 
On 8 November 2017, the IMC on Comprehensive Social Security was called before parliament to 
help resolve the impasse between SASSA and SAPO. MPs criticised the IMC for not intervening 
sooner. No clarity was given as to why South Africa was facing yet another potential self-created 
crisis come April 2018. It came as a shock to MPs that Minister Jeff Radebe (Minister in the 
Presidency for Performance Monitoring and Evaluation) was now the chair of the IMC, instead of 
President Zuma, as had been announced earlier that year in March (Staff Writer, 2017a). In 
December 2017, the IMC announced that an agreement had been signed between SASSA and 
SAPO, in which SAPO would play a key role in implementing a “hybrid model” for taking over of 
grants come 1 April 2018. The agreement allocated SAPO the responsibility of carrying out all of 
the functions that it had proposed in its response to the RFP, but also catered for other banks to play 
a more prominent role in the distribution of grants and envisioned an increased role for “‘second 
economy’ merchants such as general dealers, corner shops, spaza shops, village banks, and 
cooperatives in township and rural areas outside of the 5-km radius” (SASSA, 2017b: 55). 
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The agreement has been lauded by many as a “breakthrough, which would finally see the back of 
CPS and the emergence of a new service provider” (Saba, 2018). This sentiment should be 
cautioned, however, given SASSA’s and the DSD’s less-than-flattering track record. The recent 
progress report filed by SASSA with the Constitutional Court raises several red flags and contains 
few details on exactly how the two agencies will be taking over the payment of grants. For instance, 
negotiations with the private banks, to provide accounts for grant recipients at reduced rates, have 
not yet been concluded. Biometric verification is still a mandatory requirement. SAPO is still in the 
process of developing the necessary technology (similar to that of CPS), with the associated card 
production capacity and does not yet have the backend system in place to manage grant payment 
integration. In addition, there is the issue of managing the physical cash payment distribution 
nationwide (SASSA, 2017b). Ultimately, the issue of physical cash payments would lead to yet 
another extension of the invalid contract between SASSA and CPS in March 2018 (Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, 2018). 
 
The IMC was established in 2006 and was tasked with developing and preparing a long-term policy 
for a comprehensive social security system for the country. Towards the end of 2016, the IMC was 
“re-activated” for the release of the CSSD, which had been prepared in 2012 (Dlamini, 2016a). 
Why the release of the document had been delayed for over four years is unknown. The CSSD is a 
policy document that puts forward a proposal for structural reform for South Africa’s broader social 
security system. Some of the proposed changes include consolidating the various social security 
programmes such as UIF, RAF, etc. under a single management structure called the NSSF. The 
policy also envisages the expansion of Social Assistance for Child Support and making Old Age 
grants applicable to everyone over a certain age. The most impactful recommendation is the 
introduction of a National Pension Fund, which would operate on a similar basis as the UIF (direct 
deductions from salaries would contribute to the fund) (IDTT, 2012).  
 
As previously indicated, the relevance of the proposed CSSD, which was prepared by the IDTT, is 
that it would undoubtedly add an increased level of complexity to the challenge of SASSA taking 
over the payment of grants in the near future. 
 
According to the plans put forward by the work streams, it would appear that there was some 
recognition of this long-term plan and they had proposed that their model would address some of 
the future requirements laid out in the CSSD, such as being able to interface with UIF and RAF, etc. 
(although not much detail is provided with regard to what this would actually entail). However, they 
seemed to selectively ignore the specific requirement of having to operate within the NPS. The 
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minister and the work streams were determined to implement a closed-loop system, even though 
this would go against government policy (IDTT, 2012).  
 
It is important to highlight that the work streams’ proposal extended far beyond just the payment of 
grants. It called for an entire overhaul and replacement of most (if not all) of SASSA’s 
administrative systems, including the legacy “SOCPEN” system, which is used to manage the social 
grant beneficiary register. The proposal indicates the development of an integrated web-based 
system that would cover the entire grant administration and payment system end-to-end, from grant 
applications, to card management, to call-centre interactions, etc. This is in fact a mammoth 
undertaking, which would take years to complete and cost billions. It is unclear if this was possibly 
the source of the R6.4 billion referred to by the minister and Ms Bhengu (SASSA acting CEO) or if 
that only relates to the payment system (Ndlendle, 2017). To be fair, as members of the MAC, they 
were tasked to investigate how SASSA would take over the payment of grants. This is assumed to 
have been the long-term planning of the Agency and it is unlikely that this extended past the 
conceptualisation of a possible model. It took the work streams just three months to flesh out the 
details and prepare their proposal.  
 
As previously highlighted, with the close-loop solution based on a “white label EMV standard” 
(Dlamini, 2017b) prepaid debit smart card technology, SASSA would have to license the backend 
proprietary/IP and technology indefinitely and even though there are several service providers that 
could provide this technology, this is definitely something that could be provided by Net1. The 
ongoing battle to set the rules of the game to suit Net1/CPS continues. In addition to the cards, 
SASSA would also be required to purchase/license thousands of compatible ATMs and PoS devices 
that would have to be distributed across the country. The motivation for this is that it “would grant 
SASSA the ‘power’ to dictate pricing as well as negotiate discounts from merchant chains and local 
stores” (Sole & McKune, 2017). The staffing complement that SASSA would require in order to 
negotiate and manage these contracts, as well as the training requirements or the technical support 
that would be required to operate a system like this, also remain unclear. A human resources work 
stream was not involved in the development of this proposal. As highlighted by the Panel of 
Experts: “The lack of cost justification by SASSA for implementing its insourcing proposal is a 
serious concern” (Thamm, 2017b).  
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8.4 The Ransom 
 
The last statement of the previous section above was made in the report by the Panel of Experts, 
which was appointed by the Constitutional Court to monitor SASSA’s progress of taking over the 
payment of grants from CPS come April 2018. What is the cost of these highly complex and 
frequently opaque manoeuvrings to favour a particular service provider with high-level political 
connections to the Zuma-centred power elite?  
 
It has been shown thus far that when Zuma’s administration took over in 2009, there was a distinct 
shift in favour of a privatised “ideal” solution delivered by Net1/CPS in the form of its proprietary 
biometric technology. It can be questioned as to whether or not this solution could actually result in 
a sufficient reduction in fraud to warrant the total cost of the solution, which is unknown as a full 
detailed audit of the profits and expenses of the five-year invalid contract is still to be released. A 
figure of R2 billion is touted by SASSA, the DSD, and the minister as the amount of money that has 
been “saved” or “returned to the state” as a result of some 150 000 grant recipients (which is less 
than 1% of the total number at the time) being removed from the registry in 2013 during the re-
registration campaign undertaken by CPS (at an additional fee of R316 million). However, without 
reconciled data on grants dispersed and grants not collected or an understanding of how many 
recipients might not have approached SASSA to re-register, it should not be definitively stated that 
this amount is factually correct.  
 
There was no way to assess the extent of fraud and corruption because the system was fragmented 
and not standardised. There can be no doubt that the re-registration process went a long way to 
reduce the systemic risk of beneficiary fraud. Still, there is no evidence to prove how effective the 
new CPS system would be.  
 
Comparing the reported cases of fraud, as reported in SASSA’s 2011/2012 and 2015/2016 annual 
reports, provides some insight into what the impact of the CPS payment model has been. In 2011 it 
was reported that there was an “investigation into 2,488 fraudulent grants and the prosecution of 
2,258 persons for grant fraud” (SASSA, 2012: 44). By comparison, in 2015 “a total of 1,122 fraud 
cases were received, 90 cases were finalised, 837 were closed, and 195 were still under 
investigation” (SASSA, 2016b: 55). This implies that the number of cases of reported fraud appears 
to have more than halved since CPS took over the payment of grants.  
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In 2011 it was reported that “[a] total of 5,487 persons signed acknowledgement of debts (AODs) 
valued at R56,8 million to repay the fraudulently paid grants” (SASSA, 2012: 44), and in 2015 it 
was indicated that the “monetary value of the finalised cases is R2 429 519” (SASSA, 2016b: 55). 
This indicates that there has been a major decrease in the amount of money that the state is able to 
recover from fraud. This, however, does not necessarily equate to the amount of money that might 
be lost due to fraud. It is also important to point out that the ratio of cases of fraud finalised and 
successfully prosecuted relative to investigations for the respective years appears to have greatly 
reduced.  
 
No details or amounts relating to cases of fraud (1 122) were provided in the 2016/2017 annual 
report (SASSA, 2017a). However, in a presentation made in June 2016 by Thokozani Magwaza 
(acting DG of the DSD at the time) on syndicate grant fraud, he indicated that there was “a broader 
ongoing criminal investigation involving more than 4 776 fraudulent social grants amounting to 
more than R34.7 million identified to date” (Hawks, SASSA & SAPS Crime Intelligence, 2016). 
Comparing these amounts with the 2011 and 2015 figures, it would appear that even though there 
has been a reduction in the number of cases of fraud, there is relatively little difference in the 
number of fraudulent social grants or the amounts lost due to fraud. That is to say, the way in which 
fraud is carried out seems to have changed, but the impact of fraud has not significantly decreased. 
It has gone from being cases of minor fraud by individual grant beneficiaries to syndicated large-
scale looting.  
  
In order to holistically assess the costs versus benefits of the CPS system, it is also important to 
consider the costs incurred by beneficiaries. In terms of costs for beneficiaries, there is the matter of 
the transaction fees that recipients pay when they use standard ATMs to withdraw their grants. As 
indicated in Text Box 5, some 4.9 million recipients receive their grants from ATMs (Minister of 
Finance, 2017) and more than 50% of all grant recipient transactions take place using non-CPS 
compatible (PIN-based) ATMs and PoS devices (SASSA, 2017c), all of which incur transaction 
fees. Unlike most other banks, CPS/Grindrod has a scaled transaction fee that ranges from R6.11 to 
R22 (withdrawal of R50 to R2 000). In the agreement between SASSA and SAPO before the 2012 
contract with CPS, the account with SAPO would include two free withdrawals a month. Now even 
though it may seem that this is splitting hairs and counting cents, it is important to remember that 
for South Africa’s poorest of the poor every cent counts, and given that there are some 10.5 million 
recipients, those cents add up to millions of rands.  
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The costs that can be attributed to the “illegal” and immoral deductions from grants recipients, 
which are most certainly fraudulent in nature, must also be taken into account. In a meeting at the 
Parliament of the Province of the Western Cape on 31 May 2016, Magwaza reported that at that 
stage “the total monetary loss due to the unlawful deductions was close to R800 million of which 
only R1.5 million has been recovered” (Standing Committee on Community Development, 2016: 
131). This is not a loss to the state or the taxpayer. This is money that has in effect been stolen from 
the country’s most vulnerable citizens – children, the elderly, and people with disabilities. 
 
The insistence of the appointment of CPS, based on the biometric verification requirement under 
the auspices of preventing fraud, has arguably not resulted in any major financial savings for the 
state and could potentially have come at a loss, given the associated irregular (and potentially 
illegal) expenditure. This has also in effect resulted in increased expenses for beneficiaries and 
opened the door for exploitation of the country’s most vulnerable by predatory lenders. 
Undoubtedly, this has reduced the overall potential positive socio-economic impact for which 
grants are intended. 
 
Besides the financial costs that result from the uncompetitive bidding processes or potential 
corruption, there is a greater economic cost that comes with the broader macro-economic 
implications of all that has transpired during the Zuma era. In this particular case it is important to 
consider the impact on and future outlook of the social grants system, where the number of people 
on social grants will undoubtedly continue to grow because of the persistence of high 
unemployment and low growth rates. Low growth also means lower annual increases in fiscal 
revenue. Simply stated, there will be more people dependent on social assistance with fewer 
resources to meet this obligation, and ultimately something will have to give. 
 
8.5 Is Technology a Solution or a Tool and for Whom? 
 
In order to fully appreciate the impact of the State Capture project, it is necessary to step back and 
examine what implications this project has had on the overall grant payment system. Drawing from 
the details presented in the text boxes and events that have transpired, the following is a summary of 
how the grant system itself has changed over time and the implication thereof. A tabulated 
breakdown of the changes to the grant payment system over time is provided in Appendix C.   
 
As previously noted, prior to the establishment of SASSA in 2006, the responsibility for the 
payments of social grants resided with each of the respective provinces. They in turn entered into 
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contract agreements with various service providers, which included CPS, AllPay, and Empilweni. 
The social grant system was fragmented, inconsistent, and inefficient. Most of the operations were 
undertaken manually and there were several loopholes that allowed for various types and scales of 
fraud to occur. When SASSA took over the contract from the provinces, it became clear that the 
systems needed to be consolidated, reconciled, and then standardised (Donovan, 2013). In 2007, 
SASSA released the first national tender for the provisioning of service provider(s) for the payment 
of grants, but in early 2009 (to much controversy, as previously discussed) it was announced that 
the tender had been cancelled (DSD, 2009c). At the time it was estimated that approximately 70% 
of beneficiaries received cash payments (Adjudication Committee, 2008). CPS had a higher 
percentage of cash payments compared to AllPay and Empilweni (Pulver & Ratichek, 2011). 
 
With the tender abandoned, from 2009 to 2011, SASSA continued to renegotiate (when there was a 
shift from payment per beneficiary to payment per recipient) and extended the contract agreements 
with each of the various service providers and other banks (which was the cause of one of the legal 
disputes between CPS and SASSA). However, SASSA also entered into a new agreement with 
SAPO in 2009, whereby a new grant beneficiary would be afforded the option to open a 
“subsidised” SAPO Mzansi bank account. The main objectives of the agreements were to promote 
the use of electronic payment methods by grant recipients (which is cheaper for SASSA) and to 
promote inter-governmental cooperation and efficiencies.  
 
Aggrieved by the SASSA/SAPO agreement, as well as the agreements that SASSA had with the 
banks to subsidise grant recipients’ banking fees, Net1/CPS instituted several legal cases against 
SASSA. In 2011, after having the High Court find in favour of CPS, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
ruled that the agreement between SAPO and SASSA was valid (Supreme Court of Appeal of South 
Africa, 2011). This outcome would, however, be of no consequence as in the month that followed 
SASSA would initiate a fresh tender process for identifying a service provider for the payment of 
grants.   
 
By 2011, when the bid document was issued, there were approximately 14.5 million beneficiaries, 
where approximately 58% of the total 9.2 million recipients were paid electronically into a bank 
account (including SAPO and AllPay accounts). At the time it was estimated that almost two-thirds 
of the cash payments were made by CPS (Pulver & Ratichek, 2011).  
 
As has been discussed at length, in 2012 CPS was awarded the (ultimately invalid) contract for the 
nationwide payment of social grants. A critical point to highlight, however, is that CPS was 
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awarded the tender because of its biometric technology, in particular because it was going to use 
voice verification for recipients who did not use biometric devices for receiving grants 
(Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2013). It would seem, however, that CPS misled SASSA 
when it indicated that it had voice biometric verification technology, as this was only implemented 
in 2014 (SASSA, 2014). More significant, however, is that the use of this voice verification 
technology was dropped within a matter of months after implementation (Staff Writer, 2014a).  
 
As part of the contract, CPS was allocated the responsibility for the re-registration and payment 
(including into other bank accounts) of all grant beneficiaries. This was one of the main overall 
objectives that were outlined in the RFP, which served as the basis for the contract between CPS 
and SASSA. The other objectives included, inter alia, the following:   
 
 The overall intent is to shift from the current largely [so-called] cash-based payment model 
to [a] more electronic-based payment model …  
 … should cater for financial inclusiveness by allowing Beneficiaries to interact through the 
regulated National Payments System. 
 The proposed solution should not burden Beneficiaries with transaction cost and should be 
able to accommodate a subsidisation for transaction costs, which costs should be included 
in the Bidder’s Firm price. 
 Bidders should note that SASSA’s strategic intent is to migrate Beneficiaries to electronic 
payment systems to allow for their integration into the mainstream economy of the country. 
Such migration shall achieve at least a maximum of 20% cash payment Beneficiaries after 
four years from commencement of the contract (Pulver & Ratichek, 2011: 22). 
 
A Finmark Trust (2012) sample survey indicated that approximately 30-37% of beneficiaries 
received grants via actual physical cash paypoints. Cash payments require a CPS card and, as such, 
all beneficiaries who opted for the cash payment method received SASSA bank accounts.  
 
As discussed in Section 6.2.2, Net1 and its subsidiaries have been accused of utilising grant 
beneficiary data obtained under the CPS contract to peddle their financial products to beneficiaries. 
In March 2015, when SASSA was in the process of issuing a new tender for the payment of grants, 
in line with the Constitutional Court judgements, the Black Sash Trust approached the court to 
ensure that the use of beneficiary data was restricted, in an effort to address the issue of the “illegal” 
and immoral deductions from grant recipients (Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2015). As 
previously discussed, this tender, it would appear, was designed to fail and ultimately was not 
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awarded. However, what should be noted is that CPS had decided not to bid for the tender. In its 
announcement, Net1 indicated that its business plan would henceforth focus on the “continued 
successful deployment of its EasyPay Everywhere bank account, its biometric ATMs and mobile 
portal, its suite of financial and added value service” (Staff Writer, 2015). In June 2015, Net1 
launched its new low-income EPE account.  
  
In an effort to stop deductions being made from grants, in May 2016 the DSD issued changes to 
Regulations 21 and 26A to the Social Assistance Act, No. 13 of 2004
 
(Matshediso, 2016). In 
response to the new regulations, Net1, Grindrod (the bank that is partnered with CPS and provides 
bank account services for grant recipients), and others approached the High Court to provide clarity 
on the regulations. The High Court ruled in favour of Net1, but this matter has since been taken to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
By the time the SASSA-Gate crisis reached its peak at the beginning of 2017, Net1 had managed to 
sign on approximately 1.95 million EPE bank accounts since its launch in June 2015 (Net1, 2017). 
It is unknown exactly how many of these bank accounts belong to social grant recipients; however, 
given the volumes of reporting on how grant recipients have been misled into opening these 
accounts, it is assumed that they account for the vast majority, if not all. To gauge if CPS had 
indeed met the requirements of the initial RFP, as indicated above, it is necessary to establish the 
breakdown of how grant recipients are paid.  
 
Unfortunately, a comprehensive dataset is yet to be released into the public domain; however, the 
following estimates were determined by correlating and aggregating information contained in the 
RFP response to questions released by SASSA in early 2017 (SASSA, 2017c) and the presentation 
made by the Minister of Finance to parliament in March 2017 (Minister of Finance, 2017). The 
following points are highlighted, and a breakdown of the different payment methods is provided in 
Figure 9: 
 
 At the time, an estimated 38% of grant payments were made in cash. 
 Of the remaining grant payments, it is estimated that 19% of the recipients had their grants 
transferred directly to EPE accounts. Only 15% received payments into individual bank 
accounts with other banks.  
 The remaining 28% of grant recipients received payments into SASSA/Grindrod accounts 
and used either ATMs or PoS to access their grants. Of these, only 3% utilised biometric 
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verification (Net1) ATMs or PoS devices. That means 25% of the recipients using the 
SASSA/Grindrod account were paying transaction fees for accessing their grants.  
 
 
Figure 9: Breakdown of grant payment type 2016/2017  
 
Based on this breakdown, it is clear that, firstly, the contract between SASSA and CPS did not 
result in a reduction in the percentage of cash grant payments. Secondly, less than half of the grant 
payments utilise the biometric verification system. Thirdly, an estimated 25% of grant recipients 
using the SASSA card are burdened with transaction fees; not to mention that the other 34% of the 
recipients who receive payment directly into their bank account would also be required to pay 
banking fees. Lastly, this highlights the monopoly market access that Net1 has attained through the 
invalid CPS contract. It would therefore seem that the objectives were definitely not realised.  
 
As outlined in Section 8.2, in December 2017 the IMC announced that an agreement had been 
signed between SASSA and SAPO. The agreement has been referred to as a “hybrid model”, where 
SAPO was allocated the responsibility of carrying out the functions it had proposed in its response 
to the RFP (card production, banking services, and the integrated payment system), but also catered 
for other banks to play a more prominent role in the distribution of grants (SASSA, 2017b). It is 
difficult to see any major differences between this model and the system that was in the process of 
being developed prior to the 2012 contract. This is with one exception, being that between 2009 and 
2011, there were multiple service providers and the grant system was not monopolised (or rather 
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controlled) by a single entity. As noted by the Panel of Experts, this still places the entire grant 
payment system at risk (Auditor-General, 2017).  
 
The issue that remains, however, is to determine what role the actual technology of CPS and Net1 
played in the SASSA-Gate debacle. The motivation put forward by the minister and SASSA for 
pursuing the use of biometric verification was primarily to prevent beneficiaries from defrauding 
the grant payment system. As discussed in the previous section, it cannot be ascertained if this 
objective was actually realised, particularly considering the number of grant recipients who do not 
utilise biometric verification. Interestingly, however, is that it seems that the adoption of the 
biometric verification has indeed improved the grant payment system – just not in the way it was 
lobbied for. The Panel of Experts reported that SAPO should speed up its adoption of the biometric 
verification technology, as there were numerous instances where old age pensioners and others 
experienced difficulty in reverting to a PIN-based form of verification (Auditor-General, 2018).  
 
In light of the above, I would argue that the technology itself (the use of biometrics for payment 
verification) played little (if any) part in the SASSA-Gate crisis. Rather, the issues surrounding the 
technology are with regard to the manner in which it was represented and how it was utilised as a 
technical lever to manipulate both the procurement and grant payment systems. That is to say, 
technology on its own is amoral and has no value outside of its application. However, the 
technology can be utilised as a tool for deception and manipulation.  
 
8.6 Summary 
 
In terms of the “Long Game”, this case illustrates how even the minor manipulation of policy and 
tender procurement can have long-term implications and in effect change the rules of the game. In 
this case, the change of just one word for the biometric specifications has had a major impact. Not 
only did it allow CPS to monopolise the market of selling financial services to grant recipients 
(which was the intention all along), but it also resulted in the regulations being changed (restrictions 
on deductions from social grants); it has possibly expedited the inclusion of biometric technology 
into the NPS (indicated by PASA’s announcement in 2016); and it has established several 
precedents and norms for beneficiaries (by providing access to financial services that were not 
available before, as well as by establishing a demand for biometric payment verification). All these 
implications can be viewed as disruptions of the socio-technical transitions within the financial 
sector and social protection landscapes. Only time will tell the full measure of the long-term impact 
that the insistence on biometric technology will have. There are still debates and uncertainty around 
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the grant payment system, as well as issues regarding the immoral deductions, the misuse of 
beneficiary data, and the various payment models (closed-loop versus open-architecture models). 
Further assessment is required in order to address these complex technical issues that have been 
highlighted throughout the case study.   
 
This chapter did, however, show the more immediate impacts that have resulted from the adoption 
of the biometric technology, or specifically the impact of “how” (through State Capture and the 
manipulation of the tender processes) and “why” (the intention as opposed to motivations given) the 
technology was adopted. The argument put forward for the adoption of biometrics was specifically 
for the reduction of beneficiary fraud; however, the case study shows that there is no way to prove 
that this is true or that the amount/value of fraud “eradicated” is worth all of the costs/problems that 
the CPS contract has caused.  
 
It is not possible to provide a comprehensive, all-encompassing estimation of the costs that can be 
attributed to the State Capture of SASSA. There are, in fact, several costs that must be considered 
and some are not quantifiable; however, the following have been identified:  
 
 Cost of the 2012 irregular contract (estimated R10 billion over five years, as well as the cost 
incurred by the state as a result of the contract extensions). Added to this should be the legal 
costs related to the litigation of the contract.   
 Opportunity cost to the state, in that seven years after the SASSA/CPS contract was signed, 
we are back at a point where SASSA is contracting with SAPO for the payment of grants. 
The weakening of SASSA as an institution should also be taken into account. This is not 
something that can be readily quantified; however, with the recent appointment of SAPO, it 
is evident that the appointment of CPS was arguably an unnecessary delay in the payment of 
grants being undertaken by the government itself.    
 There is the highly questionable escalation of irregular expenditure at the DSD from only 
R8.8 million in 2007 to R1.4 billion in 2017. Included in this amount are the irregular 
payments of R316 million to CPS (for the re-registration of beneficiaries) and R43 million 
paid to the work streams.  
 Of course there is the slow repressiveness of the value of grants themselves (where annual 
grants are increased at CPI, which is lower than real food inflation), the 1% increase of 
VAT, numerous fuel increases, etc. Even though this cannot be attributed directly to the 
State Capture of SASSA, this is the result of the fiscal and economic impacts/decisions of 
the Zuma administration. 
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 The most important is the costs to beneficiaries. There are no definitive figures for this as 
yet, but it is known that beneficiaries incurred potentially unnecessary costs relating to 
transactions fees by CPS/Grindrod. Then there are the monies lost that correspond with the 
“illegal”/immoral deductions from grants (in May 2016, Magwaza reported that at that stage 
“the total monetary loss due to the unlawful deductions was close to R800 million”).  
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 Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This last and final chapter seeks to provide closure to this master’s thesis. It is, however, important 
to recall the premise upon which this case study was undertaken. Specifically, that the primary goal 
of this case study was to develop a greater understanding of the phenomenon that is State Capture 
and to gain “some insight into what is going on and why this is happening” (Maxwell, 2013: 220). 
As highlighted by Flyvbjerg (2006: 238), 
 
[t]he goal is not to make the case study be all things to all people. The goal is to allow the 
study to be different things to different people … Case stories written like this [in dense 
narrative format] can neither be briefly recounted nor summarized in a few main results. 
The case story is itself the result. 
 
What this thesis presented was an in-depth qualitative case study of State Capture, where a granular 
research method was adopted in order to investigate and to deconstruct the dense narrative of the 
event, people, decisions, systems, and institutions that were collectively entangled in the SASSA-
Gate debacle. The term “State Capture” was used to encapsulate the distinct context-specific 
contemporary phenomenon that occurred under the Zuma administration in South Africa, where:  
 
State Capture is the formation of a shadow state, directed by a group of power 
elite, which operates within and parallel to the constitutional state (in both formal 
and informal ways) and whose objective is to repurpose state governance in order 
to derive benefits that align with the power elite’s narrow financial or political 
interests – which are often in conflict with public norms and not aligned with the 
principles of the Constitution. 
 
With the above duly noted, the paragraphs that follow summarise some of the main insights that I 
attained through and from this master’s research journey, with only some of the significant aspects 
of the case study being outlined.  
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9.2 Summary of SASSA State Capture Case Study 
 
One of the primary goals of this case study was to unpack a detailed account of the SASSA-Gate 
crisis and to establish if there are any insights that pertain to the phenomenon of State Capture. This 
case study highlighted the nature and dynamics of the Zuma-centred political project. It highlighted 
that State Capture is not just about corruption and is not limited to only one network (Zuma-
Guptas). It is a slow and systemic erosion of the social compact between the citizens of the country 
and those who were selected to lead by those same citizens, guided by the Constitution. It has 
demonstrated in detail several aspects of the modus operandi of the State Capture project, in which 
both formal and informal means are simultaneously utilised to promote and achieve the financial 
and political objectives of the power elite. This modus operandi includes the removal of well-
intentioned and effective government bureaucrats (who are not willing to fall in line), the 
manipulation of procurement processes to favour a single company (by changing just one word), 
and the commercial arrangements of the shadow network (supported or connected to the political 
elite) with said company to profit from the endeavour. This clearly shows that governance and 
accountability mechanisms were inadequate. The powers of the minister to intervene are highly 
problematic. The crisis might have been avoided if SASSA had an independent board of directors. 
However, as demonstrated in other SOEs, this does not automatically resolve issues of governance 
or guarantee that those in power do not plunder state resources. What is perhaps the most important 
intervention would be to clarify the roles of the minister / deputy minister and senior officials. 
When the DSD, SASSA, and CPS put a gun to the heads of millions of South Africans by 
threatening to stop grant payments without an alternative, the stark erosion of state capacity was 
revealed. 
 
This case study firmly revealed that the challenges are systemic, stretching across and within all 
spheres of government and society. In the case of SASSA and the biometric system that Dlamini 
fixated on, there is truth that the solution provided by CPS reduced the opportunity for beneficiary 
fraud and exploitation. However, there exists another truth that this has resulted in a situation where 
a private sector company has monopolised a state function and diminished the accountability of the 
government to society. Dlamini’s CPS solution effectively took the social contract, which resided 
between the state and its citizens, and handed it to a for-profit organisation, which, if left to its own 
prerogative, is accountable to no one. The case study outlined how a state institution can be 
repurposed not only for potential financial gain, but also for political expedience and the 
manipulation of voters. It also illustrated how, when relinquished to private interests, a fundamental 
state function itself can be repurposed for commercial exploitation. This is the case where 
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Net1/CPS utilised its role in the distribution of grants, having access to the personal data of a 
market of 17 million poor people, to establish millions of clients for their financial products.  
 
As was detailed in this thesis, corrupt activities may or may not have been involved in SASSA-
Gate. At the end of 2015 it was announced that the Hawks had investigated allegations of 
corruption levelled against Net1/CPS and brought their findings before two separate prosecutors, 
who decided not to prosecute. There are no details surrounding the cases or the reasons for deciding 
not to prosecute, but given the wealth of information that has emerged since then (in terms of both 
the SASSA case and the seemingly compromised actions of the Hawks and National Prosecuting 
Authority [NPA] under the Zuma administration), I would argue that there is potentially a case that 
could be pursued. There are several court cases currently underway, which will undoubtedly shed 
more light on the SASSA-Gate debacle and hopefully provide us with a better understanding of 
how to rectify the shortcomings of the social welfare system. Most important of these is the case 
brought against CPS and SASSA by Corruption Watch with regard to the irregular R316 million 
payment for the “re-registration” of grant beneficiaries and the case of SASSA (and others) against 
CPS regarding the “illegal” deductions from grants, both of which are set to be heard by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
The awarding of the 2012 contract was in effect deemed illegal and to date no individual has been 
held accountable for this illegality. If there was no case of criminal corruption, it would seem that 
this illegal act resulted from pure incompetence and it is the same incompetence that could therefore 
also be blamed for the events that unfolded in the crisis of March 2017 and appear to have 
continued unabated. By establishing a parallel reporting structure that excluded SASSA, the 
minister should arguably be held liable for the resulting mess. This was the purpose of the Inquiry 
that was instituted by the Constitutional Court, the outcome of which is still to be determined. There 
are, however, still many questions surrounding SASSA-Gate, the people involved, and the events, 
which the Inquiry was not tasked to answer. For example, little is known about the decisions taken 
while Ms Peterson was the CEO of SASSA (from 2011 to 2016), the role that Michael Hulley 
played in the crisis, exactly how much Net1/CPS has benefited from the unlawful contract, or the 
extent to which (if any) the BEE objective of government policy was achieved.  
 
With the end of the Zuma era and the surrounding scandals seemingly fading fast from memory, 
perhaps the most important objective of this case study was to serve as a cautionary tale, which we 
need to heed and carry through if we are to truly enter a “new dawn” for South Africa. It showed 
that when it comes to implementing political ideals of policy into practice, the means by which this 
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is done (the what, who, and how of implementation) are just as important as the motivation behind 
the said ideals (the why). When state capacity is weak, those in power are able to manipulate the 
means of implementation for their own self-interest, often leading to possibly unintended yet 
disastrous outcomes. By not holding those involved to account and not addressing the incapacity of 
state institutions, the tendency to perpetuate the bending and breaking of rules will continue. The 
result will be the erasure and replacement of the social compact embodied in the Constitution. A 
silent coup is about the seizure of power by a power elite beholden only unto themselves. The story 
of SASSA and the social grants system during Minister Dlamini’s term, narrated in this report, 
revealed the consequences of this betrayal of the promise of 1994. 
 
9.3 Overall Findings of the Research 
 
9.3.1 Understanding State Capture: Matching theory and reality  
 
The first research question sought to establish the difference or relationship between state capture 
and neopatrimonialism and how either of these concepts might be applicable to the SASSA-Gate 
debacle. As this research in part emerged from the work undertaken in the Betrayal of the Promise 
report, it was already known that the strict definition of state capture, as a form of “grand 
corruption”, provided by Hellman et al. (2000), was insufficient to adequately encapsulate the 
phenomenon that is State Capture under the Zuma administration.  
 
Neopatrimonialism provides an alternative theory for State Capture, which incorporates not only the 
activities of corruption, but also focuses on the manner and motivations of this corruption. The 
theory of neopatrimonialism, however, has, through its various applications and interpretations over 
time, become somewhat of a “catch-all” concept (synonymous with poor governance, corruption, 
and failure in economic development) that still presents a “major methodological challenge for 
empirical research” (Erdmann & Engel, 2007: 103-104). Through the continuous review of the 
literature and while undertaking the iterative process of matching theory to the case study, several 
issues regarding neopatrimonial theory emerged; however, they were in turn addressed by the 
critical review of the literature. The issues identified regarding the application of neopatrimonialism 
theory entail the conflation of ideal types of dominance with different types of regimes, the failure 
to adequately explore and recognise the formal-rational component of neopatrimonial dominance, 
and the reductionist (Afro-pessimist) tendency to associate neopatrimonialism with abuse or misuse 
of power (which is countered by recognising regulated as opposed to predatory forms of 
neopatrimonialism). I argue that, provided these issues are acknowledged and accounted for, where 
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the underlying presumptions with regard to the analysis are clearly stated, the application of the 
concept is still relevant and valid.  
 
State Capture is a context-specific type of systemic neopatrimonialism, where public norms are 
founded on a liberal democratic legal-rational form of dominance; however, the practices of those 
in power are predatory in nature and resemble a patrimonial form of dominance in that they are 
informal and personal. State capture (in terms of the strict theoretic definition and a form of grand 
corruption) is just one of the more visible phenomena that have occurred under South Africa’s State 
Capture. State Capture, conceived of as systemic neopatrimonialism, also includes, but is not 
limited to, the use and manipulation of the media (capture of the independence of the media), 
securing control over law enforcement agencies (which enables but is not corruption), and using 
state resources to secure patronage and political leverage (also not explicitly corruption). 
 
The conceptual framework and definition of State Capture were derived and developed from 
literature on both neopatrimonialism and state capture, together with reflections on the case study 
research itself. As such, the case study served to illustrate the conceptual framework, as discussed in 
the section above.  
 
The summaries provided at the end of each chapter outlined the key aspects that this case study 
illustrated with regard to State Capture, as does the overall summary above. The paragraphs that 
follow outline the four general conclusions that can be drawn from this case study, particularly with 
regard to the broader State Capture project and the theories of corruption and neopatrimonialism.  
 
First, the case study showed the existence of the shadow state and, more importantly, it showed how 
the shadow state operates both within and outside of government institutions, both through formal 
and informal ways. This was in essence the main objective of the case study – to unpack the modus 
operandi of State Capture as systemic neopatrimonialism, which entails the following:  
 
 Securing control over the public service, in particular through the appointment of cabinet 
ministers. Edna Molewa in 2009 (then removed – possibly because of Molewa’s refusal to 
award CPS the 2008 tender) and then Bathabile Dlamini in 2010 as minister of the DSD.  
 Intentionally weakening key technical institutions and formal executive processes. In this 
case it was by removing key top officials and replacing them with people who would not be 
obstructionist, and having officials only in acting positions (limiting their ability to take 
long-term strategic decisions). The evident involvement of persons who appear to be part of 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 181 | P a g e  
the shadow state (such as Michael Hulley) in manipulating procurement processes. The 
appointment of the work streams (and instruction not to interfere) also limited the ability of 
SASSA officials to carry out their mandate.   
 Securing access to opportunities for repurposing the state by manipulating or changing the 
directives or objectives of government; in particular the manipulation of tender processes 
that resulted in the contract between SASSA and CPS for the nationwide payment of social 
grants. This was achieved by changing just one word in the tender specifications, where 
“preferred” changing to “must” changed the rules of the game.  
 Creating parallel political, governmental, and decision-making structures that undermine the 
functional operation of government institutions. In this case, it was the establishment of a 
parallel governance structure where the recommendations of an external advisory team (the 
work streams that reported directly to the minister) were elevated above those of SASSA 
officials. The meetings with Michael Hulley (advisor and lawyer to Zuma) also played a key 
role in this aspect.   
 
Second, is that this case highlighted power dynamics that underpin and enable the capture of 
government institutions. In particular, the clientelistic relationships entailed in consolidating and 
maintaining political support, as well as the organisational network of personnel relationships that 
drove State Capture, were as follows:  
 
 Dlamini was a crucial political supporter of Zuma in the lead-up to the ANC Polokwane 
Conference, where in her position as Secretary-General she was able to mobilise significant 
support, resulting in Zuma being nominated for president by the ANCWL. For this support, 
Dlamini was rewarded with the position of Deputy Minister (and later Minister) of the DSD.   
 Dlamini could be considered as “elite” due to her position as Minister of the DSD and as 
president of the ANCWL. Michael Hulley (Zuma’s former lawyer), who played an active 
role in providing “legal opinions” both in the awarding of the 2012 CPS contract and the 
2017 SASSA-Gate crisis, could then be considered a “fixer”, and Lunga Ncwana could be 
the “broker/middleman”, due to his personal and business relationship links to Dlamini and 
Hulley (in government), and with multiple individuals who were involved with the BEE 
partnerships/deals with Net1.  
 
The third key aspect of state capture that this case showed is that repurposing of the state involves 
more than just corruption and rent-seeking, and that there can be personal and political motivations, 
in particular to address the aspect of mass clientelism required for both regulated and predatory 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 182 | P a g e  
forms of systemic neopatrimonialism. In this case, it was illustrated in the Public Protector’s report 
– State and Party, Blurred Lines – where the ANCYL distributed food parcels that were arranged 
by SASSA. There are many other examples of how SASSA resources (events, grant relief, etc.) 
have been used to garner favour and political support for the governing party. 
 
Lastly, the critical aspect of State Capture that this case study highlighted is that, under a shadow 
state, there is often a conflict/contradiction between motivations that are put forward to the public 
and the actual intentions of the shadow state. This could be seen throughout the case study; 
however, perhaps the two most pertinent examples are the following: 
 
 The contradiction with regard to the preferences that appear to have been given to Net1 and 
CPS, given the political rhetoric surrounding the calls for RET and calls for an end to WMC 
dominance in the economy. Net1 is a US-based company and the Constitutional Court was 
at pains to express its disappointment in the company’s B-BBEE partnership arrangements. 
 The original motivation (to reduce beneficiary fraud) for changing the technical 
specifications of the RFP, by changing just one word from “preferred” to “must”, which 
resulted in CPS being awarded the 2012 grant payment contract.  
 
9.3.2 Development Studies: Be Aware of Informality in Disruptive Transitions!  
 
The third research question and second aim of this research emerged from the case study itself, 
namely to determine what role disruptive technology (biometric verification) played in the SASSA-
Gate crisis and what can be learned from this case study in terms of the unfolding 4IR.  
 
As discussed in the literature review, the notion of the 4IR is yet to be fully realised. Developing 
theory with regard to the 4IR falls outside the scope of this research; however, the use of biometric 
technology to manipulate the tender processes and then the grant payment system itself serves as a 
cautionary notice as to the potential negative consequences of the unfolding 4IR. As highlighted in 
the case study, the technology is not the actual issue, but rather the manner in which it was deployed 
in conjunction with the State Capture project, which resulted in negative impacts felt by 
beneficiaries, the institutional capacity of SASSA, and the social security system.  
 
The case study showed that government can be a driver of technology adoption; the question of 
course is, to what end? The biometric adoption in grant payments has advanced the adoption of the 
technology in the financial sector. It has also improved the grant payment system (by making it 
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easier for pensioners who are unable to use PIN verification to access their grants), although not in 
the way it was promoted it would. Solomon (2018) put forward the following four main questions 
that should be asked with regard to adopting a new technology, all of which were applicable in the 
case of SASSA adopting the biometric verification; however, none were adequately addressed: 
 
 Should the technology be developed in the first place? 
 If a technology is going to proceed, to what ends should it be deployed? 
 If the technology is to go forward, how should it proceed? 
 Once norms have been set, how will the field be monitored to ensure adherence?  
 
The key challenges that the 4IR presents do not lie in the development of the technologies 
themselves, but in how our socio-technical, political, economic, and governance systems are able to 
adapt and respond to the exponential rate of change. As highlighted in Section 8.5, technology on 
its own is amoral and has no value outside of its application. As noted by Kim (2017: 8), 
 
unlike many existing technologies developed with clear performance goals in mind, most 
technologies underpinning or driving the Fourth Industrial Revolution are being developed 
without clear end-results in view. This implies that the specific paths of technological 
development for the Fourth Industrial Revolution are much more likely to depend on how 
various actors of the innovation eco-system, especially those three main tripartite actors 
(university-industry-government), perceive the utility and risk of emerging technologies and 
structure the discussions of alternative futures of those technologies.  
 
9.4 Reflections on the Study 
 
9.4.1 Challenges of State Capture research 
 
This section discusses two of the main challenges that I faced while undertaking this case study 
research. There were of course several others, including time constants, financial constraints, etc.; 
however, the following were the two most significant.  
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9.4.1.1 Bounded in time and scope 
 
The scope of the research was not just limited in terms of its cut-off date (the resignation of former 
president Zuma), but it was also necessary to limit the extent to which the investigation would 
examine the historic activities in South Africa’s evolving social security system. Although it is 
mentioned in the Betrayal of the Promise report, the details of events and the past dealings between 
CPS and other government departments were not fully drawn out. The reason for this is that the 
state capture, as described in the Betrayal of the Promise report, was the political project of the 
Zuma-centred elite and as such it required focusing specifically on the events that took place under 
his administration. The overlap and similarities between the activities that took place before Zuma 
should, however, not go unrecognised.  
 
This overlap in nefarious activities is directly linked to an additional challenge that emerged when 
attempting to uncover the full story of the state capture project, namely the attempt to differentiate 
the “capturing” and exploitation of state institutions and resources for the benefit of the political 
party (which has arguably been the case long before Zuma’s presidency), as opposed to the specific 
actions taken by the Zuma faction within the party, which looted the state for their own benefit. 
This is briefly touched on in the case study, in the section that outlined the Public Protector’s report, 
titled State and Party, Blurred Lines (Public Protector, 2016b).  
 
There are a number of allegations and examples in the public domain of where state resources have 
been misused and misappropriated for party political reasons and arguably this type of practice 
should not be relegated to the ANC alone. These practices, although definitely neopatrimonial in 
nature, do not necessarily constitute State Capture as defined in the Betrayal of the Promise report. 
The links and lines between neopatrimonialism and state capture are blurred and should 
undoubtedly be subjected to further academic enquiry, and it is to this end that I hope this case 
study may be of assistance. 
 
9.4.1.2 Issues of unknowns and bias 
 
As is the case in most instances where criminality is suspected, one of the greatest challenges faced 
when exploring a sequence of unfolding events is the ability to discern criminal intent. Similarly, 
where there are so many unknown factors that can be attributed to any number of decisions that 
were taken, allegations could unintentionally be made against individuals. In short, without full 
ventilation of events and intent regarding those involved in the SASSA-Gate crisis, it would be 
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incorrect to attempt to pass opinion off as fact. It is primarily for this reason that the case study 
attempted to minimise assertions and refrain from criticising any one individual’s motivations, 
capabilities, or character. At the same time it must be accepted that, when examining informal 
networks and the shadow state, these are sometimes unavoidable.  
 
While undertaking the research, there were several instances in the feedback from reviewers where 
sharp criticism and conflicting views were expressed with regard to certain role players. For 
example, in the case of the former CEO of SASSA, Virginia Peterson, there is the instruction she 
gave in Bidders Notice 2 (which was unquestionably the reason for CPS ultimately being awarded 
the tender); however, she would later threaten to cancel the contract with that company over the 
improper use of grant beneficiary data (although she never followed through on this threat). This 
presents contradictory approaches to her dealings with CPS and as such it would not be justified to 
paint her with the broad brush of being complicit to corruption or demonstrating intentional 
malfeasance. As was shown in many other cases of State Capture, those involved in the events that 
unfold are not necessarily part of the shadow state. The use of coercion and the pressure placed on 
individuals are external factors that can only be recognised once they are ventilated in the public 
domain. Similarly, it is just as easy to paint all those who had attempted to thwart CPS’s capture of 
the grant system as “heroes”; however, as was documented in this case study, several of them also 
had equally potent allegations levelled against them that still have not been adequately addressed. 
For example, there were allegations that resulted in the suspension and resignation of Mr Fezile 
Makiwane and there is Dlamini’s own claim that “[Zane Dangor] and Sipho [Shezi] have been used 
by [SASSA CEO Thokozani] Magwaza who is a friend to my former boyfriend who wanted to 
extort money from Lunga and could not”. This messy reality of people, being complex and 
multifaceted, was aptly demonstrated during the parliamentary inquiry of state capture at Eskom 
and it is my hope that this case study might inform similar, further parliamentary undertaking (if it 
is not included in the judicial inquiry underway) in respects to the SASSA-Gate debacle.  
 
This leads to a second area of difficulty with regard to State Capture research, namely the 
temptation to comment on or criticise the technical capabilities of individuals or the value they 
contribute (i.e. quality of work). This is particularly the case when it comes to the work streams and 
the reports/proposals they produced. It could easily be implied that their technical proposal was 
“poor”; however, without a full understanding of their mandate and the work environment 
(particularly within the parallel reporting structures), this would be little more than conjecture. Poor 
instruction habitually guarantees a poor outcome and this often has little to do with actual 
capability. For instance, a reviewer of the report noted that the work stream proposals did not 
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present any solutions for SASSA taking over the grants by April 2017. However, it would seem that 
they were not required to devise a short-term solution for removing CPS from the grant payment 
system in the first place. 
 
9.4.2 The value of granular case study research 
 
The approach and methodology adopted for this case study were outlined and explained in 
Chapters 1 and 3. As previously noted, the research presented in this thesis is the outcome of an 
extensive exploration of the events, people, decisions, systems, and institutions that are collectively 
entangled in the SASSA-Gate crisis. This is an in-depth qualitative case study of State Capture, 
where a granular research method was adopted in order to investigate and construct a dense 
narrative.   
 
The main features of the way this research was undertaken were that I did not confine myself to 
focusing on only one aspect of the case (I examined all relevant people, events, systems, and 
institutions), discipline, perspective, or theory, and kept the research questions open so as to allow 
for multiple levels of analysis to take place. It is important to recognise and appreciate some of the 
criticism that these types of case studies can receive, and to reflect on the benefits and limitations 
that this type of approach to qualitative research presents. Admittedly, this approach is not in line 
with standard approaches to case study research, which seek to produce generalised theory or 
provide outcomes that can be easily summarised and that are replicable (Flyvbjerg, 2011). The 
value of this type of research, however, resides in the fact that it is very good for unpacking 
complexity, particularly when multiple disciplines, theories, and perspectives are required to truly 
understand a phenomenon. Complex transitions present a unique challenge for standard approaches 
to case study research in that they do not have predictive outcomes. However, as this is primarily a 
descriptive and exploratory case study, the issue of establishing any form of predictive outcome is 
not applicable.   
 
Granular research was useful for theory testing (for identifying gaps and flaws in theory), 
particularly in relation to neopatrimonialism and state capture. One of the advantages that emanate 
from presenting dense narratives is that they are often embedded in and are reflexive of the 
complexity and contradictions of the real world. The second advantage of applying this research 
method was that, because the research was not confined to a single discipline or level of analysis, it 
was possible to identify synergies between and within various theories.   
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One of the major challenges of this type of research is that it is highly time consuming. Not being 
easy to summarise and being left open-ended, it is possible that the content of case itself might fall 
victim to misinterpretation and misrepresentation.  
 
9.5 Implications and Scope for Future Research 
 
The project of State Capture is messy, complex, and multifaceted. One of the main benefits of 
selecting SASSA as a case study was that it provides a rare and detailed example of which a lot of 
this mess can be laid out and explored. It should, however, be recognised that this case study is by 
no means a comprehensive or complete telling of the SASSA-Gate story. There are still many 
details that are unknown and, as indicated above, there are many people whose involvement 
remains unclear.   
 
There are also numerous lenses through which this case study can be viewed and explored, all of 
which could be beneficial in expanding our understanding of state capture and finding ways in 
which to address the damage that State Capture has caused the country. For instance, from a 
governance perspective, the setting up of a governing board for SASSA may be proposed (as had 
been proposed in the years of Minister Zola Skweyiya), or, from a regulatory perspective, financial 
regulations could be improved to address the issues surrounding deductions for low-income 
financial services. For each of these lenses, further investigation and enquiry are necessary, but it is 
my hope that this report can serve as a foundation from which said explorations can emerge. 
 
The limitations on the scope and timeframe of the case study present two other areas, or rather 
trajectories, for further research. The first is in relation to other sub-phenomena that fall within State 
Capture. As highlighted in Section 3.5, the case study was limited in terms of the extent that some 
of the indirect role players and institutions could be explored and/or assessed. For instance, as 
indicated in the bounded scope of the case study, even though the power dynamics and political 
aspects are included as part of the research, this does not extend beyond those who are directly 
involved in the SASSA-Gate debacle. As noted, extensive analysis of parliament and the governing 
political party, I argue, should be treated as standalone cases and separate sub-phenomena of State 
Capture.  
 
As was highlighted in the critical review on neopatrimonial theory, it is also important to recognise 
those institutions of the state that fall outside of the government, as well as those institutions in 
government that might not have been repurposed for the objective of looting state resources but that 
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serve other functions for the State Capture project. As noted, state capture (in terms of the strict 
theoretical definition and a form of grand corruption) is just one of the more visible phenomena that 
have occurred under South Africa’s State Capture. It is important to note, however, that there are 
several other phenomena that can be attributed to State Capture, including, but not limited to, the 
use and manipulation of the media (capture of the independence of the media), securing control 
over law enforcement agencies (which enables but is not corruption), and using state resources to 
secure patronage (also not explicit corruption). 
 
It is important to recall that the purpose of this case study was not to examine the history of 
neopatrimonialism in South Africa or to explore in detail why State Capture was able to occur, but 
rather the aim was to describe and define what the phenomenon of State Capture is and how it 
manifests within a government institution. For the purposes of this case study, State Capture is a 
term that is used to encapsulate the distinct contemporary phenomenon that has occurred under the 
Zuma administration in South Africa. However, it is acknowledged within the case study that 
certain neopatrimonial (or rather specifically clientelistic) practices were definitely occurring before 
Zuma. I proposed that the Zuma administration represented a transition point where the country 
moved from a regulated to predatory form of neopatrimonial domination. I thus also recommend 
that further research be undertaken to establish whether and to what extent this transition has 
actually occurred. 
 
The other main limitation of the study was with regard to the scope of the academic enquiry that 
could be undertaken within the given time and financial constraints, as well as the actual complexity 
of the subject matter. The objective of the research was not to develop an explicitly new academic 
theory, but rather to explore whether and how existing theory may be applicable to a specific case 
study. For neopatrimonialism and the 4IR, I propose that both concepts should be developed further 
in terms of establishing theoretical and analytical frameworks, which would need to address the 
interdisciplinary dynamics of each of the respective concepts.  
 
9.6 Closing Remarks 
 
In May 2017, a collective of academics released the Betrayal of the Promise report. The report 
provided a conceptual framework for understanding the phenomenon of State Capture, outlining the 
mechanics by which state institutions are repurposed and how the shadow state is formed. The 
subsequent release of the Gupta Leaks e-mails and revelations contained therein have reaffirmed the 
findings that were laid out in the Betrayal of the Promise report. The role of the Guptas has been 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 189 | P a g e  
exposed and more details of the extensive depth and breadth to which the parasitic network extends 
are emerging every day. The shock of these revelations to the nation is significant; a judicial inquiry 
into the Guptas’ business dealings with the state and several parliamentary committee inquiries into 
“state capture” have been launched, which are signals that the fight to reclaim the constitutional 
state has gained momentum. This momentum has led to the resignation of Jacob Zuma and the 
instatement of Cyril Ramaphosa, who was elected president of the ANC in December 2017 at a 
highly contested national conference and he is now the president of South Africa. All of these 
developments, together with the long-awaited action finally being taken by the NPA (in instituting 
charges against several of the Gupta cohorts), have most South Africans feeling a new sense of 
hope and relief. However, with much of the country’s focus now on repairing the damage left in the 
wake of the Zuma-Gupta network shenanigans, it would be easy to resort to a “corruption”-based 
narrative of State Capture and to neglect to interrogate the other less conspicuous networks of Zuma 
elites and the more nuanced dynamics of the political project.  
 
Criminal investigations and various forms of inquiries, which seek to unearth the corrupt activities, 
should be applauded and will undoubtedly go a long way to bring those who are guilty of 
plundering state resources for individual gain to book. Still, the corruption of the country’s polity 
cannot be redressed through court actions or convictions of individuals alone. The political project, 
which is State Capture, extends beyond just looting of the state – it is also about the corruption of 
our collective values and the mutating of our political ideals. They are ideals that cannot be read 
directly from the printed letters in the pages of the Constitution, but are discovered by reading 
between the lines and reside in the spirit and principles on which this document is founded. These 
very ideals and principles were (and to some extent still are) under threat. 
 
This case study of the State Capture of SASSA serves to emphasise the call to expand our 
understanding of State Capture from merely the typical activities of bribery and corruption to being 
a broader political project. The significance of this case study is that it showed that State Capture 
goes beyond the Zuma-Gupta network and is not contained in or limited to only a closed circle of 
connected individuals, but is part of a much larger network of political players. Up until now, 
significant focus has been on commercial SOEs (a preferred locale for the Guptas), but this case 
study demonstrated how State Capture has infiltrated other spheres of government and infected its 
fundamental social service functions as well. 
 
Lastly, and arguably most importantly, this case study showed that State Capture is not just a form 
of “grand corruption” resulting in a financial loss to the state and taxpayer, but is a political project 
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that has a direct negative impact on the poorest and most vulnerable in our society; the 
consequences of which will undoubtedly be felt for years to come. This case study does not present 
a smoking gun, in terms of corruption or state looting, although there are several questions that are 
raised in this regard. It is possible that grand-scale looting was actually prevented due to the 
interventions by AllPay, the Judiciary, civil society, and the media. This case study served to 
highlight that State Capture extends beyond the narrow objective of extracting monetary wealth. In 
this case it showed that repurposing of state institutions serves a political objective, and that State 
Capture can actually result in the repurposing of a fundamental function of government itself. Here 
the constitutional obligation of the state – the administration of social grants – was handed to a 
private company, knowing that this function would be repurposed to enable said company to profit 
from the poor.    
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Timeline of the SASSA-Gate 
Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
Pre 2005 Grants were managed at 
provincial level (non-
standardised and 
fragmented) 
Legal case in 2005, which 
found that the Limpopo Tender 
Board had irregularly awarded 
a grants payment contract to 
CPS for services over the 
period 2003 to 2006.  
  The case was also the subject of 
an investigation by the 
Scorpions in 2004, in which 
high-profile ANC officials were 
implicated (such as former 
premier Ngoako Ramatlhodi) 
and involved allegations of 
tender manipulation and 
channelling of funds into the 
provincial ANC.  
2005 - 2006 SASSA is established. 
Fezile Makiwane was 
appointed as SASSA 
CEO. At the time Dr Zola 
Skweyiya was Minister 
of Social Development 
 SASSA takeover the provincial 
service provider contracts for 
grant payment. Contracts existed 
with CPS, Empilweni, and 
AllPay at the time 
In 2006 Annual Report, Net 1 
highlight that they were already 
providing lending in South 
Africa. The business strategy 
clearly indicates that the 
company’s objectives include 
selling financial services to 
beneficiaries.  
 
2007 May   SASSA and South African Post 
Office entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding 
to work together on grant 
payment. Grant Tender #1 Nine 
bids were received in response to 
the RFP for grant payment 
service providers.  
  
2008 Sept.   Grant Tender #1 BAC 
recommends to the CEO that no 
award be made 
In late 2006 Net 1 purchased 
Prism Holdings Ltd, which 
focused on “secure transaction 
technology, solutions and 
services” and which later 
became the owner of EasyPay 
Ltd (Net1, 2008). 
Adv. Norman Arendse (BAC 
Chair) alleges an attempted 
bribe in favour of CPS  
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
2009 Mar.   SASSA initiate talks with SAPO 
in regard to taking over grants 
payments. SASSA extend 
contracts with respective service 
providers on a temporary basis 
  
May Zuma appoints Edna 
Molewa  as Minister of 
DSD and Bathabile 
Dlamini deputy minister 
    
July Fezile Makiwane 
(SASSA CEO) is placed 
on special leave 
following a probe by the 
Special Investigations 
Unit (SIU) into alleged 
misuse of funds 
 SASSA CEO Makiwane 
concluded the Letter Agreement 
with SAPO - back dated to 
January of that year 
 Dangor attends a meeting 
(Dlamini arranged) with Hulley 
and Duduzani Zuma, where it is 
proposed 2008 tender be 
reopened and contract awarded 
to CPS. This is rejected by 
Dangor and Molewa. 
Nov.  CSP wins HC case against 
SASSA and SAPO, setting 
aside the decision to enter into 
the agreement and interdicted 
SASSA from contracting with 
SAPO 
   
2010 Apr. Makiwane is dismissed. 
Coceko Pakade, the then 
CFO of DSD, appointed 
as acting CEO SASSA. 
    
Nov. Bathabile Dlamini is 
appointed Minister of 
DSD 
    
2011 Mar.  SCA upheld the appeal by 
SASSA (regarding SAPO 
agreement) and overturned 
previous ruling of HC in favour 
of CPS 
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
Apr. Ms V.L. Petersen was 
appointed CEO of 
SASSA 
 Grant Tender #2 SASSA 
published RFP for social grants 
payment service provider 
  
June   Grant Tender #2 Bids are 
received for SASSA Grant 
Tender.  
CPS enters MoA with Born 
Free Investments and Others 
for SASSA Grant Payment 
Contract. 
Bidders Notice 2 is issued, by 
Ms Peterson. Hulley, Monyeki 
and Moyane were all involved in 
the Bid Adjudication process.  
2012 Jan.   Grant Tender #2 SASSA awarded 
a contract to CPS 
Net1 enter new (separate) BEE 
deal with Business Venture 
Investments 1567 (Pty) Ltd 
(BVI) 
BEE deal with BVI appears to 
be separate from MoA. In both 
cases there appear to be 
individuals who are linked to a 
friend of Dlamini and Hulley, 
namely Lunga Ncwana (former 
ANCYL member linked to Brett 
Kebble and allegations of 
improper political party funding) 
Feb.   SASSA concluded the contract 
with Cash Paymaster to provide 
services for payment of social 
grants 
  
Apr.   CPS commenced its services for 
grant payments 
  
Aug.  AllPay HC case against 
SASSA and CPS declares 
tender process unlawful, but do 
not set aside agreement 
   
Oct. Vusi Madonsela no 
longer DG of DSD, 
acting position filled by 
Coceko Pakade (Jan 
2013) and then Wiseman 
Magasela (April 2013) 
   Wiseman was one of the 
members of the 2011/12 BEC 
that downgraded AllPay 
technical scoping. He would 
also later become a Special 
Adviser to the Minister and 
acting CEO during the SASSA-
Gate crisis 
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
2013 Earl
y 
2013 
In May Coceko Pakade 
officially appointed DG 
of DSD 
AllPay appeal to SCA for 
remedial action to be instituted 
against SASSA and CPS is 
dismissed  
 Feb 2013 - FSB prohibited 
Smartlife from carrying on any 
new insurance business. 
 
Aug.     Dlamini appoints the Ministerial 
Advisory Committee (MAC). 
Nov.  AllPay 1 Judgment handed 
done by Con Court - The 
appeal succeeds and the order 
of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal is set aside. 
   
2014 Apr.  AllPay 2 Con Court - outline 
remedial actions. CPS to 
remain service provider while 
SASSA finds new service 
provider. Also stated that 1) 
CPS is performing an “organ of 
state ” function due to social 
grants 
2) SASSA to protect personal 
and confidential data of social 
grant beneficiaries  
SASSA BAC approved the R316 
million payment for the ‘re-
registration’ of grant beneficiaries. 
Net1 had concluded the 
conditions of BEE deal with 
BVI.  
The BEE deal was concluded 
just days before the R316mill 
payment was made. The 
closeness of the cost of the BEE 
deal and the payment is also 
worth noting 
Aug.    Net1 repurchased shares to 
repay the BEE loan agreement 
(in June) and BVI would sell 
back the remainder of its shares 
for cash amount R97.4 million 
and a 12.5% ownership in CPS 
Appears that the CPS MoA for 
the SASSA contract was never 
implemented, however no clarity 
has been given on this matter. 
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
Dec.   Grant Tender #3: SASSA  
initiates the re-issuing of the 
bidding process for grant 
payment services in line with Con 
Court ruling 
National Credit Regulator 
(NCR) asked the National 
Consumer Tribunal (NCT) in 
Sept 2014 to cancel the 
registration of Moneyline, on 
the basis that it included child 
and foster child grants in 
affordability assessments of 
customers, in contravention of 
the National Credit Act. 
Ministerial Advisory Committee 
recommended that SASSA 
should build its own payment 
system; and that work-streams 
should be established 
2015 Mar. Thokozani Magwaza 
appointed as Acting DG 
for DSD 
AllPay 3: 24 March, Court 
rules on RFP requirements for 
Grant Tender 3.   
   
May    Net 1 UEPS Technologies 
(CPS) announced its 
withdrawal from Grant Tender 
#3. In June Net 1 starts 
operations of the EPE bank 
accounts 
 
July    FSB withdraws its prohibition 
on Smart Life to conduct new 
business  
Dlamini sends letter to SASSA 
CEO to instruct her to appoint 
work streams, which were 
members of the MAC, namely: 
Tim Sukazi, Mpolokeng Tankiso 
Parkies and Patrick Monyeki. 
Also included Andile Nyhonyha 
(founder and director of 
Regiments Capital) and Sizwe 
Shezi (trustee of two of Zuma’s 
trusts). Both were supposed to 
be included leaders of work 
streams, but this did not happen.  
Aug. Bathabile Dlamini 
became president of the 
ANCWL  
   MAC draft report indicating that 
it should be disbanded "to speed 
up processes"  
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
Oct.   Grant Tender #3: was adjudicated 
however the tender was not 
awarded due to "non-responsive 
Bids" 
 The fixed fee for the service 
providers was set at a rate, 
which was lower than what 
SASSA was paying at the time. 
No explanation for this has been 
given, but some suggest that the 
bid was 'engineered to fail'  
Nov.  SASSA filed progress report to 
the Con Court -  set out the 
steps in terms of which SASSA 
proposed to assume the duty to 
take over the payment function  
 Dec - Net1 announced that 600 
000 EasyPay Everywhere 
(EPE) accounts have been 
opened since the launch of this 
product in June 2015. 
 
2016 
Apr. 
  SASSA acknowledges it is 
unlikely it will be able to take 
over the payment of grants in 
April 2017 
On 11 March 2016, the 
Tribunal ruled that the 
complaint was valid and that 
there were “good reasons” to 
investigate Moneyline. 
Moneyline are appealing the 
ruling 
It is still unclear as to what 
work, if any was undertaken for 
SASSA taking over the payment 
of grants come April 2017. 
May 
 Net1, Grindrod and others 
approached the High Court to 
provide clarity on the changed 
regulations, pertaining to the 
issue of the 'illegal' deductions. 
In May 2017, the High Court 
ruled in favour of Net1 
DSD issued amendment on 
regulations (Regulations 21 and 
26A to the Social Assistance Act, 
No. 13 of 2004) to further limit 
the type and amount of 
deductions which could be made 
from grants, to only allow a 
maximum of 10% of the grant 
from being deducted and only for 
the purposes of funeral cover 
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
June 
May Ms Virginia 
Petersen leaves. 
Statement issued 
announcing Magwaza as 
CEO; however, Ms 
Raphaahle Ramokgopa 
was appointed Acting 
CEO. Magwaza was 
acting DG at the time.  
 Legal Opinion 1 - Adv. Cassim 
SC and Mostert was forwarded to 
Ms Mvulane and the acting CEO 
of SASSA Ms Ramokgopa 
CPS/Grindrod transferring 
money from the SASSA bank 
account. 1.1 million SASSA 
beneficiaries with EPE bank 
accounts by 
June 2016. 
 
July 
    Work-Streams are appointed, 
include the following: Sukazi, 
Parkies and Monyeki. 
July 
to 
Dec. 
Nov - Mr Thokozani 
Magwaza is appointed 
CEO and Zane Dangor is 
appointed DSD DG 
 MTT request a progress on the 
transition for payment of grants. 
Appears SASSA Management do 
not know/have plans for 
transition. Legal Opinion 3 - 
SASSA obtained a further 
opinion from senior counsel 
(Adv. Muzi Sikhakhane SC). 
SASSA issued a public request 
for information (RFI) aimed at 
assisting it to formulate a public 
request for proposal (RFP).  
 Work-streams had issued the 
first draft report - confirming 
that SASSA would not be able 
to over grants. Present Work-
Stream model for Grant 
Payments and Legal Opinion 2 - 
Adv. Wim Trengove SC.       
First indication of difference in 
opinion on proposed SASSA 
payment model. Work-streams 
want new contract with CPS, 
SASSA Exec do not want to 
continue with CPS 
Mid 
to 
late 
Dec. 
    Several meetings take place with 
Hulley and senior DSD & 
SASSA officials, where Hulley 
allegedly shows strong support 
for CPS. 
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Timeline 
Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
2017 
Jan. 
  The TTT (technical task team for 
NT, DSD, SARB and others) was 
formalised - tasked to develop the 
most viable options to enable 
SASSA to pay Social Grants. 
TTT then (24th Jan) presented 6 
options for addressing grants 
crisis. Agreement reached to 
extend CPS services short term 
(12 months) on provision that 
long-term solution is Open 
Architecture model and the Con-
Court approval. 
 Dlamini sent document to 
Gordhan (NT), the day before 
the TTT presented its options, 
critical of the idea of using the 
banks (Open Architecture 
model) and preference for 
Work-Stream Model. In 
response NT rejects this option, 
opting instead for an option 
presented by TTT (Open 
Architecture model). The 
differing views are aired in 
public.  
Mid 
Feb. 
  Meeting took place with DSD, 
SASSA and Work streams. All 
agreed to limit extension to 12 
months and that the future long-
term payment model would use 
the NPS. Magwaza writes a letter 
to SAPO requesting assistance. 
 Dlamini had instructed report 
not to be file with the Con-
Court. Dlamini and Mvulane 
meet with Michael Hulley and 
the "new approach" is adopted 
(SASSA would not seek Con-
Court consent, but would only 
inform the court once new 
contract was in place).  
End 
Feb. 
Mr Magwaza goes on 
sick leave and Ms Thamo 
Mzobe appointed  acting  
CEO 
An affidavit that Magwaza had 
signed was filed with the 
Constitutional Court. This was 
not based on a Work-Streams 
report. Black Sash approach 
Con Court (separate to the 
AllPay case) for urgent relief to 
attain clarity on how grants 
would be paid come April 
2017. (Start of the Black Sash 
case).  
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Administration and 
Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
Earl
y to 
mid 
–
Mar. 
Zane Dangor resigned 
DG of Social 
Development. Ms Thamo 
Mzobe also goes on sick 
leave and Mr Wiseman 
Magasela appointed 
acting CEO SASSA. 
Magwaza returned to 
work from sick leave a 
few days later. 
1) After Dlamini retracted 
Magwaza filing and with new 
Black Sash Case underway, 
Con-court directed questions 
for DSD and SASSA to 
respond. 2) DSD & SASSA 
submit affidavit to Con-Court 
signed by Wiseman Magasela 
in acting CEO capacity.  3) 
Con Court hears arguments in 
the case and handed down 
ruling on the 17th March. 2012 
invalid contract is extended 
Acting SASSA CEO Mzobe 
leads negotiations with CPS. 
They agreed in principles, but 
were still subject to approval by 
the Minister and the NT. NT was 
not present at the meeting.   
[Inter] Ministerial Task Team 
("IMTT") decided to scrap the 
negotiations with CPS.  
  
End 
Mar. 
Zuma reshuffles Cabinet. 
Dlamini remains Minister 
of DSD in spite of 
scathing Con Court 
judgment 
   Zuma reveals to SACP that he 
intends to fire Pravin Gordhan 
and Mcebisi Jonas, based on the 
suspect "intelligence report". 
Zuma calls back Pravin from US 
investor tour 
Apr. 
Special adviser Sipho 
Shezi was been fired 
Magwaza and Dangor file 
affidavit with the Con Court in 
response to 'misleading' 
statement made by Dlamini in 
defence as to why she should 
not be held personally liable. 
  Revelations, in the SMS sent 
from Dlamini to then former 
DSD DG Zane Dangor, accusing 
the pair of conspiring with 
Magwaza (SASSA CEO) and a 
former lover of attempting to 
extort money from Lunga 
Ncwana 
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Politics 
The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
May 
to 
mid-
July 
 SASSA withdraw from the 
Corruption Watch court case to 
review the R316m irregular 
payment to CPS for  ‘re-
registration’ of beneficiaries 
Letter from Treasury allowing for 
deviation of process for SASSA 
and SAPO to enter agreement and 
Magwaza signs letter with SAPO 
for co-operative agreement for 
payment of grants  
(From Net 1 Annual Report) At 
July 31, 2017, EPE had more 
than 2.0 million active 
accounts, compared to 1.95 
million at April 28, 2017…. 
Since July 1, 2016 we sold 
approximately 250,000 new 
policies related to our simple, 
low-cost life insurance 
products, in addition to the free 
basic life insurance policy 
provided with every EPE 
account opened. 
Magwaza cancels the Work 
Stream Contracts (R43 million 
already paid for the 3 year 
contracts which were to amount 
to a total budget of R47) 
Mid 
July 
to 
Oct. 
Mr Thokozani Magwaza 
is resigns as CEO and 
Pearl Bhengu  becomes 
acting CEO 
 RFP issued to SAPO for 
response. RFP reviewed by 
CSIR, but BAC recommendation 
do not seem to take it into 
account. SASSA make offer to 
SAPO for it to undertake only 
one of the functions for payment 
of grants. SAPO responds 
indicating that they reject the 
offer. 
 Panel of experts, appointed by 
the Con-Court to monitor 
SASSA's Progress. Filed a 
report which raised a red flag on 
SASSA's progress towards 
taking over grants after the CPS 
contract extension (April 2018). 
Nov.   SCOPA and the Social 
Development Portfolio 
Committee called the DSD, 
SASSA, and SAPO to provide 
parliament with an update. The 
committees then called on the 
IMC to intervene.  
Moneyline will oppose an 
application by the National 
Credit Regulator (NCR) to 
cancel its registration for 
alleged reckless lending to 
social grant beneficiaries. 
a letter from the DG of NT to 
the CEO of SASSA were 
distributed to the MPs. it was 
stated that “SASSA should not 
have approved the 
disqualification of SAPO on 
three areas” 
Dec.   An agreement between SASSA 
and SAPO was signed 
 Pearl Bhengu signs off on 
suspect payments (all just under 
R500k – non-competitive) for 4 
events, with a total expense of 
R20m. Timing coincides with 
ANC national conference  
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The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
2018 Jan.  The Section 38 Enquiry (into 
Dlamini possibly being held 
liable for the litigation 
regarding SASSA-Gate) started 
on 22 January 2018.  
  It was reported that CPS was 
claiming +- R1 billion in 
damages from SASSA - 
speculation it relates to disputes 
prior to the 2012 contract. 
Feb. 14 Feb. Zuma resigns and 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
becomes president of SA.   
    
Mar.  27 March Ramaphosa 
decided to relocate 
Bathabile Dlamini from 
DSD to the Ministry of 
Women, under the 
Presidency. Susan 
Shabangu appointed 
Minister of the DSD. 
23 March 2018 Con Court 
allows further extension of the 
CPS contract for six months, to 
allow for the transition of the 
payment of grants to the South 
African Post Office (SAPO). 
Court again criticised Dlamini 
and Bhengu for the delay.              
Corruption Watch wins High 
Court case against CPS for the 
R316m irregular payment for 
‘re-registration’ of beneficiaries. 
Ordered to pay amount + 
interest. 
SASSA takes over direct payment 
to beneficiaries individual bank 
accounts. SAPO starts transfer of 
recipients to the new system. CPS 
still required carrying out the 
pay-point distribution of grants 
(approximate 2.8 million 
recipients). Electronic payments 
are made directly to Grindrod 
SASSA accounts, but no 
agreement or plan in place to 
transfer these recipients to the 
SAPO system.  
By March there where +- 2.4 
million grant recipients who 
were transferred onto EPE 
account. Confirmed by Panel of 
experts, majority of these did 
not submit written notification 
for payment into separate bank 
account (as required by 
Regulation 21). CPS could only 
provide electronic 'mandates'.  
Grindrod charges recipients R10 
account fees (+ additional 
transaction fees) for use of these 
accounts (mostly to cover R9.50 
Net 1 service fee).  
Apr. Abraham Mahlangu 
appointed as acting CEO. 
Pearl Bhengu "requested 
to be sent back to her 
provincial post in 
KwaZulu-Natal" 
Judge Bernard Ngoepe files 
report on the Section 38 
Enquiry into Dlamini possibly 
being held liable for the 
litigation regarding SASSA-
Gate.  
   
May   A tender process initiated by 
Dlamini, to find replacement for 
CPS (still providing cash 
payments) was cancelled. 
Shabangu sets up a technical 
committee to address cash 
payments. Cash payments now 
add to the SAPO contract.  
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The Litigation Payment of Grants CPS and BEE partners 
Controversies and the Parallel 
/ Shadow State 
June      Panel of Experts file report with 
the constitutional court. Allege 
that CPS was sabotaging 
SASSA/SAPO efforts (by 
denying access) for transfer onto 
the new system. Also raised 
issues of misinformation and 
ambush marketing being used to 
get grant recipients to open EPE 
accounts. 
July  SASSA begun a process of 
instituting legal proceedings 
against Grindrod Bank to 
recover excessive bank charges 
carried by social grant 
beneficiaries. 
At the begin July there were 
several issues with the new 
SAPO systems, resulting in 
nearly 800 000 recipients not 
being able to access their grants. 
In addition there in ongoing strike 
action at SASSA and SAPO. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 224 | P a g e  
Appendix B: Example Illustration of Shadow State Network  
 
The figure presents a mapping of the persons identified as potentially being part of the shadow state, with labels assigned to those who are specifically part of the 
power elite. Please note, the graph does not imply or insinuate corruption or illegality on the part of any of those individuals included. 
External Advisors 
DSD and SASSA 
Jacob Zuma 
Bathabile Dlamini 
(Power Elite) 
Michael Hulley 
(Fixer) 
Net 1 and its other subsidiaries 
CPS 
Grindrod 
Bank 
Born Free Investments  
/ Mazwi Yako 
Other BEE Partners 
(Rents Distribution) 
Lunga Ncwana 
(Broker/Middleman) 
Business Venture Investments 
/ Kgomotso Mosehla 
Patrick Monyeki 
Tom Moyane 
Virginia Petersen 
Wiseman Magasela 
Vuyelwa Nhlapo 
2012 Tender 
Formal State / Agreements 
Informal / Shadow State 
Tim Sukazi 
Mpolokeng Parkies 
Raphaahle Ramokgopa 
Zodwa Mvulane 
2017 SASSA-
Gate Crisis 
Pearl Bangui 
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Appendix C: Overview of Changes to the Grant Payment System 
Timeline Pre-2009 2009 - SAPO agreement 2011 CPS Contract 2012-2017 2016/2017 New SAPO payment model 
Payment Model 
Provinces held 
contract were 
transferred to 
SASSA. There was 
no standard model. 
Contracts with cash 
payment service 
providers were extended. 
There was a shift from 
payment per beneficiary 
to payment per recipient. 
SASSA had agreements 
with SAPO and other 
banks, with the objective 
to move grants payment 
from cash to electronic. 
  
CPS responsible for re-
registration and payment 
(including into other bank 
accounts) of all grant 
beneficiaries. CPS won the 
tender because of its 
biometric technology - in 
particular because it was 
going to use voice 
verification for recipients 
which were not using their 
biometric devises for 
receiving grants. This was 
only implemented for a 
limited time in 2014, but 
was not suitable.   
  
Referred to as a Hybrid 
Model, this will in effect 
return to the basic principles 
of the SAPO agreement. 
SAPO will however manage 
the integrate payment system, 
which will keep track of all 
recipients that utilise the 
SASSA/SAPO card. 
Indication is that SASSA 
would also enter into 
agreements with other banks 
(assume to subsidise banking 
fees for recipients that have 
grants transferred directly).  
 # of Grant 
Beneficiaries  
13 072 173  14 935 832  17 000 000  
 Estimated total # of 
Grant Recipients  
8 063 017  9 200 000  10 500 000  
Cost Implications 
Cost to SASSA 
Varied. average 
handling charge of 
contractors amounts 
to R32.11 per 
transaction 
Varied. SAPO proposed 
“a once-off fee of R13.68 
for every beneficiary 
account opened and 
thereafter a monthly fee 
of R14.59 per 
beneficiary”. There was 
also still subsidisation of 
other banks 
  SASSA paid a fixed 
monthly fee of R16.44 
(including VAT) per 
recipient  
  Costs vary based on service 
per beneficiary (i.e. 
bank/electronic service is 
R6.71 vs. cash payment 
R55.60).  
Cost to 
Beneficiaries 
No fees for cash. 
Some cases banking 
fees subsidised. 
No fees for cash. Under 
the Mzansi (SAPO) 
accounts SASSA 
subsidised admin fee, 
allowed for some free 
withdraws as well as 
transactions (in line with 
the Mzansi account) 
  Private bank account 
charges are for the 
beneficiary. Under CPS 
fees are charged where 
beneficiaries do no use 
Net1/CPS biometric 
devices (e.g. at PIN 
ATMs). However there 
were (higher than normal) 
fees charged for 
  Private bank account fees 
might in future be subsidised 
(at present remain cost to 
beneficiary). SAPO/SASSA 
account has no admin fee, 
include 3 free transactions, 
mini statement, and account 
enquiries (similar to previous 
offering). At present 
Grindrod is charging 
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Timeline Pre-2009 2009 - SAPO agreement 2011 CPS Contract 2012-2017 2016/2017 New SAPO payment model 
transaction from non 
Net1/CPS devises and 
ATMs. 
beneficiaries R10 admin fee 
for using the old SASSA/CPS 
card and account.  
Payment Methods (%)  
Cash Payments 5 644 112  70% 
Separate contracts for 
cash payments in the 
different provinces. CPS 
had higher percentage of 
cash payment compared 
to AllPay and Empilweni 
3 864 000  42% 
In 2012 Finmark Trust 
study it is indicated that 
approximately 30-37% 
receives grants via cash 
payments. Cash payments 
require CPS card 
4 000 000  38% 
Plan to reduce the number of 
cash pay points by using 
existing SAPO sites. Initially 
cash payment was put out on 
tender, but is now included in 
SAPO contract. CPS contract 
extended only for this 
function. Cash payments will 
require SAPO card. Expect to 
reduce cash pay points to 
cater for less than 1 mill 
beneficiaries. 
E
le
ct
ro
n
ic
 P
a
y
m
en
ts
 
ATM (Bio) 
2 418 905  30% 
±500 k beneficiaries 
opened Postbank 
accounts, +-1 mill held 
Sekulula (ABSA/AllPay) 
accounts. It is assumed 
CPS and Empilweni also 
provided electronic 
payment and that other 
bank accounts could also 
be used by beneficiaries.  
5 336 000  58% 
Under the previous model 
it was more competitive, 
but less standardised. 
Figures given by SASSA 
do not appear to separate 
between SASSA/CPS 
Grindrod accounts and the 
EPE/Grindrod accounts.  
2 900 000  
2% SASSA pays directly into 
recipient bank accounts 
(including Grindrod where 
they still use the old 
SASSA/CPS/Grindrod card). 
SAPO-SASSA card is meant 
to replace the Grindrod cards, 
but no agreement in place for 
this. In the interim 
EPE/Net1/Grindrod have 
been on a misinformation 
campaign to get beneficiaries 
to open EPE accounts.   
ATM (PIN) 17% 
PoS (Bio) 1% 
PoS (PIN) 8% 
Bank 
Account - 
EPE 
2 000 000  19% 
Bank 
Account - 
Other 
1 600 000  15% 
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